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FREE LUNCH OR CHEAP FIX?: THE EMISSIONS 
TRADING IDEA AND THE CLIMATE CHANGE 
CONVENTION 
David M. Driesen* 
Emissions trading has become a key component of U.S. environmental 
legal regimes. The U.S. has successfully lobbied to make the trading of 
international environmental benefits-an expanded form of emissions 
trading-a part of international efforts to address the threat of global 
climate change through the Framework Convention on Climate Change 
and the Kyoto Protocol to that Convention. Legal scholars have lauded 
emissions trading as a "free lunch" that will encourage innovation, en-
hance democratic accountability, and reduce the cost of environmental 
cleanup. This article argues that emissions trading functions as a cheap 
fix, reducing short-term costs while tending to lessen innovation and 
thwart democratic accountability. Because of this, emissions trading will 
ultimately weaken efforts to address complex environmental problems, 
unless policymakers carefully limit trading programs to make sure that 
they do not undermine innovation and democratic accountability. The 
author recommends specific limits to international emissions trading 
designed to avoid undermining the long-term efficacy of the climate 
change regime. 
* Assistant Professor, Syracuse University College of Law; J.D. Yale Law School, 1989. I wish 
to thank Professors William Buzbee and Charles Hall for their advice and suggestions. I assume 
responsibility for any errors and omissions. 
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[PJarsimony is not economy. It is separable in theory from it; and in 
fact it mayor it may not be a part of economy, according to circum-
stances. Expense, and great expense, may be an essential part in true 
economy. Ifparsimony were to be considered as one of the kinds of that 
virtue, there is, however, another and a higher economy. Economy is a 
distributive virtue, and consists, not in saving, but in selection. Parsi-
mony requires no providence, no sagacity, no powers of combination, 
no comparison, no judgment. Mere instinct, and that not an instinct of 
the noblest kind, may produce this false economy in perfection. The 
other economy has larger views. It demands a discriminating judg-
ment, and a firm, sagacious mind. 
-Edmund Burkel 
INTRODUCTION 
When the roof leaks, a homeowner must decide whether to patch 
the roof or replace it. The homeowner recognizes that this decision 
involves a choice between a cheap fix and a solution with more short-
term costs and more long-term benefit. 
The decision to patch the roof may address today's leak more 
cheaply than replacing the roof. But the wise homeowner does not 
regard this "least-cost" solution as something she should accept as 
readily as, say, a "free lunch" to which there is no discernible down-
side. The homeowner at least considers whether a more expensive 
solution, replacing the roof, may work better in the long run. 
Nations often face a similar choice between cheap fixes and more 
enduring solutions to societal problems when they create new law. 
However, policy makers and scholars may either fail to perceive the 
existence of this choice or fail to think about it carefully. Any solution 
that promises to meet a short-term policy goal with fairly low imme-
diate costs may seem like a "free lunch." 
This article focuses on a very serious problem facing the interna-
tional community, global climate change, and a very important idea in 
environmental policy, achieving environmental goals more cheaply 
through emissions trading.2 Emissions trading programs allow pollut-
1 A Letter to a Noble Lord (1795), in SELECTED WRITINGS AND SPEECHES-EDMUND BURKE, 
at 564-65 (Peter J. Stanlis ed.) (1968). 
2 See Daniel Bodansky, The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change: A 
Commentary, 18 YALE J. INT'L L. 451, 453 (1993) (predicted rise in temperature "could have 
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ers to forego otherwise required pollution reductions at regulated 
pollution sources if they produce or purchase equivalent reductions 
made elsewhere.3 Since a polluter will only choose to purchase a 
reduction elsewhere when doing so saves money, emissions trading 
tends to reduce private sector compliance costs. Recognizing this, 
some very prominent scholars have analogized emissions trading to a 
"free lunch" and this analogy has influenced many policy makers.4 
The United States has made international emissions trading a cen-
terpiece of its climate change policy.5 Trading issues commanded the 
attention of delegates to the recent Kyoto conference on climate 
severe effects on coastal areas, agriculture, forests, and human health"); Dr. Ranee Khooshie 
Lal Panjabi, Can International Law Improve the Climate? An Analysis of the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change Signed at the Rio Summit in 1992,18 N.C.J. INT'L 
L. & COM. REG. 491, 493-500 (1993); Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), THE 
REGIONAL IMPACTS OF CLIMATE CHANGE: AN ASSESSMENT OF VULNERABILITIES (Robert T. 
Watson et a!. eds., 1997) [hereinafter IPCC REGIONAL IMPACTS]; IPCC, CLIMATE CHANGE 
1995: THE SCIENCE OF CLIMATE CHANGE 6 (J.T. Houghton et a!. eds., 1996) [hereinafter IPCC 
1995 SCIENCE]; David M. Driesen, Is Emissions Trading an Economic Incentive Program?: 
Replacing the Command and Control/Economic Incentive Dichotomy, 55 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 
289, 291-92 (1998) (describing the importance of emissions trading in environmental policy); 
Royal C. Gardner, Banking on Entrepreneurs: Wetlands Mitigation Banking, and Takings, 81 
IOWA L. REV. 527 (1996) (arguing that trading offers a way of avoiding takings claims while 
continuing to regulate wetlands); Robert W. Hahn & Robert N. Stavins, Incentive-Based En-
vironmental Regulation: A New Era from an Old Idea?, 18 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1 (1991) (discussing 
factors explaining increased use of emissions trading); Robert W. Hahn & Gordon L. Hester, 
Where Did All the Markets Go? An Analysis of EPA's Emissions Trading Program, 6 YALE J. 
ON REG. 109 (1989); Daniel J. Dudek & John Palmisano, Emissions Trading: Why is this 
Thoroughbred Hobbled, 13 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 217 (1988). 
3 See Driesen, supra note 2, at 290. 
4 See Bruce A. Ackerman & Richard B. Stewart, Reforming Environmental Law: The Demo-
cratic Case for Market Incentives, 13 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 171, 172 (1988); THE ENVIRON-
MENTAL PROTECTION SYSTEM IN TRANSITION: ToWARD A MORE DESIRABLE FUTURE 39-40 
(1998) [hereinafter ENVIRONMENTAL TRANSITION] (reflecting a policy consensus of various 
government officials, industry representatives, and academics that emissions trading programs 
''hold great promise as cost-effective methods for achieving environmental goals and encourag-
ing technological innovation"). Nevertheless, most responsible analysts and policy-makers real-
ize that emissions trading poses complex design issues and is not a good tool for aU problems. 
See, e.g., Driesen, supra note 2, at 309, 329 & n.186; WILLIAMJ. BAUMOL & WALLACE E. OATES, 
THE THEORY OF ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 190 (2d ed. 1988) (claiming that the ideal policy 
requires a mix of trading and other approaches); J.H. DALES, POLLUTION, PROPERTY AND 
PRICES 98 (1968) (pointing out that emissions trading is impracticable for "diffuse" pollution); 
ENVIRONMENTAL TRANSITION, at 39-40. 
5 See James H. Searles, Analysis of the Kyoto Protocol to the u.N. Framework Convention 
on Climate Change, 21 Int'!. Env't. Rep. (BNA) 131, 133 (Feb. 4, 1998) (U.S. has demanded 
emissions trading in exchange for legally binding emissions reductions); Tanya L. Forsheit, 
International Emissions Trading: Equity Issues in the Search for Market-Based Solutions to 
Global Environmental Degradation, 18 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 689, 704 (1997). 
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change, and they promise to play an important role in the future 
evolution of international law addressing climate change.6 
This article argues that the cheap fix metaphor describes emissions 
trading better than the free lunch metaphor that some scholars have 
applied to it. The "free lunch" metaphor captures emissions trading's 
theoretical capacity to meet a short-term goal at less cost than tradi-
tional regulation. But emissions trading, and environmental benefit 
trading generally, may increase the risk of long-term environmental 
damage. For example, trading may facilitate avoidance of initially ex-
pensive or difficult investments in innovative technology. Avoidance 
of innovation may raise long-term costs and make future progress 
more difficult. The cheap fix metaphor captures significant problems 
with emissions trading that have received relatively little attention. 
Decisions about whether to adopt legal cheap fixes involve ana-
logues to the economic and budgetary considerations a homeowner 
faces in deciding whether to replace or repair a leaky roof. Writing 
law, however, involves more than just financial calculations. Law helps 
shape norms7 and political expectations that help a community to 
function effectively over the long-term.8 The need to shape norms 
capable of uniting a community to address difficult problems often 
makes short-term fixes less desirable for a society than for a stable 
homeowner. For cheap fixes may disregard important norms and 
values. Yet government officials may have even more reasons to 
choose cheap fixes than the heads of stable households. This suggests 
6 Searles, supra note 5, at 132-33; Kyoto Protocol Opensfor Signature As Officials Face Talks 
on New Issues, 21 Int'l Env't. Rep. (BNA) 246 (March 18, 1998) (joint implementation and 
emissions trading at core of agenda for Buenos Aires conference in November). 
7 See FRIEDRICH V. KRATOCHWIL, RULES, NORMS, AND DECISIONS: ON THE CONDITIONS OF 
PRACTICAL AND LEGAL REASONING IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND DOMESTIC AFFAIRS 
(1989); Audie Klotz, Norms Reconstituting Interests: Global Racial Equality and U.S. Sanc-
tions Against South Africa, 49 INT'L ORG. 451 (1995); Richard H. McAdams, The Origin, 
Development, and Regulation of Norms, 96 MICH. L. REV. 338 (1997); Lawrence Lessig, Social 
Meaning and Social Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2181 (1996); Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expres-
sive Function of Law, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2021, 2022 (1996); Carol M. Rose, Rethinking 
Environmental Controls: Management Strategies for Common Resources, 1991 DUKE L.T. 1, 
36 (''We need to pay attention to the lessons we provide for ourselves through our laws."); cf 
ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: How NEIGHBORS SE'ITLE DISPUTES (1991). 
8 See, e.g., Klotz, supra note 7, at 451 (describing how a norm of racial equality helped 
transform politically defined interests in South Africa). See generally LYNNE M. JURGIELEWICZ, 
GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW: PROSPECTS FOR PROGRESS IN 
THE LEGAL ORDER 100-16 (1996) (discussing the role of norms and expectations in establishing 
international regimes); Robert D. Cooter, Decentralized Law for a Complex Economy: The 
Structural Approach to Adjudicating the New Law Merchant, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1643, 1647 
(1996) (norms arise to coordinate the interaction of people in a community). 
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that scholars should make understanding cheap fix problems a central 
focus of their work, especially when they write about treaty regimes 
and legislation. 
Part I of this article explains key features of the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (Framework Convention 
or Convention),9 the Kyoto Protocol to that Convention/a and emis-
sions trading. The Framework Convention contains two potentially 
conflicting principles relevant to emissions trading, the principle that 
developed countries should provide leadership in addressing climate 
change (the leadership principle), and the cost effectiveness princi-
ple.ll Part I explains the "free lunch" theory of emissions trading and 
trading's role in the Climate Change Convention (i.e., the Framework 
Convention with the Kyoto Protocol to that Convention). 
Part II of this article examines emissions trading's likely impact on 
the long-term development of the Climate Change Convention. The 
Framework Convention's leadership principle may require developed 
countries to create and apply advanced technology reducing green-
house gas emissions. Unfortunately, a broad trading program may 
help avoid that investment. Part II discusses how innovation avoid-
ance may affect long-term efforts to address climate change. This part 
also discusses how emissions trading may interfere with the demo-
cratic accountability needed to make any international environmental 
legal regime effective over the long-term.12 It argues that a "cheap 
fix" theory of emissions trading calls much needed attention to poten-
tiallong-term problems with emissions trading that the "free lunch" 
theory neglects. 
9 Report of the Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee for a Framework Convention on 
Climate Change on the Work of the Second Part of its Fifth Session, U.N. Conference on 
Environment and Development: Framework Convention on Climate Change, 5th Sess. pt. 2, 
Annex I, U.N. Doc. AlAC.237/18 (1992) (Part II)/Add. 1, reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 849 [hereinafter 
Framework Convention]. 
10 Report of the Conference of the Parties on its Third Session, Kyoto Protocol to the U.N. 
Framework Convention on Climate Change, 3rd Sess., pt. 2, Annex I, U.N. Doc. 
FCCC/CP/1997I71add.1, reprinted without certain technical corrections in 37 I.L.M. 22 (1998) 
[hereinafter Kyoto Protocol]. 
11 Generally speaking, this article uses the term "developed countries" to refer to those 
countries listed in Annex I to the Framework Convention on Climate Change. See Framework 
Convention, supra note 9, Annex I, 31 I.L.M. at 872. These countries include the European 
countries, Japan, Canada, Australia, the United States, and the former Soviet Union. 
12 See, e.g., David A. Wirth, Legitimacy, Accountability, and Partnership: A Modelfor Advo-
cacy on Third World Environmental Issues, 100 YALE L.T. 2645, 2653-55 (1991) (discussing 
accountability problems at the World Bank). 
6 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS [Vol. 26:1 
Part III discusses the general problem of how scholars should think 
about the desirability of cheap fixes. It recommends that legal schol-
ars identify the competing values at stake in the choice of whether 
to use a cheap fix to address environmental and social problems. This 
analysis should include consideration of the role law plays in defining 
norms for the society and helping a community remain cohesive 
enough to address important problems in the future. Finally, this part 
recommends limiting this experiment in international trading to cap-
ture some of trading's cheap fix benefits without damaging the long-
term international effort to effectively address climate change and 
other international environmental problems. 
I. THE CLIMATE CHANGE CONVENTION AND THE EMISSIONS 
TRADING IDEA 
This part will discuss the Framework Convention on Climate 
Change, the recent Kyoto Protocol to the Framework Convention, 
and emissions trading. This discussion will provide a basic under-
standing of the "free lunch" theory of trading and the law governing 
trading under the Climate Change Convention. 
A. The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
This discussion of the Framework Convention begins with an ex-
planation of the principal problems its drafters sought to address. 
This part then describes the Framework Convention itself, emphasiz-
ing the major principles relevant to evaluating emissions trading. 
1. Equitable and Practical Problems 
Greenhouse gases, such as water vapor, carbon dioxide, nitrous 
oxides, and methane, tend to warm the earth's atmosphere.13 Since 
the dawn of the industrial age, anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse 
gases have caused a significant rise in global mean surface tempera-
tures and scientists expect these gases to cause greater increases in 
13 See IPCC 1995 SCIENCE, supra note 2, at 59-60. The World Meteorological Association and 
the United Nations Environmental Program have established the Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change (IPCC). G.D.P. DBASI & Hs. E. DOWDESWELL, Foreword to IPCC 1995 SCI-
ENCE, supra note 2, at vii. Thousands of scientists in more than 150 countries participate in 
IPCC assessments. The 1995 report, for example, reflects the work of more than 500 scientists 
as either authors, contributors, or reviewers. ROBERT BOLIN ET AL., Preface in IPCC 1995 
SCIENCE, supra note 2, at xi. This article relies principally on the consensus views of this large 
number of scientists as reflected in the IPCC reports. 
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the future. 14 Burning fossil fuels creates greenhouse gas emissions, so 
serious efforts to combat climate change may involve less reliance 
upon fossil fuels. 15 Some terrestrial ecosystems (such as forests) and 
the oceans tend to sequester carbon emissions, acting as "carbon 
sinkS."16 Carbon sinks effectively reduce atmospheric concentrations 
of carbon, because they absorb more carbon from the atmosphere 
than they release.17 Hence, efforts to conserve and enhance forests 
help ameliorate climate change.18 Conversely, burning forests exacer-
bates climate change by releasing carbon dioxide into the atmos-
phere.19 
Climate change in turn may increase the frequency of floods, 
droughts, and other natural disasters, spread infectious diseases, and 
disrupt ecosystems.20 Warming may melt ice sheets and raise sea 
levels, causing inundation of low lying coastal areas.21 
14 IPCC 1995 SCIENCE, supra note 2, at 3-7. 
16 Winfried Lang, Is the Ozone Depletion Regime a Model/or an Emerging Regime on Global 
Warming?, 9 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL'y 161, 161 (1991) (progress on global warming depends 
upon meeting the rising needs of developing countries without reliance upon fossil fuel combus-
tion). See IPCC, CLIMATE CHANGE 1995: IMPACTS, ADAPTATIONS AND MITIGATION OF CLI-
MATE CHANGE: SCIENTIFIC-TEcHNICAL ANALYSES 14-16 (Robert T. Watson et al. eds., 1996) 
[hereinafter IPCC IMPACTS] (discussing reducing greenhouse gas emissions from fossil fuel and 
switching to non-fossil energy sources); IPCC, CLIMATE CHANGE 1995: ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL 
DIMENSIONS OF CLIMATE CHANGE 11 (James P. Bruce et al. eds., 1996) [hereinafter IPCC 
DIMENSIONS] (discussing energy efficiency improvements, fuel switching). In 1990, fossil fuel 
consumption accounted for 70% to 90% of all anthropogenic sources of carbon dioxide. IPCC 
IMPACTS, at 84. Fossil fuel combustion is "the primary source of the greenhouse effect." Jennifer 
Woodward, Turning Down the Heat: What United States Laws Can Do to Help Ease Global 
Warming, 39 AM. U. L. REV. 203, 208 (1989). 
16 See IPCC 1995 SCIENCE, supra note 2, at 61, 449; John H. Cushman, Scientists are Turning 
to Trees to Repair the Greenhouse, N.Y. TIMES, March 3,1998 at F4. 
17 Joy E. Hect & Brett Orlando, Can the Kyoto Protocol Support Biodiversity Conservation? 
Legal and Financial Challenges, 28 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10508, 10509 (1998). 
18 See IPCC DIMENSIONS, supra note 15, at 11 (discussing "forestry options"); IPCC IMPACTS, 
supra note 15, at 776-97 (evaluating forest management strategies for mitigating climate 
change); Richard A. Houghton & George M. Woodwell, Forests as Carbon Sinks, in CRITERIA 
FOR JOINT IMPLEMENTATION UNDER THE FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE 
35-40 (Kilaparti Ramakrishna ed. 1994) [hereinafter CRITERIA] (discussing the implications of 
continued deforestation, halting deforestation, net reforestation and substituting wood fuels for 
fossil fuels). 
19 See IPCC 1995 SCIENCE, supra note 2, at 449; Woodward, supra note 15 at 208-10. 
20 IPCC REGIONAL IMPACTS, supra note 2, at 2-S; see Robert L. Fischman, Global Warming 
and Property Interests: Preserving Coastal Wetlands as Sea Levels Rise, 19 HOFSTRA L. REV. 
565,565 (1991) (discussing climate change's potential threats to coastal wetlands). 
21 See IPCC REGIONAL IMPACTS, supra note 2, at 5,7,9-15; IPCC 1995 SCIENCE, supra note, 
2 at 6; LYNNE T. EDGERTON, THE RISING TIDE: GLOBAL WARMING AND WORLD SEA LEVELS 
(1991). This poses an especially severe problem for small island states. See William C. Burns, 
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In 1992, representatives of more than 140 countries gathered in Rio 
de Janeiro to address the climate change problem. The delegates to 
this "Earth Summit," the United Nations Conference on Environ-
ment and Development, faced a formidable challenge, because so 
many important activities contribute to climate change.22 Electricity 
generation, industrial production, transportation, timber harvesting, 
and land use decisions all play significant roles.23 
The delegates also faced a serious equitable problem that frequent-
ly arises in international environmental law. Developing countries 
usually have very limited resources to address environmental prob-
lems that require global efforts.24 Furthermore, developed countries 
often have made disproportionate contributions to global pollution 
problems. Creators of international environmental treaties must craft 
obligations that adequately address the environmental problem at 
hand, yet avoid imposing an unfair burden upon developing coun-
tries.25 
Developed countries, especially the United States, played a leading 
role in creating the climate change problem, primarily by burning 
large amounts of fossil fuels.26 Industrialized countries contain just 
20% of the world's population, yet they generate approximately 65% 
of present global emissions. These developed countries were respon-
sible for producing 73% of cumulative emissions between 1950 and 
1995.27 The United States has the highest per capita carbon dioxide 
Global Warming-The United Nations Framewark Convention on Climate Change and the 
Future of Small Island States, 6 DICK. J. ENVTL. L. & POL'y 147 (1997). 
22 Martin J. LaLonde, The Role of Risk Analysis in the 1992 Framewark Convention on 
Climate Change, 15 MICH. J. INT'L L. 215, 217 (1993). See Kyoto Protocol, supra note 10, Annex 
A, 37 I.L.M. at 42 (listing sources of emissions). 
23 See IPCC IMPACTS, supra note 15, at 21, 39-51; W. NEIL ADGER & KATRINA BROWN, LAND 
USE AND THE CAUSES OF GLOBAL WARMING (1994). See, e.g., European Commission Outlines 
Strategy to Cut C02 Emissions From Transportation, 28 Env't Rep. (BNA) 2679 (April 17, 
1998). 
24 This article uses the term developing countries to refer to those countries not listed in 
Annex I of the Framework Convention. See Framework Convention, supra note 9, Annex I, 31 
I.L.M. at 872. 
25 See Edith Brown Weiss, International Environmental Law: Contemporary Issues and the 
Emergence of a New Warld Order, 81 GEO. L.I. 675, 705 (1993) (citing issues of responsibility 
for harm to global resources as the most controversial equitable issues in the international 
community). 
26 See IPCC DIMENSIONS, supra note 15, at 94 (describing historic carbon dioxide and methane 
contributions by region and discussing fossil fuel burning as source of emissions). 
27 DUNCAN AUSTIN, CLIMATE PROTECTION POLICY: CAN WE AFFORD TO DELAY 17 (1997). 
The figures for cumulative emissions matter, because past emissions remain in the atmosphere 
and contribute to present and future warming trends. See IPCC DIMENSIONS, supra note 15, 
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emission rate in the world28 and alone accounts for about one quarter 
of the world's fossil carbon emissions.29 
But the developed countries probably cannot solve this problem 
alone.30 A number of underdeveloped countries are growing rapidly 
and increasing their own greenhouse gas emissions at prodigious 
rates.3t If large developing countries (such as China, India and Brazil), 
emulate America's inefficient technology32 as they grow economically, 
their greenhouse gas emissions will probably surpass developed coun-
try greenhouse gas emissions within a few decades.33 
2. A Framework of Principles and Goals 
The delegates to the 1992 Earth Summit failed to agree upon am-
bitious and specific legally binding obligations to reduce greenhouse 
emissions and limit rainforest destruction. Instead, they adopted a 
"framework convention," which established objectives, principles, and 
a set of unambitious, and sometimes vague, obligations.34 The adoption 
of an initial framework convention has become a common means of 
beginning international legal efforts to solve environmental prob-
lems.35 For example, efforts to address depletion of the stratospheric 
ozone layer and transboundary air pollution in Europe began with 
at 93 (noting contribution of P88t emissions to current atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse 
g88es). Hence, developed countries' P88t contributions remain relevant to the equities in dis-
tributing reduction obligations going forward. 
These differentials in emissions reflect differentials in consumption. "About 25% of the world's 
populations consume almost 80% of the global energy." IPCC IMPACTS, supra note 15, at 82-83. 
Since 1860, less than 20% of the cumulative global popUlation h88 consumed 85% of all energy 
used. Id. at 83. 
28 IPCC DIMENSIONS, supra note 15, at 95. 
29Id. at 95. 
30Id. at 97. 
31 See IPCC IMPACTS, supra note 15, at 657-68. 
82 The United States emits more carbon per unit of gross national product (GNP) than any 
country in the world except China if GNP is me88ured in purch88ing power parity exchange 
rates. See IPCC DIMENSIONS, supra note 15, at 96. U.S. carbon emissions per unit of GNP 
remain among the highest in the world if me88ured in U.S. dollars at market exchange rates. 
Id. 
33 Even if one 88sumes fairly modest growth in developing country carbon dioxide emissions, 
developed countries' fossil fuels carbon dioxide emissions will equal those of the DECD countries 
by 2020. IPCC DIMENSIONS, supra note 15, at 97. 
34 See Framework Convention, supra note 9. 
35 See Weiss, supra note 24 at 687-88; Developments in the Law-International Environmental 
Law, 104 HARv. L. REV. 1484, 1542-46 (1991) [hereinafter Developments] (evaluating the 
framework-protocol approach and predicting that it may not adequately address global warm-
ing). 
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framework conventions.36 In these two cases, and in some other cases 
as well, agreement to substantive measures came later, often in the 
form of protocols to the framework convention.37 In other cases, sub-
sequent obligations never became more concrete and international 
legal efforts failed to accomplish much.38 
The Framework Convention that emerged from the Earth Summit 
established an objective for the international community, namely "sta-
bilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a 
level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with 
the climate system."39 The Framework Convention contains a set of 
obligations and principles designed to help the world work toward 
meeting this objective.40 The discussion that follows focuses on the 
obligations and principles most relevant to the emissions trading idea 
and the "cheap fix" versus "free lunch" theme.41 
36 See United Nations: Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer, Mar. 22,1985, 
26 I.L.M. 1516 (framework convention was established to address ozone depletion); Convention 
on Long Range Transboundary Air Pollution, Nov. 13, 1979, 18 I.L.M. 1442; Lang, supra note 
15, at 164--67 (discussing evolution of ozone regime and long-range transboundary air pollution 
regime). 
37 See JURGIELEWICZ, supra note 8, at 186 (the Vienna Convention established a "general 
obligation" to protect the ozone layer and the subsequent Montreal Protocol created "more 
substantive obligations"). See, e.g., Protocol to the 1979 Convention on Long-Range Transboun-
dary Air Pollution on the Reduction of Sulfur Emissions or Their Transboundary Fluxes by at 
Least 30 Percent in United Nations: Protocols to the 1979 Convention on Long-Range 
Transboundary Air Pollution, July 8, 1985, 27 I.L.M. 698, 707; Protocol to the 1979 Convention 
on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution Concerning the Emissions of Nitrogen Oxides or 
Their Transboundary Fluxes, Oct. 31, 1988, 28 I.L.M. 212, 216; Protocol to the 1979 Convention 
on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution Concerning the Control of Emissions of Volatile 
Organic Compounds or their Transboundary Fluxes, Nov. 18, 1991, 31 I.L.M. 573; Montreal 
Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, Sept. 16, 1987, 26 I.L.M. 1541, 1550 
(entered into force Jan. 1, 1989) [hereinafter Montreal Protocol]; Montreal Protocol Parties: 
Adjustments and Amendments to the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone 
Layer, June 29, 1990, 30 I.L.M. 537 [hereinafter London Amendments]. 
sa See David S. Ardia, Does the Emperor Have No Clothes? Enforcement of International 
Laws Protecting the Marine Environment, 19 MICH. J. INT'L L. 497, 526 (1998) ("Few interna-
tional agreements contain substantive commitments .... "); cf Catherine Tinker, Responsibility 
for Biological Diversity Conservation Under International Law, 28 VAND. J. 'l'RANSNAT'L L. 
777, 813 (1995) ("it is too early to tell how effectively the treaty will be implemented .... "); 
Amanda Hubbard, Comment, The Convention on Biological Diversity's Fifth Anniversary: A 
General Overview of the Convention-Where has it Been and Where is it Going?, 10 TuL. 
ENvT'L L.J. 415, 444 (1997) (substantively, the convention has accomplished little). See, e.g., 
Convention on Biological Diversity, June 5, 1992, 31 I.L.M. 818; Lee A. Kimball, The Biodiversity 
Convention: How to Make It Work, 28 VAND. J. 'l'RANSNAT'L L. 763, 765 (1995). 
39 Framework Convention, supra note 9, art. 2, 31 I.L.M. at 854. 
40 See Lang, supra note 15, at 172 (pointing out in 1991 that potential state parties already 
understand that a global warming regime would probably consist of a framework convention 
supplemented by more specific protocols). 
41 For a comprehensive treatment of the Framework Convention see Bodansky, supra note 
2. See also Dr. Ranee Khooshie Lal Panjabi, supra note 2. 
I 
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a. The Developed Country Leadership Principle 
The 154 states that signed the Framework Convention agreed upon 
a principle of "common but differentiated responsibilities," which ap-
pears in article 3, section 1.42 This principle requires all countries to 
assume some responsibility for addressing climate change while al-
lowing the vigor of each nation's response to vary. This principle 
addresses the problem of reconciling equity with the need for global 
efforts addressing a problem to which all countries contribute.43 
The principle of "common but differentiated responsibilities" also 
reflects the experience of the rather successful effort to address simi-
lar equitable problems while preventing stratospheric ozone deple-
tion.44 Several chemicals tend to deplete the stratospheric ozone layer, 
which shields human beings from harmful levels of ultraviolet radia-
tion. At the time the international community agreed to phase out 
several chemicals under the Montreal Protocol on Ozone Depleting 
Chemicals, the industrialized world used large amounts of these sub-
stances as refrigerants and industrial solvents.46 Developing countries 
were not prepared to give up the future benefit of refrigeration or 
domestic industries that use solvents, benefits long enjoyed by devel-
oped countries.46 So the developed countries agreed to lead the effort 
to solve the environmental problem they caused by phasing out sev-
eral ozone-depleting substances during the Montreal Protocol's first 
decade.47 They also agreed to a program of developing and transfer-
ring new technology to make it possible for less developed countries 
42 Framework Convention, su'Jlf'a note 9, art. 3(1), 31 I.L.M. at 854. 
43 Article 3 section 1 of the Framework Convention clearly links equity to the common but 
differentiated responsibilities principle. "The Parties should protect the climate system for the 
benefit of present and future generations of humankind, on the basis of equity and in accordance 
with their common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities." [d. art. 3(1), 
31 I.L.M. at 854; see also IPCC DIMENSIONS, sU'JIf'a note 15, at 90. 
44 IPCC DIMENSIONS, supra note 15, at 89 ("the Montreal Protocol approach was extensively 
discussed as a 'model' for the Framework Convention on Climate Change"); see Elizabeth P. 
Barratt-Brown, Building a Monitoring and Compliance Regime Under the Montreal Protocol, 
16 YALE J. INTL L. 519, 519--31 (1991) (discussing the evolution of the legal regime protecting 
the ozone layer); RICHARD ELLIOT BENEDICK, OZONE DIPLOMACY: NEW DIRECTIONS IN 
SAFEGUARDING THE PLANET (1991) (describing the diplomatic history of the regime). 
46 OECD, CLIMATE CHANGE: MOBILIZING GLOBAL EFFORT 95 (1997); see Montreal Protocol, 
supra note 37, art. 2, par. 1-4,26 I.L.M. at 1552. 
46 See generally Barratt-Brown, supra note 44, at 534 (discussing developing country dissat-
isfaction with the agreement before concerns about availability of substitute chemicals were 
allayed). 
47 See Montreal Protocol, sU'JIf'a note 37, art. 2, par. 1-4, 26 I.L.M. at 1552; London Amend-
ments, supra note 37, arts. 2A, 2B, 2C, 2D, 2E, 30 I.L.M. at 539-41, 543-45. 
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to enjoy refrigeration and increased manufacturing capability without 
relying on ozone-depleting chemicals.48 The Montreal Protocol author-
ized some initial increases in developing countries' use of ozone de-
pIeters, but required developing countries to reduce consumption of 
these chemicals a decade after the developed countries phased them 
out.49 Developing countries agreed to a late phaseout because they 
believed that developed countries would develop adequate substi-
tutes as they eliminated their own consumption of ozone depleters.50 
Accordingly, developing countries could help solve the environmental 
problem without foregoing benefits formerly associated with use of 
ozone depleters. The developed countries did, in fact, develop ade-
quate substitutes for many ozone-depleting chemicals, many of which 
actually cost less than the chemicals they replaced. 51 
The Framework Convention's principle of "common but differenti-
ated responsibility" to address climate change includes a principle of 
developed country leadership. Article 3, section 1 states that the 
differentiated responsibilities must match the "respective capabili-
ties" of the various countries.52 It then states, "[a]ccordingly, the 
developed country Parties should take the lead in combating climate 
change .... "53 
The delegates to the Earth Summit envisioned leadership similar 
to that developed countries showed in addressing ozone depletion. 54 
The structure of the specific obligations developed countries assumed 
under the Framework Convention helps flesh out the contours of this 
leadership principle. 
The leadership principle includes an expectation that developed 
countries will make earlier and/or deeper cuts in greenhouse gas 
emissions than less developed countries, as under the Montreal Pro-
tocol.55 The Framework Convention obligates developed countries to 
48 See Montreal Protocol, supra note 37, art. 5, par. 2-3, 26 I.L.M. at 1556. The parties 
subsequently agreed to create a multilateral fund to promote this technology transfer. See 
London Amendments, supra note 37, arts. 10, lOA, 30 I.L.M. at 550-51. 
49 See Montreal Protocol, supra note 37, art. 5, par. 1, 26 I.L.M. at 1555; London Amendments, 
supra note 37, art. 5, 30 I.L.M. at 547-48. 
50 OECD, supra note 45, at 93 (target dates for phaseout are later than similar obligations for 
developed countries to allow ''time for effective technology transfer and cooperation"). 
51 [d. at 97 (replacements for ozone depleting substances "have frequently proved cheaper and 
more effective than" the substances they replaced). 
52 Framework Convention, supra note 9, 31 I.L.M. at 854. 
53 [d. 
54 OECD, supra note 45, at 97 (stating that the approach to ozone depleting chemicals relied 
upon a principle of "common but differentiated" responsibilities). 
55 See NICK MABEY ET AL., ARGUMENT IN THE GREENHOUSE: THE INTERNATIONAL Eco-
NOMICS OF CONTROLLING GLOBAL WARMING 11 (1997) (the "general tone of the agreement is 
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adopt measures and policies with an "aim of returning" greenhouse 
gas emissions to 1990 levels by the year 2000.56 
This stabilization target does not apply to developing countries. 
Rather, the Framework Convention obligates developing countries to 
"address," rather than stabilize, greenhouse gas emissions.57 Hence, 
the leadership principle calls on developed countries to exercise lead-
ership by example, i.e., by stabilizing emissions before requiring de-
veloping countries to do so. 
The Framework Convention explicitly links differentiation of emis-
sions control obligations to the leadership principle. It requires that 
developed countries' "policies and measures . . . demonstrate that 
developed countries are taking the lead in modifying longer-term 
trends in anthropogenic emissions."58 The reference to "longer-term 
trends" may obligate developed countries to meet the near term 
stabilization goal through methods that might make subsequent re-
ductions easier. Modifying long-term trends requires reductions not 
just in the next few years, but also far into the future. Innovation can 
lower long-term costs and make subsequent achievements easier. 59 
The obligations respecting rainforests also reflect some differentia-
tion of responsibilities. The Framework Convention obligates devel-
oped countries to protect and enhance carbon sinks.60 Developing 
countries, on the other hand, need only "address" removal by sinks 
and "promote and cooperate in the conservation and enhancement, as 
appropriate, of sinks .... "61 The Framework Convention differenti-
ates responsibilities by using more qualified language to describe the 
that the developed countries must demonstrate that they are serious about limiting emissions 
... "). 
56 Framework Convention, supra note 9, art. 4(2)(a), (b), 31 I.L.M. at 856-57. This stabilization 
target for emissions reflects a compromise between the United States, which did not want to 
reduce emissions, and most other developed countries, which seemed willing to make some cuts 
in greenhouse gas emissions. See Bodansky, supra note 2, at 468, 475, 490-91; PRUE TAYLOR, 
AN ECOLOGICAL ApPROACH TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 332 (1998) (the United States achieved 
a "watering down of obligations by continual threats to boycott" the Earth Summit); James A. 
Beard, An Application of the Principles of Sustainability to the Problem of Global Climate 
Change: An Argumentfor Integrated Energy Services, 11 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 191,203 (1996) 
(discussing successful U.s. efforts to defeat a proposal to reduce emissions by 20%). 
57 Framework Convention, supra note 9, art. 4(1)(b), 31 I.L.M. at 855. 
58Id. art. 4(2)(a), 31 I.L.M. at 856. 
59 See Richard B. Stewart, Regulation, Innovation, and Administrative Law: A Conceptual 
Framework, 69 CAL. L. REV. 1256, 1260, 1279, 1285, 1311 (1981); 1995 IPCC DIMENSIONS, supra 
note 15, at 37 (innovation provides perhaps the best opportunity for low cost reductions). 
60 Framework Convention, supra note 9, art. 4(2)(a), 31 I.L.M. at 856. 
61Id. art. 4(1)(b), (d), 31 I.L.M. at 855 (emphasis added). 
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developing country obligation than the language describing the devel-
oped country obligation.62 
The Framework Convention does not, however, impose a clear 
specific quantitative commitment or goal upon any country's rainfor-
est protection or enhancement efforts. The Framework Convention 
does not explicitly state, for example, that all countries must halt 
rainforest destruction or limit its loss by a fixed percentage or acreage 
amount.63 
The leadership principle also requires the most developed countries 
to provide technological and financial support to aid developing coun-
tries' efforts to address climate change.54 Specifically, the most devel-
oped countries must provide the "agreed full incremental cost" of 
developing country treaty compliance, including funds "for the trans-
fer of technology."65 This language closely resembles language in the 
London Amendments to the Montreal Protocol on Substances that 
Deplete the Ozone Layer66 that promised technological and economic 
assistance deemed essential to realizing protocol objectives equitably 
and effectively.67 
Since developing countries did commit to addressing greenhouse 
gas emissions and sink conservation and enhancement, the developed 
countries' commitment to financing these efforts has meaning even 
62 If the "as appropriate" language requires enhancement of sinks only when appropriate, with 
conservation being an option when it is more appropriate, then the language actually constitutes 
a nearly equivalent obligation. If on the other hand, the "as appropriate" language means that 
the country may forego conservation and enhancement when neither seems appropriate to it, 
then the language imposes a much lesser obligation. 
63 The lack of an explicit demand for developed country leadership in sink conservation based 
upon a quantitative commitment probably reflects two problems. First, reform of national 
policies to actually reverse rainforest destruction poses enormous political and economic chal-
lenges. Second, most of the rainforest lies in developing rather than developed countries. This 
means that an approach based on strict conservation in developed countries would have little 
direct impact on most of the world's rainforests. See IPCC DIMENSIONS, supra note 15, at 95 
(almost all carbon dioxide emissions from deforestation come from "a relatively small group of 
developing countries"). By contrast, developed country reductions in greenhouse gas emissions 
would have great impact on worldwide emissions, since developed countries account for most 
of the world's emissions. 
64 The term "most developed countries" refers to the countries listed in Annex II to the 
Framework Convention, which generally excludes the former Soviet Union and much of eastern 
Europe. See Framework Convention, supra note 9, Annex II, 31 I.L.M. at 873. 
65 [d. art. 4(3), 31 I.L.M. at 858. 
66 See London Amendments, supra note 37, art. 10, par. 1, 30 I.L.M. at 550. 
67 See id. art. 10, 30 I.L.M. at 550-51 (requiring funding of "all agreed incremental costs" of 
developing country compliance); id. art. lOA, 30 I.L.M. at 551 (requiring each party to take 
"every practicable step" to ensure appropriate technology transfer). . 
I 
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prior to adoption of quantitative commitments. Indeed, developing 
countries without quantitative commitments have implemented sev-
eral energy conservation and renewable energy projects.68 The 
Frame-work Convention creates a financing mechanism to support 
such efforts.69 
The Preamble to the Framework Convention also reflects the tech-
nological and financial components of the leadership principle. It rec-
ognizes that developing countries will actually need to increase en-
ergy consumption in order to grow, but qualifies this recognition by 
"taking into account the possibilities for achieving greater energy 
efficiency .... "70 The Preamble then recognizes that energy efficiency 
involves "application of new technologies on terms which make such 
application economically and socially beneficial."71 
The Framework Convention clearly envisions leadership from de-
veloped countries. More precisely, the Framework Convention re-
flects an expectation that developed countries will apply advanced 
technologies to improve energy efficiency and reduce emissions and 
then transfer the fruits of these efforts to less developed countries 
with appropriate financial support. This differentiation of responsibil-
ity should lead developing countries, in time, to accept more concrete 
commitments under the treaty. 
b. The Cost-Effectiveness Principle 
The Framework Convention also contains a cost-effectiveness prin-
ciple. This principle arises in the context of an articulation of the 
"precautionary principle," a general principle of international environ-
mental law. The precautionary principle counsels nations to address 
environmental problems as a precaution even in the face of scientific 
uncertainty.72 Article 3, section 3, states that ''lack of full scientific 
68 See also Wirth, supra note 12, at 2656 (discussing potential for energy efficiency improve-
ments in developing countries); IPCC IMPACTS, supra note 15, at 88 (explaining that "solar, 
wind, and hydro power can be either carbon-free or carbon neutral"). 
69 See Framework Convention, supra note 9, arts. 4(3), 11, 31 I.L.M. at 858, 864-65. For 
negotiating history and parsing of details see Bodansky, supra note 2, at 524-27. 
70 Framework Convention, supra note 9, preamble, 31 I.L.M. at 853. 
71 Jd.; see also Wirth, supra note 12, at 2657 (energy efficiency and conservation could help 
developing countries avoid at least $1.4 trillion in power supply expansion costs between 1990 
and 2008). 
72 See Weiss, supra note 25, at 690 (stating that there is no agreement on the content or 
existence of the principle); Daniel Bodansky, Scientific Uncertainty and the Precautionary 
Principle, 33 ENV'T 4 (1991); M.P.A. Kindall, UNCED and the Evolution of Principles of 
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certainty should not be used as a means of postponing" measures 
needed to respond to "threats of serious or irreversible damage." 
This precautionary principle has special salience in the climate 
change context, because of the particulars of the science. Greenhouse 
gases emitted today commit the world to climate change decades (if 
not centuries) hence, because they remain in the atmosphere for many 
decades after their emission.73 In addition, scientists fear that climate 
change may occur quickly and unpredictably.74 Hence, waiting for 
scientific certainty before taking action may involve suffering through 
decades or centuries of hurricanes, droughts, ecological destruction, 
and sea level rise. This is so even if a moment of actual certainty 
arrives exactly as these disasters begin, and this recognition triggers 
an immediate and vigorous response.75 Climate-induced environmen-
tal change cannot be reversed quickly, and may not be reversible at 
all, due to the long time scales involved.76 The paragraph that articu-
lates the precautionary principle states that countries' response 
measures "should be cost-effective so as to ensure global benefits at 
the lowest possible cost."77 
The cost effectiveness principle found in article 3, section 3 of the 
Framework Convention may conflict with the developed country lead-
ership principle. The leadership principle calls on developed coun-
tries to make the earliest and/or deepest emission cuts in order to 
develop the technologies needed for everyone to make progress. Cuts 
in greenhouse gas emissions may be more expensive in developed 
countries than in developing countries, because developing countries 
use such primitive technology that improving technology to reduce 
International Environmental Law, 25 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 19,23 (1991) (discussing elements 
of a precautionary approach). 
73 IPCC 1995 SCIENCE, supra note 2, at 3 (explaining that long lives of greenhouse gases 
means that ''they affect radiative forcing on long time scales"); IPCC IMPACTS, supra note 15, 
at 4 (stating that given a stable level of greenhouse gas emissions, stabilization of atmospheric 
concentrations of long-lived greenhouse gases will require decades to millennia, and that stabi-
lization of atmospheric concentrations will only produce "equilibration of the climate system" in 
decades to centuries). 
74 William K. Stevens, If Climate Changes, It May Change Quickly, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 27, 1998, 
at F1; IPCC IMPACTS, supra note 15, at 25; WILLIAM R. CLINE, THE ECONOMICS OF GLOBAL 
WARMING 34-35 (1992) (reviewing several potential catastrophe scenarios). 
76 Furthermore, "[u]nambiguous detection of climate-induced changes in most ecological and 
social systems will prove extremely difficult in the coming decades." IPCC IMPACTS, supra note 
15, at 5; cf NASA Scientists Propose Climate Index; Suggest Change Apparent in Alaska, Asia, 
21 Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA) 446 (Apr. 29,1998) (discussing index designed to distinguish long-term 
climate change from natural fluctuations). 
76 IPCC IMPACTS, supra note 15, at 23. 
77 Framework Convention, supra note 9, art. 3(3), 31 I.L.M. at 854. 
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emissions often costs very little.78 But the principle of developed 
country leadership would seem to require that the potentially more 
expensive cuts from developed countries come first. 
Article 3, section 3 addresses this potential conflict and suggests 
that the leadership principle may qualify the cost effectiveness prin-
ciple. It states that policies and measures should "take into account 
different socio-economic contexts."79 This statement suggests that 
more economically advanced countries should carry most of the bur-
den. 
Since article 3, section 3 calls for taking both cost effectiveness and 
differing socio-economic contexts into account, it fails to definitively 
resolve the tension between the cost effectiveness and leadership 
principles. In light of the wealth of support for the leadership principle 
in the convention's preamble,BO principles,81 commitments,82 and prece-
dent,&'! the cost effectiveness principle ought not defeat the leadership 
principle. On the other hand, cost effectiveness clearly has a role to 
play under the treaty. So far, cost effectiveness concerns have tended 
to dominate debates about implementation of the Climate Change 
Convention.84 
The commitments in the Framework Convention did not effectively 
address the climate change problem.85 Since the Framework Conven-
tion's signing, greenhouse gas emissions and rainforest destruction 
have increased in many countries. The failure to agree on clearly 
binding numerical limits to greenhouse gas emissions or rainforest 
destruction helps explain this failure. Although developed countries 
did agree upon an emissions stabilization target, the treaty language 
does not clearly state whether this target is a mere goal or a binding 
commitment.86 
78 See Bodansky, supra note 2, at 521 ("developing countries tend to use energy less efficiently 
than developed countries and can attain emissions reductions more cheaply."). 
79 See Framework Convention, supra note 9, art. 3(3), 31 I.L.M. at 854. 
80 See id., preamble, 31 I.L.M. at 851-53. 
81 See id. art. 3(1), (2), 31 I.L.M. at 854. 
82 See id. art. 4, 31 I.L.M. at 855-59. 
83 See, e.g., Montreal Protocol, supra note 37, art. 2, 26 I.L.M. at 1552-54; London Amend-
ments, supra note 37, 30 I.L.M. at 539-15. 
84 See Alex G. Hanafi, Note, Joint Implementation: Legal and Institutional Issues for an 
Effective International Program to Combat Climate Change, 22 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 441, 
461-62 (1998). 
85 See MATTHEW PATERSON, GLOBAL WARMING AND GLOBAL POLITICS 64 (1996) (commen-
tators generally agree that the Framework Convention is environmentally inadequate). 
86 See Framework Convention, supra note 9, art. 4(2), 31 I.L.M. at 856-57. 
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The Framework Convention, however, articulates principles that 
establish a foundation for subsequent agreements to move further.87 
In effect, the Earth Summit created international legal norms to 
guide subsequent efforts to write more specific rules to address cli-
mate change, even if it did not itself produce a set of rules that would 
actually improve the environment.88 
B. The Kyoto Protocol to The United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change 
The Framework Convention generally requires its "supreme 
body", the Conference of the Parties (COP),89 to meet periodically to 
review the adequacy of the convention and national implementation 
efforts.90 By the mid-1990s, it was obvious that developed countries, 
including the United States, would not meet the Framework Conven-
tion's target, stabilization of emissions at 1990 levels by the year 
2000.91 Moreover, the overwhelming majority of scientists agreed that 
the parties needed to make cuts substantially below 1990 levels, not 
just stabilize emissions at those levels, to even stabilize atmospheric 
concentrations of carbon dioxide at very high levels many years in the 
future.92 Furthermore, stabilizing greenhouse gas concentrations at 
these already high levels commits the earth to rising global tempera-
tures and sea level rise for hundreds of years after stabilization.93 
The COP agreed to meet in Kyoto in 1997 to enact protocols aimed 
at making the Convention more effective.94 Prior to this meeting, the 
87 See JURGIELEWICZ, supra note 8, at 217 (explaining that the Framework Convention may 
generate expectations that lead to firm legal rules in the future). 
88 See McAdams, supra note 7, at 383-84 (explaining that communities internalize abstract 
norms prior to more concrete norms translating the abstraction into concrete behavior). 
89 Framework Convention, supra note 9, art. 7(2), 31 LL.M. at 860-61. 
90Id. art. 7, 31 LL.M. at 860-62. In particular, it requires a review of the adequacy of the 
principle commitments in the treaty at its first session and again, no later than the end of 1998. 
See id. arts. 4(d), 7(4), 31 I.L.M. at 857, 862. 
91 See Report of the Conference of the Parties on its Second Session, Framework Convention 
on Climate Change, U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/1996115, at 5 (1996) [hereinafter COP2 Report] (first 
national communications of developed country parties revealed that they "expected to be unable 
to meet the emission reduction targets of the Convention" to stabilize greenhouse gas emissions 
at 1990 levels). 
92 IPCC 1995 SCIENCE, supra note 2, at 25; IPCC, CLIMATE CHANGE 1994: RADIATIVE 
FORCING OF CLIMATE CHANGE AND AN EVALUATION OF THE IPCC IS92 EMISSION SCENARIOS 
(J.T. Houghton et al. eds., 1995) [hereinafter IPCC, RADIATIVE FORCING]. 
93 IPCC 1995 SCIENCE, supra note 2, at 45. 
94 See Report of the Conference of the Parties on its First Session, The Berlin Mandate: 
Review of the Adequacy of Article 4, paragraph 2(a) and (b), of the Convention, including 
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European Union proposed a fifteen percent reduction in each devel-
oped country's greenhouse gas emissions.95 In the United States, this 
proposal alarmed industries that relied heavily on fossil fuel burning. 
These industries sought to persuade the President and the Congress 
to take positions that would assure a failure to adopt concrete com-
mitments to emission reductions at Kyoto. 
The United States Senate passed a resolution demanding that the 
United States accept no agreement quantitatively limiting green-
house gases unless developing countries also agreed to reduce in the 
same time period.96 Compliance with this resolution would rule out 
emulation of the specific approach used to reduce stratospheric ozone 
depletion-that is, deferring developing country emission reductions 
until after developed countries have already completed substantial 
cuts. Indeed, one could imagine only one possible international agree-
ment that might represent real compliance with the emission reduc-
tion component of the leadership principle, while remaining consistent 
with the Congressional resolution. In theory, the developed world 
could agree to deep cuts and secure commitments from less developed 
countries for modest reductions over the same time period. 
The Clinton Administration, however, took a position that appeared 
to preclude this outcome. Just prior to the Kyoto meeting, President 
Clinton announced that the United States would seek a postponement 
of the 2000 deadline for stabilization at 1990 levels, rather than accept 
cuts in emissions below 1990 levels.97 Given this position, adherence 
to the developed country leadership principle would almost surely 
conflict with the combined positions of the executive and legislative 
branches of the American government. Developing countries could 
not make any cuts below 1990 levels without making more reductions 
proposals related to the protocol and decisions on follow-up, Decision lICP.1, U.N. Doc. 
FCCC/CP/1995I71Add.1 (1995),34 I.L.M. 1671, 1676 (concluding that the commitments made in 
the Framework Convention are inadequate and calling for establishment of "quantified limita-
tion and reduction objectives"). 
95 Paola Bettelli et al. eds., Report of the Third Conference of the Parties to the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change: 1-11 December 1997, 12 EARTH NEG. BULL. 76, 
at 2 (available at <http://www.iisd.ca>) (visited May 15, 1998) [hereinafter COP3 Summary]. 
More precisely, the European Union proposed a fifteen percent reduction from 1990 levels of 
carbon dioxide, methane, and nitrous oxide by 2010. Patricia Thompson, The Third Conference 
of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change: The December 
1997 Kyoto Protocol, Y.B. COLO. J. INTL ENVTL. L. & POL'y 219, 221 (1997). 
96 143 CONGo REC. S8113-05 (daily ed. July 25, 1997). 
97 See Searles, supra note 5, at 134 (describing U.S. agreement to a seven percent cut as a 
"significant change from its earlier proposal to merely stabilize emissions at the 1990 level"). 
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than the developed countries would under the United States proposal, 
since the United States proposal called for no cuts from developed 
countries. 98 
After Vice President Gore instructed the U.S. negotiators to show 
more "flexibility," they helped break the impasse this initial position 
created by agreeing to slightly more vigorous action.99 The resulting 
Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change (Kyoto Protocol) does not contain rules limiting emis-
sions of particular gases. IOO Instead, the parties agreed to a more 
abstract limit, a limit on aggregate greenhouse gas emissions.101 This 
approach allows countries to forego carbon dioxide reductions in ex-
change for reducing other specifically listed greenhouse gases. The 
Kyoto Protocol requires each developed country to meet quantitative 
limits for "carbon dioxide equivalent emissions."102 The protocol uses 
an estimate of the "global warming potential" of listed greenhouse 
gases to measure the worth of reducing other gases in lieu of carbon 
dioxide.103 
The Kyoto Protocol contemplates at least a five percent reduction 
in developed country greenhouse gas emissions, on average, by the 
"commitment period 2008 to 2012."104 The Kyoto Protocol supplements 
this aim with more specific binding national quantitative reduction 
requirements. In a break with precedent, the Protocol actually as-
signs different percentage reduction requirements to different devel-
oped nations.105 For example, Japan, the United States, and the Euro-
98 See generally AUSTIN, supra note 27, at 17 (if the United States opts to delay emission 
reductions developing countries will almost certainly follow suit). 
99 See Joby Warrick, Gore Urges Resolution at Climate Talks; With Summit in Disarray, Vice 
President Prods U.S. Negotiators to Bridge Gaps, WASH. POST, Dec. 8, 1998, at AI; Searles, 
supra note 5, at 134 (describing U.S. compromise in agreeing to a seven percent reduction below 
1990 levels). 
100 See Kyoto Protocol, supra note 10, 37 LL.M. 22. See generally Searles, supra note 5; Clare 
Breidenich et aI., The Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change, 92 AM. J. INT'L L. 315 (1998). 
101 Kyoto Protocol, supra note 10, arts. 3(1), 5(3), 37 I.L.M. at 33, 35. 
102 Id. art. 3(1), 37 I.L.M. at 33. 
loa Id. art. 5(3), 37 I.L.M. at 35. The listed gases are carbon dioxide, methane, nitrous oxide, 
hydrofiuorocarbons, perfiuorocarbons, and sulfur hexafluoride. See id. Annex A, 37 I.L.M. at 42. 
Estimates of the relative global warming potential of greenhouses gases have substantial 
uncertainties. See IPCC 1995 SCIENCE, supra note 2, at 188; IPCC, RADIATIVE FORCING, supra 
note 92. The parties must use the estimates of relative global warming potential over a 100 year 
period provided in the relevant 1995 IPCC report as the basis for tradeoffs amongst gases. 
Methodological Issues Related to the Kyoto Protocol, in Report of the Conference of the Parties 
on its Third Session, FCCC/COP, 3rd Sess., U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/1997I71Add.l, at 31. 
104 Kyoto Protocol, supra note 10, art. 3(1), 37 LL.M. at 33. 
105 See id. Annex B, 37 I.L.M. at 42. 
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pean Union may have to reduce emissions by six, seven, and eight 
percent, respectively, but the Kyoto Protocol authorizes some devel-
oped countries with more modest emissions to actually increase their 
pollution within specified limits. 106 
This modest five percent average cut from developed countries left 
little room for differentiated developing country reductions, and the 
Kyoto Protocol contains no specific mandates for developing country 
emission reductions.107 Hence, the agreement may not meet the stric-
tures of the Senate resolution, and United States ratification of the 
agreement, which requires Senate approval, remains uncertain. lOS The 
Protocol will only enter into force if nations responsible for fifty-five 
percent of the developed country emissions ratify the Protocol. 
Hence, a failure by the United States and Russia to ratify the Protocol 
could prevent its entry into force.109 Because the Protocol only mod-
estly limits developed country emissions and does not limit developing 
country emissions, global carbon emissions may still rise by thirty-
two percent by the year 2010, even assuming full compliance. I1O 
C. Accountability under the Climate Change Convention 
The Climate Change Convention establishes international law.11l 
Traditionally, scholars have viewed international law as the set of 
legal norms governing relationships between states.112 But non-state 
actors, such as environmental groups, have a growing role in gener-
106 See id. 
107 These cuts are modest in the sense that they call for much less reduction than a number 
of climate change scientists called for. See Proposal Forwarded by 100 Countries Calls for 
Trading System, 'Green Bank,' 28 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1527, 1528 (Dec. 5, 1997) (quoting David 
Rind, a climate modeler with the National Aeronautics and Space Administration's Goddard 
Institute for Space Studies, as stating that "none of the targets floated ... go far enough."); 
David Malakoff, Thirty Kyotos Needed to Control Warming, 278 SCIENCE 2048 (1997) (reporting 
climate scientists' skepticism about the adequacy of Kyoto's cuts). Furthermore, a five percent 
reduction may be extremely inexpensive. See CLINE, supra note 74 (suggesting that a 20% cut 
in emissions may be available at no cost); Ross Gelbspan, A Good Climate For Investment, 281 
ATLANTIC MONTHLY, June 1, 1998 at 26 (stating that 30% reductions have "no negative eco-
nomic impacts"). 
108 See Searles, supra note 5, at 134; John J. Fialka, Global-Warming Debate Gets No 
Consensus in Industry, WALL ST. J., Apr. 16, 1998, at A24 (describing Congressional opposition 
to treaty implementation). 
109 See Key Issues Outlinedfor Upcoming Talks on International Emission Trading System, 
21 Int'l Env't Rep. 414, 415 (BNA) (Apr. 29, 1998). 
110 See Carbon Emissions Predicted to Increase Substantially by 2020, DOE Report Says, 21 
Int'l Env't Rep. 439 (BNA) (Apr. 29,1998). 
111 JURGIELEWICZ, supra note 8, at 219. 
112 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 101 (1986). 
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ating and ensuring compliance with international law. 113 Government 
officials seek to reach international environmental agreements be-
cause public demands and public scrutiny of implementation help the 
legal regime function.114 
International environmental law regimes govern more than just 
relationships between states. International environmental law seeks 
to induce state action to protect the environment.116 In most contexts, 
this means that international environmental law seeks state actions 
aimed at changing private conduct. No international military force 
exists to force nations to meet quantitative national limits in an inter-
national treaty.U6 Hence, a treaty must rely upon other methods to 
induce compliance.l17 
Countries generally honor specific international legal obligations.u8 
This article cannot offer a complete theory as to why nations usually 
comply or why they sometimes do not comply with international 
law.119 But democratic accountability may playa role. 120 
113 See generally JURGIELEWICZ, supro note 8, at 176-77; Barratt-Brown, supro note 44, at 
520-22. 
114 See JURGIELEWICZ, supra note 8, at 248 (stating that pressure may be needed to make 
international law "change or evolve" and that laws "heighten public expectations"). 
115 See id. at 151 ("Domestic implementation of international agreements is obviously impor-
tant for the successful implementation of a regime."). 
116 See Robert N. Stavins, Policy Insf:l"uments for Climate Change: How Can National 
Governments Address a Global Problem?, 1997 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 293,299 ("no world govern-
ment-{)r any other institution-appears capable of administering, monitoring and enforcing" 
international mechanisms to meet climate change goals). See generally Kratochwil, supra note 
7, at 256 (stating that international law is not primarily a "punitive order"). 
117 JURGIELEWICZ, supro note 8, at 113 (referring to the need for a "substitute for coercion" 
in making international legal regimes effective); Ardia, BUpro note 38, at 510 ("Because most 
... environmental agreements are only morally binding ... [their] success ... depends upon" 
voluntary national efforts to "enforce compliance amongst their citizens."). 
118 LOUIS HENKIN, How NATIONS BEHAVE 47 (2d. ed. 1979); cf Harold K. Jacobson, Concep-
tual, Methodological and Substantive Issues Entwined in Studying Compliance, 19 MICH. J. 
INT'L L. 569, 570-71 (1998) (we have a lack of systematic knowledge about the extent of 
compliance); Harold Jacobson & Edith Brown Weiss, Strengthening Compliance with Interna-
tional Environmental Accords: Preliminary Observations from a Collaborative Project, 1 
GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 119, 122 (1995) (compliance with international environmental agree-
ments is often "haphazard and ragged"). 
119 Professor Koh has sought to explain this in terms of transnational legal process. See 
generally Harold Hongju Koh, Why Do Nations Obey International Law?, 106 YALE L.J. 2599 
(1997) (review essay) [hereinafter Koh, Why Nations Obey?]; Harold Hongju Koh, 7ransna-
tional Legal Process, 75 NEB. L. REV. 181 (1996) [hereinafter Koh, 7ransnational]. 
120 See Lang, supra note 15, at 167 (explaining how green lobbies and public opinion helped 
create agreement to strong measures protecting the stratospheric ozone layer); Jacobsen & 
Weiss, supra note 118 (discussing various factors that influence compliance, including NGO 
participation, information, and political characteristics of implementing countries). 
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First, national leaders may desire esteem from their peers in other 
countries.121 To the extent their countries violate clear international 
legal obligations, they may lose face in front of their peers in other 
countries.122 Hence, they may feel accountable toward their peers and 
comply out of a sense of obligation toward them.123 
Second, national leaders may fear direct loss of prestige for them-
selves and their countries as a result of noncompliance. 124 If the 
world's people regard a nation as a violator of international law, this 
reduces the regard people around the world have for the country.125 
National leaders may feel some accountability toward world public 
opinion. 126 
Finally, leaders who violate international treaty commitments may 
offend voters in their own countries who identify with a treaty's 
goals. 127 As a result, failure to abide by treaties may harm officials in 
national elections.128 Loss of international prestige may harm leaders 
of non-compliant countries at home as well, by damaging their credi-
bility. 
For these potential consequences to motivate national leaders to 
comply, the leaders must perceive these consequences as a plausible 
result of violations. To achieve this, a mechanism must exist for de-
tecting and publicizing treaty violations. 129 In the climate change con-
text, this mechanism includes reporting and publication of national 
plans to meet targets and the data necessary to determine whether 
121 See JURGIELEWICZ, supra note 8, at 113 (states are accountable to other states). 
122 See Bodansky, supra note 2, at 533 (meetings of the COP provide a forum for discussions 
among states and bring peer pressure to comply). 
123 See generally Sunstein, supra note 7, at 2029-30 (an expectation of shame may deter people 
from violating norms). 
124 See Koh, Why Nations Obey?, supra note 119, at 2639 (discussing claim that fear of ''loss 
of reputation" provides the "ultimate impetus for compliance"). 
125 See Bodansky, supra note 2, at 533 (meetings of COP help focus "public pressure" on states 
to comply). 
126 See J URGIELEWICZ, supra note 8, at 113 (states are accountable to the international public). 
127 See id. (states are accountable to their own populations). 
128 See PATERSON, supra note 84, at 61-62 (describing how the United States modified its 
position on climate change after George Bush endured criticism from Democratic Presidential 
candidates for his initial position). 
129 See generally Jacob Werksman, Compliance Systems and the Climate Change Convention: 
Traffic Signs on the Road to Kyoto 2 (1997) (unpublished manuscript on file with the author) 
(citing the wide agreement on the need for "a robust and transparent" system of detecting 
non-compliance); Ardia, supra note 38, at 505 (describing international cooperation in monitoring 
and enforcement as crucial to making environmental agreements meaningful). 
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the nation is delivering the required reductions. 130 The Climate 
Change Convention contains provisions that address this.131 
The Climate Change Convention has provisions aimed at generat-
ing national plans to meet the targets. It requires all parties to "pub-
lish . . . programmes containing measures to mitigate climate 
change."l32 The Convention also requires developed countries to send 
the COP "a detailed description of ... measures that it has adopted" 
and "a specific estimate" of its policies' effects.133 The Convention 
requires an expert "subsidiary body for implementation" to review 
these descriptions and report the results to the COP.l34 It cautiously 
requires the COP to seek and use, "where appropriate," information 
from "non-governmental bodies."l35 The Convention thus provides a 
potential role for environmental groups in assessing ongoing imple-
mentation efforts. 
The Framework Convention also provides for the COP's assess-
ment and publication of implementation information.136 The Frame-
work Convention requires the COP to "assess ... implementation of 
the [C]onvention,"137 "adopt" and publish "regular reports" on the 
"implementation of the Convention,"13s and "facilitate" informa-
tion exchange amongst parties "on measures adopted" to meet treaty 
commitments.la9 On the other hand, the Framework Convention au-
thorizes a party to designate information about compliance as con-
fidential, thereby preventing its submission to other bodies, except as 
part of aggregated data.140 This provision could frustrate efforts to 
hold individual countries responsible for noncompliance, thereby re-
130 See Werksman, supra note 129. (describing the evaluation of compliance in the Climate 
Change regime). 
131 See Framework Convention, supra note 9, arts. 4, 7, 9, 10, 12, 31 I.L.M. at 855-60, 860~2, 
86~, 8~6; Kyoto Protocol, supra note 10, arts. 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 10, 13, 37 I.L.M. at 33-34, 35--36, 
36-37,38-39. 
132 Framework Convention, supra note 9, art. 4(1)(b), 31 I.L.M. at 855; Kyoto Protocol, supra 
note 10, art. 10(a), (b), 37 I.L.M. at 37. 
133 Framework Convention, supra note 9, art. 12(2), 31 I.L.M. at 865; see id. art. 4(2)(b), 31 
I.L.M. at 857. 
134 [d. art. 10, 31 I.L.M. at 863-64. 
136 [d. art. 7, 31 I.L.M. at 861. 
136 See Bodansky, supra note 2, at 547 (explaining why treaty language probably does contem-
plate review of individual country performance). 
137 Framework Convention, supra note 9, art. 7(2)(e), 31 I.L.M. at 861. 
138 [d. art. 7(2)(0, 31 I.L.M. at 861. 
139 [d. art. 7(2)(b), 31 I.L.M. at 861. 
140 [d. art. 12(9), 31 I.L.M. at 866. 
1998] EMISSIONS TRADING 25 
dueing the effectiveness of public accountability in encouraging com-
pliance. 
Reporting about national plans may provide information that can 
be used to assess whether countries have plans that appear likely to 
succeed. This alone may create pressures to adopt credible plans. 
However, information about plans cannot tell the international com-
munity whether plans succeed in meeting their targets. 
Accordingly, the Framework Convention contains provisions de-
signed to develop the information needed to assess actual physical 
compliance with emission reduction targets.141 Since the Kyoto Proto-
col expresses national emission limitations as a percentage of green-
house gas emissions in 1990/42 one would need to know at least the 
1990 emissions, and the emissions during the compliance period (2008 
to 2012), to determine whether compliance has occurred.143 Monitoring 
of progress toward the quantitative targets requires reporting in-
terim emissions. 
The Framework Convention requires all parties to "develop, peri-
odically update, publish and make available to the Conference of the 
Parties ... national inventories of greenhouse gas emissions."144 If 
these inventories include accurate estimates of 1990 baseline emis-
sions of each relevant gas and provide timely and accurate informa-
tion on current emissions, then it should be possible to determine 
whether a country has complied with the percentage limitations set 
out in the agreement. 
The Kyoto Protocol contains provisions designed to adapt these re-
quirements to the task of actually monitoring compliance with quan-
titative limits. Article 5 requires developed countries to estimate 
anthropogenic emissions and sink removals using methodologies that 
the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change and the COP agree 
upon.145 Article 7 requires these countries to submit annual invento-
141 Professor Robert N. Stavins argues that it may not be necessary to monitor ex post 
compliance if an ex ante "demonstration oflikely compliance" has been made. See Stavins, supra 
note 116, at 310. This argument overlooks a long history of failure to produce planned reductions 
of pollutants, even in developed countries such as the United States. It seems extraordinarily 
naIve. At any rate, Professor Stavins' judgment on this matter conflicts with that of the 
international community framing the treaty, which has provided, at least loosely, for generation 
of information that could help verify post-hoc compliance. 
142 See Kyoto Protocol, supra note 10, Annex B, 37 I.L.M. at 42. 
143 See id. art. 3(1), 37 I.L.M. at 33. 
144 Framework Convention, supra note 9, art. 4(1)(a), 31 I.L.M. at 855; see id. art. 12(1), 31 
I.L.M. at 865. 
145 See Kyoto Protocol, supra note 10, art. 5, 37 I.L.M. at 35. 
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ries of emissions and sinks including "supplementary information" to 
make sure that compliance with the new limits can be verified.146 The 
Kyoto Protocol further requires expert review teams to "provide a 
thorough and comprehensive technical assessment of ... implemen-
tation" and to communicate this assessment to the COP.147 The Kyoto 
Protocol then requires the COP to assess implementation.148 
The Climate Change Convention vaguely authorizes the COP to 
"make recommendations on any matters necessary for" implementa-
tion.149 It also creates a dispute settlement procedure.15o This proce-
dure relies primarily upon negotiation and non-binding arbitration, 
rather than binding dispute resolution. l5l Article 14 of the Framework 
Convention also allows parties to mutually agree that disputes will be 
submitted to the International Court of Justice and/or binding arbi-
tration.l52 These procedures only apply to disputes between national 
governments. The formal dispute resolution provisions do not provide 
a mechanism for non-governmental organizations (NGOs), including 
environmental advocacy groups, to seek redress of complaints. 
Since the COP meets regularly, its ongoing review processes pro-
vide a forum that may expose defects in national implementation. 153 
This tends to facilitate peer and public pressure to comply, making 
countries more accountable for implementation failures.154 A provi-
sion in the Framework Convention which allows NGOs to participate 
in COP meetings unless at least a third of the parties present object 
may help facilitate public accountability.155 Unlike some international 
agreements, the Framework Convention does not contemplate the 
146 [d. art. 7, 37 I.L.M. at 35-36. 
147 [d. art. 8, 37 I.L.M. at 36. 
148 See id. art. 13(4)(a), 37 I.L.M. at 39. 
149 Framework Convention, supra note 9, art. 7(2)(g), 31 I.L.M. at 861; Kyoto Protocol, supra 
note 10, art. 13(4)(f), 37 I.L.M. at 39. 
150 See Framework Convention, supra note 9, arts. 13, 14, 31 I.L.M. at 866-67; see also 
Bodansky, supra note 2, at 547-49. 
151 The treaty establishes a "multilateral consultative process" to resolve "questions regard-
ing" convention implementation. Framework Convention, supra note 9, art. 13, 31 I.L.M. at 866. 
Article 14, section 1 requires parties to a dispute to "seek ... settlement ... through negotia-
tion." If this negotiation process fails, a party may secure convocation of a "conciliation commis-
sion." [d. art. 14(5), (6), 31 I.L.M. at 867. The commission only makes a "recommendatory award," 
which "the parties" must "consider in good faith." [d. art 14(6), 31 I.L.M. at 867. 
152 [d. art. 14(2-4), 31 I.L.M. at 867. 
153 See Bodansky, supra note 2, at 533. The COP meets annually unless it decides otherwise. 
See Framework Convention, supra note 9, art. 7(4), (5), 31 I.L.M. at 855-61. 
154 See Bodansky, supra note 2, at 533. 
156 Framework Convention, supra note 9, art. 7(6), 31 I.L.M. at 862. 
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use of trade sanctions to secure compliancel66-nor does it mandate 
binding dispute resolution. 
In sum, the Kyoto Protocol (absent trading) creates a concrete 
obligation to meet national aggregate emission limitations. The Cli-
mate Change Convention seeks to require the submission of national 
plans that make before the fact assessment of progress toward imple-
mentation possible. The Convention also requires the availability of 
adequate national information to enable the world to ascertain (after 
the fact) whether a country has complied with specific limits on na-
tional emissions. Each country may make sufficient plans to avoid the 
embarrassment of facing accusations in a public forum that it failed 
to meet an international obligation.167 Through these mechanisms, the 
authors of the Climate Change Convention try to foster accountability 
for complying with the Convention's mandates. 
D. Emissions Trading 
The United States has used emissions trading to address environ-
mental problems over the years.16S From the perspective of many 
American government officials, it seemed only natural to make inter-
national trading part of the effort to address climate change. Not 
surprisingly, the United States has consistently worked to make emis-
sions trading a big part of the Climate Change Convention.169 
156 See generally Foundation for International Environmental Law, Implementing the Climate 
Change Convention: Trade Law Implications on the Road to Kyoto and Beyond (1997) (unpub-
lished manuscript on file with author). 
157 I use the term "may" deliberately. In spite of the existence of the formal structure 
described, the relevant international institutions and the NGOs may lack the capacity to com-
prehensively monitor implementation efforts. See Ardia, supra note 38, at 512, 524-25 (discuss-
ing the inadequacy of funding of the United Nations Environmental Program and the weakness 
of Secretariats of environmental treaties); Kamen Sachariew, Promoting Compliance with 
International Legal Standards: Reflections on Monitoring and Reporting Mechanisms, 2 Y.B. 
OF INTL ENVTL. L. 37, 39 (1991) (noting that the high cost of "maintaining large scale permanent 
monitoring networks" limits NGO's involvement in monitoring). Monitoring remains highly 
dependent upon cooperation from national governments. 
158 See, e.g., Driesen, supra note 2, at 311-21. 
169 The United States' insistence on this point almost torpedoed the negotiations at Kyoto. See 
COP3 Summary, supra note 95, at 11-12. The United States' made clear that its agreement to 
reductions depended on acceptance of emissions trading. See Paola Bettelli et aI., Highlights 
from the Third Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change: 8 December 1997, 12 EARTH NEG. BULL. No. 74 1, 2 (1997) [hereinafter 
Highlights]; see also COP2 Report, supra note 91, at 48 (United States' statement that "inter-
national emissions trading must be part of any future regime."). The United States has not 
always been alone in its support of emissions trading. See Jonathan Green and Philippe Sands, 
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1. Trading Under the Framework Convention 
The Framework Convention does not explicitly mention emissions 
trading.160 But it refers to a concept called "joint implementation," 
which one can plausibly interpret as a reference to trading.161 Article 
4(2)(a), for example, states that "[p]arties may implement ... policies 
and measures jointly .... "162 This could be interpreted narrowly to 
mean that one country could help another achieve national emissions 
reductions.163 It could also be interpreted broadly to allow a country 
to claim credits for activities it jointly implements abroad.164 These 
credits could then justify not meeting otherwise applicable domestic 
obligations. 
Recognizing that a mere reference to "joint implementation" raises 
more questions than it answers/65 the parties agreed that the COP 
would "take (sic) decisions regarding criteria to govern joint imple-
mentation" at its first session, within one year after the Framework 
Convention entered into force. 166 Since then, the COP has failed to 
agree upon detailed criteria governing joint implementation, but it 
has made a few general decisions.167 
Establishing an International System/or Trading Pollution Rights, 15 Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA) 
80,82-83 (Feb. 12, 1992) (discussing an early emissions trading proposal put forth by Norway 
and Germany). 
160 See JOYEETA GUPTA, THE CLIMATE CHANGE CONVENTION AND DEVELOPING COUN· 
TRIES: FROM CONFLICT TO CONSENSUS? 117 (1997) (Framework Convention "does not explicitly 
state" that a country undertaking measures abroad "has the right to credit itself with part of 
the emission reductions."). 
161 See JOINT IMPLEMENTATION TO CURB CLIMATE CHANGE: LEGAL AND ECONOMIC As· 
PECTS 1-6 (Onno Kuik et al. eds., 1994) [hereinafter JOINT IMPLEMENTATION]; s. Barrett, Joint 
Implementation/or Achieving National Abatement Commitments in the Framework Conven-
tion on Climate Change, OECD, Paris (1993); JOINT IMPLEMENTATION OF CLIMATE CHANGE 
COMMITMENTS: OPPORTUNITIES AND ApPREHENSIONS xi (Prodipto Ghosh & Jyotsna Puri eds., 
1994) [hereinafter OPPORTUNITIES AND ApPREHENSIONS]. 
162 Framework Convention, supra note 9, art. 4(2)(a), 31 I.L.M. at 856. Furthermore, Article 
4, section 2(b) establishes that developed countries must aim to return their emissions to 1990 
levels "individually or jointly." Id. art. 4(2)(b), 31 I.L.M. at 857. Article 4, section 2(d) provides 
that the Conference of the Parties at its first session "shall ... take decisions regarding criteria 
for joint implementation .... " Id. art. 4(2)(d), 31 I.L.M. at 857. 
163 See GUPTA, supra note 160, at 116 (stating that developing countries tend to interpret joint 
implementation to refer to "general cooperation" in implementation rather than credit transfer). 
164 See Navroz K. Dubash, Commoditizing Carbon: Social and Environmental Implications 
0/ Joint Implementation, in OPPORTUNITIES AND ApPREHENSIONS, supra note 161, at 51, 56 
(setting out such a definition). 
165 See JOINT IMPLEMENTATION, supra note 161, at 46,78; GUPTA, supra note 160, at 116-17 
(discussing the ambiguous nature of the joint implementation text). 
166 Framework Convention, supra note 9, arts. 4(2)(d), 7(4), 31 I.L.M. at 857, 862. 
167 See JOINT IMPLEMENTATION, supra note 161, at 73 (the FCCC does not define joint 
1998] EMISSIONS TRADING 29 
At its first meeting in Berlin, the COP clarified that developed 
countries could not claim credits for activities implemented jointly 
with developing countries as a means of fulfilling the Framework 
Convention target of stabilizing developed country emissions at 1990 
levels.l68 The COP, however, authorized the development of pilot joint 
implementation projects, including projects carried out in developing 
countries.169 These pilot projects involve voluntary commitments by 
governments and private companies to conduct cooperative interna-
tional activities that they characterize as contributing to the Conven-
tion's objectives.17o The COP established "a framework for reporting 
... on the possible global benefits, ... the national ... impacts," and 
any "technical difficulties encountered."l7l The COP also decided on a 
implementation); Climate Change Convention Secretariat, Activities Implemented Jointly: 
Methodological Issues, The Determination 0/ Environmental Benefits Related to the Mitigation 
0/ Climate Change Through Activities Implemented Jointly (visited Dec. 5, 1997) 
<http://www.unfccc.de/fcCC/ccinfo/aiLradd.htr> (identifying issues still unresolved in late 1997). 
168 The COP recognized the following: (1) According to the provisions of the Convention, the 
commitments under Article 4.2(a), to adopt national policies and to take corresponding measures 
on the mitigation of climate change apply only to Parties included in Annex I to the Convention 
(Annex I Parties), and that Parties not included in Annex I to the Convention (non-Annex I 
Parties) have no such commitments; (2) Activities implemented jointly between Annex I Parties 
and non-Annex I Parties will not be seen as fulfillment of current commitments of Annex I 
Parties under Article 4.2(b), of the Convention; but they could contribute to the achievement 
of the objectives of the Convention and to the fulfillment of commitments of Annex II Parties 
under Article 4.5 of the Convention; (3) Activities implemented jointly under the Convention 
are supplemental, and should only be treated as a subsidiary means of achieving the objective 
of the Convention; (4) Activities implemented jointly in no way modify the commitments of each 
Party under the Convention. Activities Implemented Jointly Under the Pilot Phase in Report 
of the Conference of the Parties on its First Session, Decision 5/CP.l, Apr. 7, 1995, U.N. Doc. 
FCCC/CP/199517/Add.l (1995),34 I.L.M. 1671, 1685 [hereinafter Pilot Phase Decision]. 
169 See id. at 1686. For a recent report on the nature of the projects see Activities Implemented 
Jointly Under the Pilot Phase: Synthesis Report on Activities Implemented Jointly (Note by 
the Secretariat), FCCC/SBSTA, 7th Sess., Item 8 of the Provisional Agenda, U.N. Doc. 
FCCC/SBSTAlI997/12 [hereinafter Pilot Phase Report]; see also Glenn Wiser, Joint Implemen-
tation: Incentives/or Private Sector Mitigation o/Global Climate Change, 9 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. 
L. REV. 747, 751 (1997); GoVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES, PUB. No. DOEIPO-0048, 
ACTIVITIES IMPLEMENTED JOINTLY: FIRST REPORT TO THE SECRETARIAT OF THE UNITED 
NATIONS FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE (1996). 
170 See Wiser, supra note 169, at 750; David Hodas, The Climate Change Convention and 
Evolving Legal Models 0/ Sustainable Development, 13 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 75, 93-94 (1995) 
(describing some projects); Announcement of Ground Rules for U.S. Initiative on Joint Imple-
mentation, 59 Fed. Reg. 28,442 (1994). 
17l Pilot Phase Decision, supra note 168 (ordering establishment of Subsidiary Body for 
Scientific and Technological Advice to develop a reporting framework); Activities Implemented 
Jointly Under the Pilot Phase: Uniform Reporting Format, FCCC/SBSTA, 2d Sess., U.N. Doc. 
FCCC/SBSTAlI99618, Annex IV (1996) (subsidiary body's proposed reporting framework); 
Activities Implemented Jointly Under the Pilot Phase, Decision 8ICP.2, FCCC/COP, 2d Sess., 
U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/1996115/Add.l (1996) at 14 (COP invites parties to use the subsidiary body's 
reporting framework). 
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set of very general criteria to govern joint implementation during the 
pilot phase.172 It did not, however, agree upon a set of criteria to judge 
whether pilot projects fail or succeed in demonstrating the feasibility 
of "joint implementation" as a credit generating activity. Nor did the 
COP ever define precise criteria that these projects should meet or 
otherwise clarify the "joint implementation" concept.173 Country re-
ports on pilot projects generally do not describe environmental bene-
fits in a detailed manner and they rarely provide sufficient explana-
tion of the basis for cost and greenhouse gas mitigation calculations.174 
2. Trading Under the Kyoto Protocol 
The Kyoto Protocol explicitly mentions provision of credits for 
projects undertaken abroad.175 The trading arguably incorporated in 
the Kyoto Protocol makes it necessary to qualify statements about 
the quantitative limits countries ostensibly accepted in the Protocol. 
To the extent the Protocol allows international trading, it may allow 
countries to make less domestic reductions than the national quanti-
tative limits seem to require, if they purchase something deemed 
equivalent from elsewhere. This involves foregoing physical compli-
ance, defined as literally bringing the emissions in a country down to 
the lower level specified in the Annex B of the Kyoto Protocol,176 
which spells out each developed countries' quantitative limits for 
greenhouse gas emissions. Instead, trading involves "virtual" compli-
ance without physical compliance.177 
The Kyoto Protocol, however, does not clearly allow trading to 
justify a country's failure to physically meet national quantitative re-
duction commitments. Article 3 simply restates the ambiguity found 
172 See Pilot Phase Decision, su'JYM note 168. The COP decided that projects "should be ... 
supportive of national environmental and development" policy and contribute to cost effective-
ness. [d. at 1686. The relevant governments should approve all projects. See id. "Activities 
implemented jointly should bring about real, measurable and long-term environmental benefits 
related to the mitigation of climate change that would not have occurred in the absence of such 
activities." [d. Finally, financing of joint implementation "shall be additional to the financial 
obligations" already contained in the treaty. [d. 
173 See Pilot Phase Decision, supra note 168. The COP decision does not explicitly define issues 
to evaluate the utility of joint implementation as a means of meeting (or redefining) quantitative 
targets for emission reductions. Individual countries have developed very general criteria, 
which vary quite a bit from country to country. See Pilot Phase Report, supra note 169, at 6. 
174 See Pilot Phase Report, supra note 169, at 5. 
176 See Kyoto Protocol, 8upra note 10, arts. 6(1), 12(3)(b), 37 I.L.M. at 35, 38. 
176 See id. Annex B, 37 I.L.M. at 42. 
177 See id. 
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in the Framework Convention, providing that developed countries 
"shall, individually or jointly, ensure that their aggregate carbon di-
oxide equivalent emissions ... do not exceed their assigned amounts" 
in Annex B.178 
Article 4 of the Kyoto Protocol supports an interpretation that 
allows at least one form of trading to result in virtual compliance. It 
states that countries that have agreed to fulfill their commitments 
jointly under Article 3 will be "deemed" in compliance when virtual 
compliance occurs.179 This provision was designed primarily to allow 
the European Community to comply with a community-wide limit 
created through aggregation of the relevant national emission limita-
tions.1SO 
But another provision addressing more generalized emissions trad-
ing,181 Article 6, states that "the acquisition of emission reduction units 
178Id. art. 3(1), 37 I.L.M. at 33 (emphasis added). 
179 The Kyoto Protocol states: 
Any parties included in Annex I that have reached an agreement to fulfill their 
commitments under article 3 jointly, shall be deemed to have met those commitments 
provided that their total combined aggregate anthropogenic carbon dioxide equivalent 
emissions of the greenhouse gases listed in Annex A do not exceed their assigned 
amounts calculated pursuant to their quantified emission limitation and reduction 
commitments inscribed in Annex B and in accordance with the provisions of Article 3. 
The respective emission level allocated to each of the Parties to the agreement shall 
be set out in that agreement. 
Id. art. 4(1), 37 I.L.M. at 34. 
180 See Farhana Yamin, Developing Countries and Emission Trading, Address at Canada/U.S. 
Emissions Trading Forum in Vancouver 5 (March 16-17, 1998) (unpublished manuscipt on file 
with the author); Breidenich et al., supra note 100, at 321. 
181 Some discussions of the issues in the Kyoto Protocol make a distinction between "emissions 
trading" on the one hand and "joint implementation" on the other. See, e.g., Brendan P. 
McGivern, Introductory Note to Kyoto Protocol, Dec. 10, 1997,37 I.L.M. 22, 26 (treating trading 
under article 16 bis [article 17 in the revised text] as emissions trading and trading under article 
6 as "joint implementation"). This distinction obscures the issues involved in any international 
transfer of credit for meeting greenhouse gas limitations and lacks clarity. See id. (treating 
transactions under article 6 as an instance of "joint implementation"); Frank T. Joshua, Inter-
national Greenhouse Gas Emissions Trading: Structure and Organization of the Emissions 
Market 6 (1998) (draft unpublished manuscript on file with the author) (treating transactions 
under article 6 as emissions trading); Negotiators Optimistic on Treaty Including Emissions 
Trading, Joint Implementation, NAT'L ENv'T DAILY (BNA), Dec. 5, 1997, available in LEXIS, 
BNA Library, BNAEVR file (describing joint implementation as "a system of credit sharing for 
emission offset projects-such as planting trees-in developing countries that are sponsored by 
industrialized nations). The text of the treaty does not define "joint implementation" and does 
not support the notion that an international consensus exists about its meaning. This article will 
therefore use the term emissions trading to refer to any arrangement involving a transfer of 
credits or obligations. 
The distinction between trading and joint implementation arose after the first COP voted to 
ban trading as a means of meeting quantitative commitments under the joint implementation 
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shall be supplemental to domestic actions for the purposes of meeting 
commitments under Article 3."182 Article 17 reinforces this idea that 
emissions trading must be supplemental, stating that "any ... trading 
shall be supplemental to domestic actions for the purpose of meeting 
quantified emission limitation and reduction commitments under that 
Article."183 The term "supplemental" could indicate that countries 
must meet their quantified obligations through physical compliance, 
but may use credits to meet basic non-quantified obligations or sup-
plement compliance with the treaty.184 
The second sentence of Article 17, however, states that developed 
countries "may participate in emissions trading for the purposes of 
fulfilling their commitments under Article 3 of this Protocol."185 This 
would seem to contradict a reading requiring complete physical com-
pliance with quantitative obligations. This ambiguity reflects the in-
ability of the international community to reach consensus on whether 
trading should generate credits toward compliance with developed 
country quantitative limits.186 
The United States did not want to limit trading to reductions in 
greenhouse gas emissions. It sought to broaden trading to allow coun-
tries and/or their polluters to forego reductions in greenhouse gas 
emissions in exchange for carrying out actions that protected or en-
hanced greenhouse gas sinks.187 This might allow credit for forestry 
projects similar to those American electric utilities implemented as 
provisions of the Framework Convention. Under pressure from the United States to authorize 
such trades, early drafts of the Kyoto Protocol contained proposals for both emissions trading 
and joint implementation, but never clearly defined either term. See, e.g., Reports by the 
Chairmen of the Informal Consultations Conducted at the Seventh Session of the Ad Hoc Group 
on the Berlin Mandate, FCCC/AGBM at 20-22, U.N. Doc. FCCC/AGBMl1997/INF.1 (1997). 
182 Kyoto Protocol, supra note 10, art. 6(1)(d), 37 LL.M. at 35 (emphasis added). 
183 [d. art. 17,37 LL.M. at 40. Article 17 appeared as article 16 bis when the Kyoto Protocol 
first appeared on the Framework Convention's web page and as reprinted in International Legal 
Materials. See id. 37 LL.M. 22, 22 n. * (noting that LL.M. text is reproduced from draft text from 
a visit to the web site on January 15, 1998); id. art. 17 (article 16 bis), 37 LL.M. at 40. The 
Secretariat subsequently made a technical correction to the text appearing on the web page, 
renumbering this as article 17. See United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
Internet Web Site (visited June 18, 1998) <http://www.unfccc.de/fccc/docs/cop3/ 107aOl.pdf>. 
184 For example, under the Framework Convention developed countries have an obligation to 
protect and enhance greenhouse gas sinks and reservoirs independent of the quantitative 
obligations in the Kyoto Protocol. See Framework Convention, supra note 9, art. 4(2)(a), 31 
I.L.M. at 856. They might use tradable credits to satisfy these obligations. 
185 Kyoto Protocol, supra note 10, art. 17, 37 I.L.M. at 40 .. 
186 See COP3 Summary, supra note 95, at 11-12; McGivern, supra note 181, at 26 ("The 
negotiations in Kyoto nearly collapsed over the issue of emissions trading."). 
187 See generally JOINT IMPLEMENTATION, supra note 161, at 187-94. 
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pilot projects to demonstrate the "feasibility" of "joint implementa-
tion."IBB 
This idea goes beyond emissions trading to encompass environ-
mental benefit trading, a concept which is a more amorphous form of 
trading than emissions trading. Proponents of this broadened trading 
argue that trading carbon sink preservation and enhancement for 
emission reductions is appropriate, because both play a role in pre-
venting climate change. The Kyoto Protocol may actually authorize 
this kind of generalized trading between developed countries, but it 
requires an expert body to develop criteria to govern trading. ls9 For 
this reason, one cannot say that the agreement requires any absolute 
reductions in greenhouse gas emissions without appropriate caveats. 
The agreement leaves open the possibility of substituting tree plant-
ing for otherwise required greenhouse gas emission reductions. 19o 
The United States also wished to expand trading to include trades 
between developed and developing countries. The Kyoto Protocol 
generally rejected this proposal; Articles 3, 4, and 6 only authorize 
trading between developed countries.191 
188 See William R. Moomaw, Achieving Joint Benefits from Joint Implementation, in CRITE-
RIA, supra note 18, at 12 (describing tree planting as the "first and best known example of a 
joint implementation strategy"). 
189 Article 6 provides that developed country parties may trade "emission reduction units" in 
order to meet its quantitative emission reduction commitments. See Kyoto Protocol, supra note 
10, art. 6, 37 I.L.M. at 35. The term emission reduction units literally refers to emission 
reductions and not sink enhancement. See id. Sink enhancement does not reduce emissions, 
rather it enhances or conserves the ability of greenhouse gas "sinks" (such as forests) to 
ameliorate the damage from increased emissions. Forestry projects may tend to remove carbon 
from the atmosphere thereby reducing atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gases, but 
they do not reduce "emissions"-the release of gases into the atmosphere by polluters. 
The context, however, shows that the parties intended to give the term a broader interpre-
tation than the literal language allows. Article 6 refers to "emission reduction units" resulting 
from "projects aimed at reducing anthropogenic emissions by sources or enhancing anthropo-
genic removals by sinks." Kyoto Protocol, supra note 10, art. 6, 37 I.L.M. at 35. Hence, projects 
enhancing forests' "anthropogenic" carbon removal capacity may generate "emission reduction 
units" under the treaty, even though they literally do not reduce emissions. 
Article 3, sections 10 and 11 require the addition or subtraction of these "emission reduction 
units" to countries' quantitative emission reduction obligations. Kyoto Protocol, supra note 10, 
art. 3(10), (11), 37 I.L.M. at 34. Hence, these emission reduction units, which might include things 
other than emission reductions, may count toward the quantitative emission limitations set out 
in Annex B of the Kyoto Protocol. 
190 Indeed, the Kyoto Protocol may allow parties to avoid domestic reductions to the extent 
it engages in vigorous domestic tree planting. See Kyoto Protocol, supra note 10, art. 3(3), (4), 
37 I.L.M. at 33, 34. 
191 Article 3 states that the "Parties included in Annex I," the developed countries, "shall 
individually or jointly," reduce emissions. Id. art. 3, 37 I.L.M. at 33. Article 4 authorizes trading 
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But Article 12 establishes a limited exception to this decision not 
to endorse trades between developed and developing countries. It 
allows developed countries to count "certified emission reductions" in 
meeting their quantitative targets. 192 Article 12 implies that these 
credits will come from projects carried out in developing countries. 
Article 12 creates a "clean development mechanism" to certify these 
credits.193 It establishes this mechanism's purpose as assisting devel-
oping countries "in achieving sustainable development and in contrib-
uting to the ultimate objective of the Convention."194 And it provides 
that developing countries "will benefit from project activities result-
ing in certified emission reductions."195 In order for projects to help 
developing countries in the manner contemplated, they must be car-
ried out in those countries. 
While Article 12 authorizes geographically broad trading, it re-
stricts some aspects of trading. In contrast to Articles 3 and 6, which 
contemplate credit for forestry projects, Article 12 only authorizes 
credits for "emission reductions."196 
Furthermore, Article 12 requires that developed country purchas-
ers of clean development credits fund more than a simple transfer of 
emission reduction credits. It directs the COP to "ensure that a share 
of the proceeds from certified" projects "cover administrative ex-
penses" and help "developing country Parties that are particularly 
vulnerable to" climate change's "adverse effects" to adapt.197 This may 
allow island states likely to suffer greatly from sea level rise and 
increasingly frequent storms to benefit from purchases of reductions. 
of commitments for "any Parties included in Annex I." Id. art. 4, 37 LL.M. at 34. Similarly, article 
6 states: 
For the purpose of meeting its commitments under Article 3, any Party included in 
Annex I may transfer to, or acquire from, any other such Party emission reduction 
units resulting from projects aimed at reducing anthropogenic emissions by sources or 
enhancing anthropogenic removals by sinks of greenhouse gases in any sector of the 
economy .... 
Id. art. 6, 37 LL.M. at 35 (emphasis added); see Highlights supra note 159, at 2 (Chairman 
Estrada said joint implementation between Annex I and non-Annex I Parties had been 
dropped). 
192 Kyoto Protocol, supra note 10, art. 12(3)(b), 37 LL.M. at 38. 
193 Id. art. 12(1), (7), 37 LL.M. at 38. For background on the negotiating history of this 
provision, see U.S. Proposes New Funding Scheme for Joint Implementation Trading, 28 Env't 
Rep. (BNA) 1525 (Dec. 5, 1997). 
194 Kyoto Protocol, supra note 10, art. 12(2), 37 LL.M. at 38. 
195Id. art. 12(3)(a), 37 LL.M. at 38. 
196 See id. art. 12(3)(b), 37 I.L.M. at 38. 
197 Id. art. 12(8), 37 I.L.M. at 38. 
1998] EMISSIONS TRADING 35 
Finally, Article 12 requires these projects to have value going be-
yond the simple generation of credits. Reductions must not only be 
"real" and measurable, but also bring "long-term benefits related to 
... climate change."l98 
The provisions adopted in the Protocol do not provide clear answer 
to even the most basic questions about joint implementation. Indeed, 
the delegates to the Kyoto Protocol recognized that the provisions 
they adopted failed to address a number of crucial issues, including 
whether credits could be claimed for activities carried out abroad, 
what entities may trade, monitoring issues, accounting issues, over-
sight, and methodologies for estimating environmental benefits.l99 
Hence, important issues about the scope and nature of trading remain 
open after Kyoto.200 
3. The Free Lunch Theory of Trading 
Many American scholars and government officials tend to view 
emissions trading as a free lunch, a proposition with no significant 
downside.20l This probably helps explain the American government's 
enthusiastic attitude toward international emissions trading. This 
subsection will explain the "free lunch" theory of emissions trading. 
Emissions trading offers the theoretical ability to achieve some 
environmental goals with less private sector cost than traditional 
regulatory approaches.202 Suppose, for example, that a 100 ton reduc-
tion in aggregate sulfur dioxide (S02) emissions could protect a lake 
from acid rain. Assume that two power plants, called Cheap and 
Expensive, cause this problem and each emits 150 tons of S02. If no 
other sources of this pollutant existed, the government could address 
this problem by requiring each pollution source to reduce emissions 
by 50 tons. This involves setting a uniform standard for an industrial 
category, an approach found in many environmental statutes.203 
198 Id. art. 12(5)(b), 37 I.L.M. at 38 (emphasis added). 
199 See Report of the Conference of the Parties on its Third Session, Decision 1/CP.3 
FCCC/COP, 3d Sess. at 5--6, U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/1997I71Add.1 (1997) (requesting subsidiary 
bodies to guide the Secretary in addressing inter alia various emissions trading issues at the 
fourth meeting of the COP in Buenos Aires in 1998). 
200 See Searles, supra note 5, at 133, 135. 
201 See, e.g., Ackerman & Stewart, supra note 4, at 172; Kyoto Meeting Ends With Agreement, 
Leaving Details/or 1998 in Buenos Aires, 28 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1567 (Dec. 12, 1997) (Senator 
Robert Byrd states that "emissions trading and 'joint implementation' ... minimize economic 
pain and maximize the use of new technologies."). 
202 Driesen, supra note 2, at 312-13; Ackerman & Stewart, supra note 4, at 179. 
203 See Ackerman & Stewart, supra note 4, at 172-73; cf Driesen, supra note 2, at 308, n.93 
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Equalized emission reduction does not necessarily imply equalized 
cost, since one plant's equipment may make pollution control more 
expensive than that of another. Suppose that Cheap has control costs 
of $1,000 per ton, but that Expensive has control costs of $2,000 per 
ton. A uniform standard demanding fifty ton reductions would then 
produce $150,000 in pollution control expenditures, $50,000 at Cheap 
($1,000 X 50) and $100,000 at Expensive ($2,000 X 50). 
Suppose, however, that the government writes the same emission 
limitations, but allows the pollution sources to trade reductions. Pre-
sumably, Expensive will pay Cheap to make fifty tons of reductions 
in its stead. Cheap will cut its emission by 100 tons below its baseline 
level at a cost of $100,000 ($1,000 per ton X 100 tons). Expensive will 
not cut its emissions at all. The public will secure the 100 tons of 
reduction needed to protect the lake from acidification, but the pollu-
tion sources will pay $100,000 instead of $150,000. In theory, emissions 
trading offers a more cost effective means of meeting an environ-
mental goal than a uniform standard, whenever marginal costs vary 
between plants. 
International trading of environmental benefits may tend to reduce 
the costs of complying with the Climate Change Convention.204 The 
precise argument generally made about emissions trading, that trad-
ing saves money relative to a uniform emissions standard,205 does not 
apply to the Climate Change Convention. For the Protocol has as-
signed non-uniform national limits to each developed country's emis-
sions. Hence, there is no problem of uniform standards to overcome 
on the international level. Furthermore, the Climate Change Conven-
tion does not require countries to use uniform emission standards to 
meet climate change goals. Countries may choose carbon taxes, sub-
sidies for advanced technologies, cooperative agreements with indus-
try, domestic emissions trading, non-uniform emission standards, uni-
form standards, or any other mechanism to reduce emissions 
domestically under the Convention. 
However, a slightly different argument for the proposition that 
trading saves money may apply. Countries (or their nationals) will 
only trade if purchasing a credit from abroad costs less than imple-
(arguing that the commentators have exaggerated the dominance of the uniform standards 
approach). See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1312 (1994); 42 U.S.C. §§ 7411(a), 7412(d), 7521 (1994). 
204 See Stavins, supra note 116, at 298-99. 
205 See Driesen, supra note 2, at 312-13; Ackerman & Stewart, supra note 4, at 173, 179 
(comparing the economic efficiency of a trading system to a system based upon uniform stand-
ards). 
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menting something at home, whether or not the home reduction 
comes about because of a unifonn emissions standard.206 For example, 
President Clinton has proposed to subsidize innovative technology 
tending to reduce carbon dioxide emissions through tax credits.207 The 
United States could reduce this investment and purchase credits for 
somebody else's reduction abroad under the treaty.206 Accordingly, a 
variant of the argument most responsible for the free lunch theory of 
emissions trading seems to apply to climate change. Emissions trad-
ing reduces the costs of meeting emission reduction goals by allowing 
countries (or their nationals) to secure the cheapest possible emission 
reductions.209 
But the parties to the Kyoto Protocol may already have taken 
cost-effectiveness into account by assigning differentiated national 
caps on greenhouse gas emissions. To the extent the differentiation 
of national emission limits already reflects consideration of cost effec-
tiveness, implementation of the Protocol should not require much 
reliance on emissions trading.210 Furthennore, even without interna-
tional emissions trading, countries can lower their compliance costs 
through the use of domestic economic incentive measures.211 So coun-
tries may lower costs without international emissions trading.212 
In spite of this, one can construct a justification for international 
emissions trading on cost-effectiveness grounds. The individual na-
tional caps may reflect considerations other than comparative cost-
206 Significant differences in marginal abatement costs may exist between countries. See Key 
Issues Outlinedfor Upcoming Talks on International Emission Trading System, 21 Int'l Env't 
Rep. (BNA) 414 (Apr. 29, 1998) (Costa Rica's minister of environment estimates that allowance 
prices in the industrialized world will cost about $70 per ton, while costing only about $10 per 
ton in the developing world). 
207 John H. Cushman Jr., Clinton Seeks Taa; Credits for Fuel Savings, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 31, 
1998, at All. 
208 See generally Wiser, supra note 169, at 760-61 (advocating a carbon tax with a credit 
against the tax available for emission reduction credits earned abroad). 
209 See JOINT IMPLEMENTATION, supra note 161, at 161 (joint implementation can enhance the 
cost-effectiveness of implementation measures "particularly where the marginal costs of re-
sponse strategies" differ from country to country). 
210 The IPCC states that the initial allocation of emissions rights amongst nations does not 
affect global abatement costs significantly. See IPCC DIMENSIONS, supra note 15, at 339. This 
makes sense if one assumes that all initial allocations will be traded until an optimum is reached 
anyway. But to the extent that the initial allocation of rights already reflects cost-effectiveness 
considerations, the initial allocation will accomplish what the trading system would otherwise 
seek to accomplish in theory, the production of more reductions where reductions are cheaper. 
211 See Stavins, supra note 116, at 302-07 (discussing domestic carbon taxes and tradable 
permits). 
212 See id. 
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effectiveness. Alternatively, the cost-effectiveness estimates justify-
ing the differentials may prove inaccurate in practice. In either case, 
emissions trading should enhance the cost-effectiveness of delivering 
the reductions. 
Similarly, even if national economic incentive programs lower com-
pliance costs, additional opportunities for cost savings may exist be-
yond the border. The existence of differentiated caps and authority to 
use national economic incentive approaches may lessen the value of 
emissions trading, but they do not necessarily eliminate the possibil-
ity of realizing some cost savings from emissions trading.213 
Professors Bruce Ackerman and Richard Stewart have also argued 
that emissions trading combines democratic accountability with the 
"market mechanism" of emissions trading.214 They claim that emis-
sions trading offers an opportunity to focus public attention on deci-
sions about aggregate emission reductions, rather than more arcane 
issues arising in environmental law. 216 This helps explain their use of 
the "free lunch" metaphor.216 If a "free market" approach also offers 
democratic accountability, perhaps no downside exists. 
In fact, an emissions trading program must begin with some public 
body establishing emission limitations; so a trading program does 
involve, more or less, democratic decisions.217 Professors Ackerman 
and Stewart go further, however, and argue that emissions trading 
actually offers more democratic accountability than traditional regu-
lation.218 They reach this conclusion by comparing a hypothetical emis-
sions trading program in which Congress sets emission limitations to 
a traditional regulatory program in which an administrative body sets 
limits for categories of pollution sources in arcane administrative 
rulemaking proceedings.219 
213 See IPCC DIMENSIONS, supra note 15, at 338-40. 
214 See Ackerman & Stewart, supra note 4, at 171; cf Lisa Heinzerling, Selling Pollution, 
Forcing Democracy, 14 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 300, 303 (1995) (arguing that the history of the acid 
rain program does not support the notion that emissions trading enhances democratic account-
ability). 
216 See Ackerman & Stewart, supra note 4, at 189. 
216 See id. at 171-72 (arguing that emissions trading combines better democratic debate with 
significant savings and then suggesting that emissions trading is a free lunch because it is better 
''in terms of all relevant public values"). 
217 See Driesen, supra note 2, at 324. 
218 See Ackerman & Stewart, supra note 4, at 171, 188-91 (economic incentives will vastly 
''improve the quality of debate about environmental values"). 
219 Professors Ackerman and Stewart criticize "uniform" best available technology (BAT) 
regulations because they "impose massive information gathering burdens on administ:rators." 
Id. at 174 (emphasis supplied). They also criticize BAT because it tends to encourage industry 
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Most writings on emissions trading also claim that trading tends to 
foster innovation.220 Commentators rely on the fact that emissions 
trading creates an incentive for some pollution sources to make more 
reductions than a regulator requires, because the owners of these 
"overcomplying" sources may sell these credits to other pollution 
sources.221 
An important question exists as to the proper scope of the free 
lunch theory of trading. Professor Ackerman and Stewart articulated 
their free lunch theory in defense of an emissions trading program 
that capped emissions at levels chosen by Congress.222 Indeed, they 
advocated a system in which polluters would have to buy permits 
from the government.223 The government would limit the quantity of 
permits and hence the volume of total emissions.224 This raises the 
question of whether the free lunch theory properly constitutes a 
theory about emissions trading in general, or a theory about cap and 
trade programs. 
The acid rain trading program capping sulfur dioxide emissions in 
order to address acid rain more closely resembles the Ackerman/Ste-
wart ideal than other emissions trading programs.225 The acid rain 
program has saved money while significantly advancing environmen-
tal protection precisely because it caps emissions and requires con-
tinuous emissions monitoring.226 As a result, the program seems likely 
to succeed in making significant reductions in pollution while lowering 
to litigate in order to delay or defeat "regulatory requirements." [d. They then state that 
emissions trading will enhance democratic debate by focusing "Congressional debate ... upon 
the fundamental question" of how many pollution permits to grant. [d. at 189. 
220 See, e.g., Ackerman & Stewart, supra note 4, at 183 (emissions trading "promises to ... 
reward innovative improvements in existing cleanup techniques."). 
221 See Driesen, supra note 2, at 334. 
222 Professors Ackerman and Stewart state that the trading system should force Congress to 
decide about the ''rate of change" of existing levels of pollution. Ackerman & Stewart, supra 
note 4, at 189-90. This necessarily implies a cap on emissions. Otherwise, it is possible to dictate 
outcomes at particular plants, but not changes in overall emission levels. Caps are also implicit 
in their argument that a restricted supply of pollution rights would be available. See id. at 186. 
See Driesen, supra note 2, at 326. 
223 See Ackerman & Stewart, supra note 4, at 178-83. 
224 [d. at 186. 
225 For a description of the acid rain program see David Driesen, Air Pollution Control, in 
POWELL, TREATISE ON PROPERTY 865.5A[5] (1994); Brennan Van Dyke, Emissions Trading to 
Reduce Acid Deposition, 100 YALE L.J. 2707 (1991); Nancy Kete, The U.S. Acid Rain Allowance 
Trading System, in OECD, CLIMATE CHANGE: DESIGNING A TRADABLE PERMIT SYSTEM 
78-108 (1992). 
226 See Driesen, supra note 2, at 317-19. 
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costS.227 It therefore seems to vindicate the free lunch theory of emis-
sions trading as offering effective environmental protection at lower 
cost. 
But perhaps not. Throughout the 1980s, United States Environ-
mental Protection Agency (EPA) authorized state emissions trading 
programs that did not cap the overall mass of emissions.228 Instead, 
polluters would secure credits in lieu of meeting source specific limits 
on emission rates.229 These programs often receive credit for saving 
pollution sources a lot of money.230 But these programs rarely pro-
duced the emissions reductions that the non-trading programs they 
replaced called for. Indeed, many of them saved polluters money by 
allowing them to hide the fact that they did nothing to reduce pollu-
tion.231 
Since 1990, the EPA has not applied the lessons this mixed experi-
ence offers to its supervision of state emissions trading programs. It 
has encouraged state programs without emission caps and without 
direct monitoring of emissions.232 As a result, a number of states have 
written rules that may duplicate the failures of the 1980s, ratherthan 
emulate the potentially successful acid rain program.233 
Government officials and a number of scholars may assume that the 
free lunch theory applies to all trading programs. But it may only 
properly apply to programs that cap emissions and carefully monitor 
them. Other kinds of programs may offer substantial cost savings for 
polluters with significant costs to the environment. Such programs 
may resemble expensive, rather than free, lunches. 
The free lunch theory of emissions trading claims that emissions 
trading (or perhaps only some emissions trading programs) offers sig-
nificant advantages over traditional environmental programs. These 
benefits include lowered cost, superior incentives for innovation, and 
enhanced democratic process. 
227 Id. at 318-19. I have questioned whether the emissions trading mechanism constitutes an 
adequate explanation of the cost savings realized so far. See id. 
228 See id. at 314-16 (describing some of these programs). I include "bubbles," which only 
authorize trades between units within a plant as trading programs, even though a ''bubble'' 
limits the scope of trading geographically. See id. at 313-16. 
229 See Driesen, supra note 2, at 317-18. 
2BO See id. at 313. 
231 See id. at 314-16. 
232 See id. at 320. 
233 See id. at 320 n.149 (discussing some of the failed 1990s bubbles); MICH. ADMIN. CODE L.L. 
336.2201-.2218 (1998) (Michigan's recently adopted "open market" trading rule). 
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II. EMISSIONS TRADING AS A CHEAP FIX 
Trading may help society meet short-term environmental goals 
more cheaply than traditional approaches. This part asks whether a 
least cost solution to an immediate environmental objective necessar-
ily constitutes the best approach to a long-term environmental prob-
lem. 
More specifically, this part questions the free lunch theory's claim 
that emissions trading tends to foster innovation and advance demo-
cratic values. It argues that emissions trading has a tendency to delay 
innovation and interfere with democratic accountability. Because of 
this, trading may hinder long-term progress, even if it does reduce 
short-term costs. For these reasons, it may constitute a cheap fix, not 
a free lunch. This should affect policy makers' response to proposed 
trading programs. 
A. Trading, Innovation, and the Future of the Climate Change 
Convention 
This subsection will address the issue of innovation under the 
treaty. First, it will discuss the issue of whether trading may tend to 
discourage innovation. Second, it will explain the importance of inno-
vation to the future of the treaty. 
This article focuses on the emissions trading issue, not the issue of 
selecting the proper target for reductions. This subsection asks 
whether international trading tends to foster innovation or facilitate 
its avoidance for any given target. 
1. Trading and Innovation 
The Framework Convention envisions a process of innovation in 
developed countries, subsidized technology transfer to developing 
countries, and the eventual assumption by all countries of adequate 
obligations to avoid dangerous climate change. Trading may either 
contribute to or detract from this long-term process. 
Many economists assume that emissions trading generates innova-
tion, because trading encourages the pollution source with the cheap-
est control options to make more reductions than the government 
requires of it in order to sell credits to other sources for which emis-
sions control is more expensive.234 These economists assume, cor-
234 See, e.g., Stavins, supra note 116, at 302-03 (describing emissions trading as promoting 
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rectly, that making more reductions will generally require more inno-
vation than making fewer reductions. Accordingly, cheap sources 
wishing to sell credits to polluters with more expensive control op-
tions innovate more than they would absent emissions trading. This 
argument focuses very narrowly on pollution sources with relatively 
cheap control options and does not consider how emissions trading 
might effect innovation at the pollution sources with relatively expen-
sive control options. 
Broadening the analysis to include all of the pollution sources eligi-
ble to trade casts grave doubts on the theory that emissions trading 
encourages more innovation than a comparable traditional regulation, 
as some economists have realized.235 An emissions trading program 
creates two incentives: an incentive for the cheaper facility to emit 
less pollution than the government will authorize; and an incentive for 
the more expensive facility to emit more pollution than the govern-
ment will authorize under a comparable traditional regulation.236 In 
emissions trading, foregoing normally required emission reductions 
at plants with relatively expensive control options finances "addi-
tional" reductions (reductions going beyond requirements) at cheaper 
facilities.237 The money saved by foregoing emission reductions at one 
facility finances the "extra" emission reductions at another.238 
At a minimum, this means that an emissions trading program de-
creases the incentives for innovations at relatively expensive facili-
ties, since operators of these facilities will emit more than they would 
under a comparable uniform standard.239 These operators, who might 
have tried to innovate to escape expensive pollution control require-
ments under a traditional performance standard, will tend to purchase 
credits instead. 
Emissions trading may induce less net innovation than traditional 
regulation.240 The trading program effectively lessens or eliminates 
"dynamic efficiency," i.e., technological innovation); Gary E. Marchant, Freezing Carbon Dioxide 
Emissions: An Offset Policy for Slowing Global Warming, 22 ENVTL. L. 623, 630 (1992) 
(applying this reasoning to the climate change problem). 
235 See, e.g., David A. Malueg, Emissions Credit Trading and The Incentive to Adopt New 
Pollution Abatement Technology, 16 J. ENV'T ECON. & MAN. 52 (1987). 
236 See Marchant, supra note 234, at 629 (emissions trading encourages "firms with lower 
marginal costs of reducing pollution to reduce more emissions than firms with higher marginal 
costs."). 
237 Driesen, supra note 2, at 337. 
238 Id. 
239 Id. at 334. 
240 See Dubash, supra note 164, at 73-74 (joint implementation lessens the incentive to inno-
vate). 
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the pollution control obligations of the sources having the greatest 
need for innovation, those facing high control costs. It provides an 
incentive for low cost sources to make more reductions than a regu-
lation would otherwise require. But the low cost sources may meet 
their needs with conventional technology, since achieving reductions 
for them is relatively cheap. Emissions trading, by shifting reductions 
from high cost to low cost facilities, may weaken incentives for inno-
vation, even while it generates short-term cost savings. 
Traditional regulation requires emission reductions from specifi-
cally targeted pollution sources. It does not allow polluters to forego 
control of a targeted source in exchange for a reduction elsewhere. 
This locational constraint may increase the need for innovation by 
requiring very focused pollution control efforts that might be expen-
sive absent innovation. Easing the spatial constraints of traditional 
regulation may make it easier to choose some standard technology at 
a pollution source where control costs are inexpensive, rather than 
encourage innovation. If countries trade a large volume of environ-
mental benefits under the Climate Change Convention, this may im-
pede innovation for similar reasons. 
Developed countries, if required to make substantial domestic re-
ductions in greenhouse gas emissions, may induce substantial innova-
tion.241 Indeed, President Clinton has announced an implementation 
strategy designed to encourage innovation in the United States. In 
particular, his policy seeks to encourage development of very energy 
efficient vehicles, renewable energy, and energy conservation. Other 
countries have announced strategies to induce similar changes, using 
a wide variety of fiscal, regulatory, and social mechanisms.242 Imple-
mentation of these packages, however, may provoke resistance, espe-
cially if policies encourage use of innovative technologies that may 
displace lucrative existing technologies. 
Trading offers a country the opportunity to make less domestic 
change to the degree it purchases credits abroad. Since innovation 
often involves significant initial costs, trading may create an economic 
incentive to deploy existing technology abroad in lieu of innovation at 
home.248 
241 See Woodward, supra note 15, at 217 (many nations look to the United States for leadership 
and innovative technology in addressing climate change). 
242 See, e.g., When Virtue Pays a Premium, THE ECONOMIST, Apr. 18, 1998, at 57 [hereinafter 
Virtue] (referring to Sweden's carbon tax and Germany's subsidy of wind power). 
243 See JOINT IMPLEMENTATION, supra note 161, at 75-76. 
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Suppose, for example, that an American electric utility faces emis-
sion limitations stringent enough to force it to increase reliance on 
renewable energy sources and fuel cells.244 Given an international 
trading option, the utility may earn equivalent credits building a 
coal-burning power plant using standard technologies in a country 
that burns coal directly to heat buildings, cook, and power small 
industries.245 Or it may retrofit an existing dirty coal-fired power plant 
abroad.246 Even if use of standard technology abroad produces equiva-
lent emission reductions at less cost than domestic reductions, the use 
of standard technology does nothing to support the process of devel-
oping renewable energy resources or advanced technologies.247 It con-
sequently does nothing to change the cost differential that prevents 
the widespread deployment of technologies with much lower emis-
sions.248 More initially expensive investments in developing and ap-
plying renewable energy might lower this cost differential over time; 
past investments have already substantially lowered the cost of pro-
ducing renewable energy.249 A decision to retrofit a Russian power 
plant (for example) resembles homeowner's decision to patch a leaky 
spot on the roof, rather than to begin building a new roof capable of 
withstanding future storms. 
Trading may not only discourage the up-front investment in inno-
vation necessary to develop new technologies with some initial costs, 
it may lead to avoidance of inexpensive but institutionally difficult 
energy efficiency improvements. Wide agreement exists that fairly 
244 Renewable energy sources include solar energy, biomass, hydropower, and geothermal 
power. See IPCC IMPACTS, sU'JYf'a note 15, at 589,602-16. Fuel cells convert chemical energy 
into electricity without burning fossil fuels. See id. at 594; see also Matthew L. Wald, Fuel Cell 
Will Supply All Power to a Test House, N.Y. TIMES, June 17, 1998, at A28. 
245 See IPCC IMPACTS, sU'JYf'a note 15, at 596. Coal is the most carbon intensive fossil fuel. See 
IPCC DIMENSIONS, su'JYf'a note 15, at 241. 
246 See Chris Rolfe, An Environmental Perspective on International Greenhouse Gas Emis-
sion Trading (visited May 10, 1998) <http://www.vcn.bc.calwceVwcelpubll998112249.html>. 
247 For a general review of available and advanced technological options for reducing green-
house gas emissions see IPCC IMPACTS, sU'JYf'a note 15, at 589--640. See also IPCC DIMENSIONS, 
su'JYf'a note 15, at 329 (a special effort is necessary to reverse the strong tendency for fossil fuel 
technology to become the major future supply source for developing countries). 
246 See Wald, sU'JYf'a note 244, at A28 (the idea of fuel cells has been around for 100 years, but 
until recently fuel cells were too expensive for every day applications.). 
249 See IPCC DIMENSIONS, su'Jyf'a note 15, at 242 (costs of renewable energy are falling partly 
because of "learning effects" and "economies of scale"). See, e.g., Honda Sets Goal of Zero Waste 
Discharges, Greenlwuse GaB Cuts at All Domestic Sites, 21 Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA) 428 (Apr. 
29, 1998) (Honda announces a solar electric power generation system that reduces power 
generation costs substantially); Wald, su'JYf'a note 244, at A28 (explaining that fuel cell costs are 
falling and are expected to fall further, especially if mass produced). 
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large cuts in greenhouse gas emissions are available at little or no net 
cost through investments in energy efficiency, which tend to reduce 
consumption of fossil fuels and associated greenhouse gas emissions.250 
Many energy efficiency improvements tend to produce enough sav-
ings in fuel costs to finance the initial cost of introducing greater 
efficiency. 
Substantial institutional barriers make it difficult to implement 
these inexpensive reductions.251 The actual free market economy, as 
opposed to the perfect market economists model, often fails to realize 
cost saving emission reductions. Energy efficiency investments that 
save money for the society as a whole over a long period of time do 
not necessarily appear economic to the people in a logical position to 
make investments. For example, a homeowner may not invest in 
insulation, energy efficient lighting, and energy efficient appliances 
that would more than pay for themselves in a few years. The home-
owner may not have the resources to make the required up-front 
investment or may not plan to live in a house long enough to realize 
the full return on the investment. 
Similarly, cultural factors, not just costs, help explain the increased 
use of passenger cars in the United States, which contributes to 
climate change.252 Reversing this increase would no doubt require 
politically difficult changes, even if a shift to mass transit were eco-
nomically attractive.253 
In many cases, realizing free or very inexpensive "no regrets" 
options requires significant institutional reforms that require political 
effort.254 Government officials may find it easier to realize more expen-
250 See IPCC DIMENSIONS, supra note 15, at 12-13 (citing agreement that energy efficiency 
gains of 10% to 30% above baseline trends is available over the next two to three decades at 
negative to zero net cost and that greater free improvements are available over longer time 
scales); see also ALLIANCE TO SAVE ENERGY ET AL., ENERGY INNOVATIONS: A PROSPEROUS 
PATH TO A CLEAN ENVIRONMENT (1997) (making policy recommendations designed to realize 
a large amount of reductions while accomplishing a net savings of $58 billion by 2010). 
251 See RolfSelrod & Asbjom 'lbrvanger, What Might the Minimum Requirementsfor Making 
the Mechanism of Implementation Under the Climate Change Convention Credible and Op-
eration, in OPPORTUNITIES AND ApPREHENSIONS, supra note 161, at 8 (discussing the existence 
of institutional and other barriers to "no regrets" (i.e. profitable) options). 
252 See Craig N. Oren, Getting Commuters Out of Their Cars: What Went Wrong, 17 STAN. 
ENVTL. L.J. 141, 160-74 (1998). Economic cost also plays a role. See id. at 165 (citing the drop 
in the cost of auto travel as a key reason for increased vehicle use). 
253 See id. at 190-98 (explaining the reasons for the failure of an employee trip reduction 
program in the Clean Air Act). 
254 The term "no regrets" refers to measures that would address climate change, but would 
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sive reductions abroad, than to realize cheap reductions at home that 
require political and cultural change. 
The broader the universe of trading opportunities, the greater the 
potential to find cheap fixes that avoid long-term investments.255 In 
crafting agreements about trading, the international community faces 
important issues about the appropriate geographic breadth of trading 
and about which countries may trade. The degree of the threat to 
innovation depends on the particulars of the law governing trading. 
Geographically broad trading opportunities to realize credits for using 
standard technologies or planting trees may facilitate avoidance of 
investments in energy efficiency and renewable energy. 
2. The Importance of Innovation under the Climate Change 
Convention 
Avoidance of innovation would have important consequences for 
the future of the treaty. As explained above, the Convention relies 
upon innovation from developed countries to meet its goals. Article 2 
of the Kyoto Protocol explicitly encourages one type of innovation of 
special importance to climate change, increased use of "new and re-
be worth doing anyway, even if no climate change problem existed, usually for economic reasons. 
IPCC DIMENSIONS, supra note 15, at 15 n.2. 
2M Even if the Climate treaty did nothing to authorize international trading, countries could 
employ domestic emissions trading to meet their national limits for greenhouse gas emissions. 
This would allow developed countries, the only countries with quantitative limits under the 
Kyoto Protocol, to reduce their costs of meeting greenhouse gas limitations. This would allow 
some avoidance of innovation. But to the extent reasonably easy things are already being done, 
some industries might have to innovate in order for a country to meet its limit. 
If one can only trade emission reductions with the OECD countries, then one can only avoid 
innovation until the limits of existing technologies are exhausted in all of these technically 
advanced countries. This may allow more deferral of innovation than a purely domestic trading 
regime would allow. But since these countries are also advanced, and they have capped green-
house gas emissions under the Kyoto Protocol, limits on greenhouse gas emissions might 
continue to drive some innovation. 
If one can trade with Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, the opportunities to avoid 
innovation become much greater. These countries have extremely dirty and antiquated means 
of producing power, including coal- burning power plants with very high carbon dioxide emis-
sions. See Ryszard Janikowski et al., Joint Implementation Projects Between the Netherlands 
and Poland, in JOINT IMPLEMENTATION, supra note 161, at 133 (describing Polish emission 
sources). This means that western countries can purchase emission reduction credits by helping 
to "modernize" existing power plants with current standard western technologies. Extending 
trading to developing countries would increase the opportunities to avoid innovation enor-
mously, since so many developing countries could reduce emissions by retrofitting existing older 
facilities. 
Allowing credit for tree planting also expands the opportunities to avoid innovation. The 
wider the area in which once can escape emission reduction obligations through tree planting, 
the greater the innovation avoidance potential. 
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newable forms of energy" in developed countries.256 Article 2 also 
encourages developed countries to make other changes relevant to 
energy policy that may require innovations, namely "enhancement of 
energy efficiency" and measures limiting greenhouse gas emissions in 
the transport sector.267 
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, an international 
panel of scientists charged with assessing the environmental and 
socio-economic impact of climate change,258 identified reducing reli-
ance upon inefficient use of fossil fuels as important to meeting climate 
change goals in a manner consistent with nations' economic aspira-
tions.269 If population and energy consumption both increase world-
wide, then continued reliance on inefficient burning of fossil fuels will 
increase, not decrease, worldwide emissions of carbon dioxide.260 
Hence, in the long run, reducing emissions while accommodating pop-
ulation growth and economic development requires reduced reliance 
upon inefficient fossil fuel consumption.261 This necessarily implies 
deploying alternative renewable energy and improving energy effi-
ciency.262 
Society tends to rely on fossil fuel burning to generate energy, 
because fossil fuel traditionally costs less than renewable forms of 
energy.263 Policies tending to perpetuate this cost differential pose a 
serious barrier to reducing reliance on fossil fuels, especially for de-
veloping countries.264 The Kyoto Protocol recognizes this and recom-
mends that developed countries phase out fiscal incentives in the 
2Ii6 Kyoto Protocol, supra note 10, art. 2(1)(a)(iv), 37 I.L.M. at 32. 
257 [d. art. 2(1)(a)(i), (v), 37 I.L.M. at 33. 
258 See Protection of Global Climate for Present and Future Generations of Mankind, G.A. 
Res. 53, U.N. GAOR, 43rd Sess., Supp. No. 49, at 133-34, U.N. Doc. AlRES/43I53 (1988). For 
background on the fonnation of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change OPCC), see 
Bodansky, supra note 2, at 463-65; see also Framework Convention, supra note 9, art. 21(2), 31 
I.L.M. at 870 (providing for cooperation between the interim Secretariat of the Convention and 
the IPCC). 
259 See IPCC IMPACTS, supra note 15, at 39-49; see also IPCC DIMENSIONS, supra note 15, at 
229-31 (discussing costs of these options); Rodas, supra note 170, at 92 (developing country 
state-of-the-art energy efficiency and renewable energy investments essential to economic 
growth without increased fossil fuel use). 
260 See IPCC DIMENSIONS, supra note 15, at 236. 
261 See IPCC, RADIATIVE FORCING, supra note 92, at 266 ("[F]ossil fuel C02 emissions 
contribute more to current and potential future climate change than any other single gas 
released by any other single human activity."); see also id. at 270 (assumptions about population 
and per capita income "are important sources of differences in projected emissions."). 
262 See INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW ANTHOLOGY 466 (Anthony D'amato & Kir-
sten Engel eds., 1996). 
263 See Cleaner Energy, THE ECONOMIST, Apr. 18, 1998, at 17. 
264 See id. (explaining how carbon taxes might help reduce carbon dioxide emissions). 
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"greenhouse gas emitting sectors that run counter to" the Conven-
tion's objectives.265 The United States, for example, actually subsi-
dizes fossil fuel burning through a wide variety of fiscal measures, 
including the oil depletion allowance and other tax breaks for the coal 
and oil industries.266 
In addition, decisions to retrofit old plants or build new coal-fired 
power plants abroad may actually make it harder to switch to cleaner 
technologies once they become available. Once investors make fresh 
investments in older plants, they may want to keep these plants 
running for a long time in order to maximize the return from these 
sunk costs. However, countries may invest in cleaner renewable en-
ergy and avoid costly retrofits or fresh investments in dirty old tech-
nology if they have cleaner technologies available. 
Innovation tends to reduce costs in the long run.267 Innovations 
tending to bring down the cost of renewable energy268 and improve 
energy efficiency may be essential to meeting the Framework Con-
vention's objective of avoiding dangerous climate change.269 
Lowering costs through innovation, however, does not constitute a 
free lunch. Typically technological innovation follows investment, 
sometimes costly investment, in researching, developing, and deploy-
ing new technologies.27o Similarly, realizing opportunities to improve 
energy efficiency, even when profitable, may require difficult institu-
tional changes that government officials may find challenging. 
Long-term societal benefits that accrue from the development of 
cleaner technologies may involve some short-term costs for some 
266 Kyoto Protocol, supra note 10, art. 2(1)(a)(v), 37 I.L.M. at 33. 
266 See Gelbspan, supra note 107, at 27 (calling for redirection of the $21 billion the United 
States invests in subsidizing fossil fuels and listing some of the subsidies); Beard, supra note 
56, at 201 (stating that the United States provides tax breaks and other subsidies to producers 
of coal, oil, natural gas, and uranium). Other countries also subsidize fossil fuels. See, e.g., Cleaner 
Energy, THE ECONOMIST, Apr. 18, 1998, at 17 (Germans pay a mandatory premium on electric 
bills to support the coal industry). 
267 See, e.g., Wirth, supra note 12, at 2657 (noting cost saving potential of energy efficiency 
and conservation). 
268 See Virtue supra note 242, at 57 ("[R]enewables are becoming less expensive."). 
269 See Gelbspan, supra note 107, at 22-26 (arguing that effectively addressing climate change 
requires a switch from fossil fuels to renewable energy sources); Irving M. Mintzer, Institutional 
Options and Operational Challenges in the Management of a Joint Implementation Regime in 
CRITERIA, supra note 18, at 47-48 (focusing joint implementation exclusively on the cheapest 
reduction options "will delay the development of technologies with the potential for the large 
emissions reductions that will be needed over the long term for stabilizing atmospheric concen-
trations" of greenhouse gases). 
270 See generally Mintzer, supra note 269 (describing increased corporate investment in re-
newables); JOHN L. BERGER, CHARGING AHEAD: THE BUSINESS OF RENEWABLE ENERGY AND 
WHAT IT MEANS TO AMERICA (1997). 
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sectors.271 Cheaper, cleaner power and more efficient energy use may 
harm producers of more expensive, dirtier fossil fuels.272 Most pro-
gress involving any kind of technological change produces some win-
ners and some losers.273 
Societal decisions to make these kinds of investments may resem-
ble, in some respects, a homeowner's decision to buy a new roof. Even 
if buying a new roof saves money in the long run, it involves higher 
short-term costs than just patching it. 
3. Disrupting the Normative Community Through Violation of the 
Leadership Principle 
Avoiding innovation may conflict with the leadership principle. This 
may have important consequences for future treaty development. As 
explained above, the Framework Convention features an agreement 
that developed countries will provide leadership through innovation 
and technological transfer. This forms an essential predicate to future 
agreements to make further progress. 
Trading increases the risk that countries and industries that have 
the capacity to develop new technologies will fail to do so. This failure 
will make it more difficult, as a practical matter, for developing coun-
tries to agree to significant cuts in the future. With innovative tech-
nologies available, developing countries can agree to future emission 
reductions without having to drastically reduce already low levels of 
consumption. 
Emissions trading may also make future emission reductions more 
expensive for countries that generate credits for joint implementa-
tion.274 These countries may exhaust cheap emission reduction oppor-
tunities in their efforts to sell joint implementation credits.275 This 
may raise the price of future emission reductions in the credit gener-
ating countries.276 
271 See Stewart, supra note 59, at 1376 (discussing scrapping of "embedded political and social 
capital in ~xisting institutions"). 
272 See generally Gelbspan, supra note 107, at 22-27 (discussing, inter alia, fossil fuel purvey-
ors' efforts to derail efforts to address climate change effectively). 
273 See Stewart, supra note 59, at 1376 (discussing transitional costs accompanying technologi-
cal change). 
274 See JOINT IMPLEMENTATION, supra note 161, at 76. 
276 See id.j see also Prodipto Ghosh et al., Perspectives of Developing Countries on Joint 
Implementation, in OPPORTUNITIES AND ApPREHENSIONS, supra note 161, at 26-27. 
276 See JOINT IMPLEMENTATION, supra note 161, at 76. 
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Moreover, developing countries may see trading as a betrayal of the 
Framework Convention's principles.277 In the Framework Conven-
tion, the international community agreed that adopted norms, includ-
ing the leadership principle, would shape future conduct.278 To the 
extent the most powerful countries force subsequent agreements to 
depart from these norms, developing countries may feel little obliga-
tion to comply with the norms that might demand a lot of them.279 
More concretely, the overarching norm of "common but differenti-
ated responsibilities" reflects an expectation that developed countries 
will provide leadership, and that developing countries will make sub-
stantial clean-up commitments in the future. If developing countries 
believe that developed countries have not exercised the required 
leadership, they may be more reluctant to assume serious commit-
ments in the future.280 Developing countries may correctly conclude 
that developed countries have not complied with the leadership prin-
ciple if they trade frequently enough to avoid innovation. 
This does not establish that all purchases of credits inherently 
conflict with the leadership principle. International trading rules that 
only allow credits for innovative projects could assure that trading 
did not undermine innovation. These rules could allow countries to 
earn credits through subsidizing renewable energy abroad, but disal-
low credits earned through retrofitting coal burning power plants, for 
example. Even trading that does not discourage innovation, however, 
might still conflict with the leadership principle. After all, the leader-
ship principle calls on developed countries to assume greater reduc-
tion responsibilities. To the extent a developed country chooses to 
purchase reduction credits abroad in lieu of making reductions at 
m See id. at 182 (discussing objections to "principle of joint implementation"). 
278 See generally KRATOCHWIL, supra note 7, at 70 (stating that norms rule out certain 
methods of goal seeking). Different disciplines use the term ''norm'' in different ways. See 
Cooter, su'JYf'a note 8, at 1656. I use it to refer to obligations. See id. at 1656-57 (endorsing this 
use of the term of legal discussions). 
2'llI See IPCC IMPACTS, supra note 15, at 83 (''The concept of equity is prominent in the 
Framework Convention on Climate Change because of the need to gain a widespread audi-
ence."); Chinese Official Says Western Nations Attempting to Shirk Climate Responsibility, 
Int'l Env't Daily (BNA) d8 (Dec. 10, 1997); Companies Encouraged to Participate in Pilot Phase 
of Joint Implementation, Int'l Env't Daily (BNA) d2 (May 25, 1995) (discussing perception 
among developing countries that developed countries will use joint implementation to shirk 
their responsibilities). 
21r1 Indeed, the developing countries have insisted that they are not yet willing to assume 
reduction commitments, in part, because the developed countries have not met the national 
emission stabilization target they agreed to in the Framework Convention. See Yamin, supra 
note 180, at 1-2. 
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home, it has arguably avoided the differentiation of responsibilities 
called for in the Framework Convention.281 
On the other hand, a trading proponent might argue that the de-
veloped country has assumed greater emission reduction responsibili-
ties than the developing country to the extent the developed country 
paid for the foreign emission-reducing activity.282 Arguably, the devel-
oped country may exercise leadership by paying for a reduction, 
regardless of its location.283 
This argument might make sense if the leadership principle only 
required a differentiation of emission reduction commitments. After 
all, the differing economic capacities of nations helped justify the 
Framework Convention's differentiation of responsibilities in the first 
place.284 To the extent that developed countries finance more reduc-
tions than developing countries, perhaps they have exercised the 
required leadership in reducing emissions.285 
But the leadership principle calls for financial help and technology 
transfer as well. More concretely, the Framework Convention re-
quires developed countries to fund the "full incremental cost" of de-
veloping country compliance with the treaty, and to fund needed 
technology transfers.286 This means that trading with developing 
countries conflicts with the leadership principle. This type of trading 
enables a developed country to claim credit for meeting a required 
281 See Environment Minister Faults U.S. Policy Emissions Trading on Eve of Kyoto Talks, 
Nat'l Env't Daily (BNA) (Dec. 2, 1997), available in LEXIS, BNA library, BNAENV file 
(French Minister of Environment and Territorial Development stating that Kyoto "had not been 
called to enable 'rich polluting nations to pay poorer nations for their efforts to reduce green-
house gas emissions.''' ); Pier Vellinga & Roebijn Heintz, Joint Implementation: A Phased 
Approach, in CRITERIA, supra note 18, at 5 (arguing that joint implementation could allow 
developed countries to ''buy their way out of their obligation to take the lead in combating 
climate change"). 
282 This would comport with the principle that those who have the most resources should 
contribute the most to a common effort to address a problem. See THOMAS M. FRANCK, 
FAIRNESS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INSTITUTIONS 390 (1995) (attributing this principle to 
the philosopher Henry Shue). 
283 See Vellinga & Heintz, Joint Implementation: A Phased Approach, in CRITERIA, supra 
note 18, at 9 (investment in joint implementation pilot projects "can be considered" a form of 
leadership). 
284 See Bodansky, supra note 2, at 479-80, 503 (explaining that OECD countries believed that 
this difference in capacity justified differential treatment of developed and developing coun-
tries). 
285 On the other hand, developing countries believe that the differences in historical emissions 
justify different treatment. See id. at 480,503. Under this view, it is not clear why escape from 
domestic obligations through purchasing of credits would be justified. 
286 Framework Convention, supra note 9, art. 4(3-5), 31 I.L.M. at 858. 
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financial leadership obligation, which in turn justifies less leadership 
from the developed country in emission reductions. Thus, a developed 
country that trades with developing countries does not offer the 
leadership that the treaty calls for. For the treaty requires the full 
complement of emissions reductions and financial assistance from 
developed countries. 
Emissions trading with developing countries also involves double 
counting, which is detrimental to the environment.287 Without trading, 
developed country compliance with the treaty generates two sets of 
reductions: reductions from projects developed countries finance in 
developing countries and reductions developed countries (or their 
nationals) make at home. Trading allows the developed country (or its 
nationals) to take credit for reductions financed abroad to justify not 
making required reductions at home. This involves double counting 
reductions made abroad to satisfy both the financial and domestic 
emission reduction obligations. Since this generates only one set of 
reductions instead of two, the double counting trading fosters gener-
ates less net reductions than the treaty calls for.288 
Developed country financing of projects in developing countries 
does constitute financing of treaty compliance. The Framework Con-
vention obligates developing countries to adopt measures "address-
ing" greenhouse gas emissions and sinks.289 Any project that could 
arguably create credits addresses greenhouse gas emissions and 
sinks. Hence, developed countries fulfill their obligation to finance 
treaty compliance when they finance projects in developing countries. 
And claiming credits for this financing does constitute double count-
ing, as described above. 
2B7 Experts on joint implementation agree that double counting is undesirable and should be 
avoided. See, e.g., JOINT IMPLEMENTATION, Bupra note 161, at 51. 
288 Professor Tsjalle van der Burg addresses a related problem in JOINT IMPLEMENTATION, 
supra note 161, at 81-84. He argues that a government sponsored joint implementation project 
meets an "additionality" requirement if "it is not acceptable according to the investment criteria 
of the government." [d. at 84. He does not address the question of how to define the "investment 
criteria" of a government with sufficient precision to separate additional from non-additional 
projects. This criteria surely should assume that the government fully meets its treaty obliga-
tions to fund the agreed incremental cost of projects needed to comply with the treaty. Inter-
preted this way, only funding going beyond the incremental cost of treaty compliance would 
meet the additionality requirement. 
The Kyoto Protocol adopted a concept of additionality much narrower than that advocated 
by Professor Tsjalle van der Burg. Accordingly, the Kyoto Protocol's additionality requirement 
does not by itself solve the double counting problem identified above, even if Professor van der 
Burg's broader concept of additionality, as interpreted here, would address this adequately. 
289 Framework Convention, supra note 9, art. 4(1)(b), 31 I.L.M. at 855. 
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The COP has made one decision that might address this issue. In 
1995, the COP agreed that "the financing of activities implemented 
jointly shall be additional to the financial obligations of" developed 
countries under the Framework Convention.290 The developed coun-
tries already have a financial obligation to finance the "full agreed 
incremental cost" of the developing countries' very general obligation 
to address greenhouse gas emissions and sink removals under Article 
4.291 Hence, this restriction could bar joint implementation with devel-
oping countries altogether. 
One could argue that this financial "additionality" language (requir-
ing that projects funded for credit be additional to those that devel-
oped countries must finance) only applies to projects undertaken 
without earning credits during the pilot phase. This language comes 
from the COP decision establishing a pilot phase of joint implementa-
tion in which no party would earn credits and the international com-
munity would evaluate the feasibility of joint implementation for 
credit.292 But this restriction on financial double counting applies to 
"activities implemented jointly," not just to activities implemented 
jointly under the pilot program.293 Hence, the language may apply to 
all activities implemented jointly, including subsequent projects for 
credit. Other sentences in the same decision expressly limit them-
selves to activities undertaken during the pilot phase. This suggests 
that the COP knew how to limit its decisions to pilot phase projects 
when it wanted, but did not do so with respect to the financial addi-
tionality requirement.294 
Assuming that this financial additionality requirement does apply 
to joint implementation generally (which seems likely), it may still 
allow some joint implementation for credit. Other language in the 
same decision specifically authorizes joint implementation of activities 
in developing countries, at least during the pilot phase.295 This would 
seem inconsistent with reading the financial additionality require-
ment to prohibit joint implementation altogether. 
290 Pilot Phase Decision, supra note 168, at 19. 
291 Framework Convention, supra note 9, art. 4(1)(b)(2), (3), 31 LL.M. at 854. 
292 See Pilot Phase Decision, supra note 168, at 19. 
293 Id. (The COP decided "that the financing of activities implemented jointly shall be addi-
tional to the financial obligations of Parties included in Annex I .... "). 
294 See id. 
295 See id. (The COP decided "to establish a pilot phase for activities implemented jointly 
among Annex I Parties and, on a voluntary basis, with non-Annex I Parties that so request."). 
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On the other hand, if the COP allows any trade with developing 
countries, it may not really address this problem of conflict with the 
leadership principle.296 For developed countries should fund the full 
agreed incremental cost of any project addressing climate change 
under the Framework Convention's terms. 
The conflict between funding projects in developing countries for 
credit and the leadership principle may strike some policy makers as 
formalistic. After all, developed countries have not always provided 
all of the funds that the Framework Convention requires.297 Most 
countries face political and budgetary constraints that make full fund-
ing difficult.298 Emissions trading may tap a new source of financing-
private sector money-since polluters can earn credits by funding 
emission reductions abroad.299 
As a practical matter, however, funding projects abroad for credit 
does not augment the effort to address climate change. Generating 
credits makes compliance with existing developed country obligations 
cheaper, since the purchaser uses a project's reductions in emissions 
to justify doing less at home. By contrast, funding that generates 
emission reductions without credits (as envisioned by the financial 
assistance provisions) generates reductions in developing countries, 
296 The Kyoto Protocol does establish a Clean Development Mechanism to certify projects in 
developing countries that may generate credits. See Kyoto Protocol, supra note 10, art. 12, 37 
I.L.M. at 38. Hence, the policy issue addressed in the COP decision remains relevant to the 
implementation of this provision. Furthermore, the United States may seek broader authority 
to trade with developing countries. 
297 See Decision 9ICP.2: Communications from Parties Included in Annex I to the Conven-
tion: Guidelines, Schedule and Process for Consideration, FCCC/COP, 2nd Sess., at 17 U.N. 
Doc. FCCC/CP/1996/15/Add.1 (1996) (recognizing "need to address the concern" that developed 
countries listed in Annex II are failing to meet their commitments to technology transfer and 
funding); Laura H. Kosloff, Climate Change Mitigation and Sustainable Development, 12 FALL 
NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T 93,96 (1997) (stating that budget contraints may cause governments 
to reallocate existing aid, rather than augment net developmental assistance to address climate 
change). 
298 See generally Irving M. Mintzer, Institutional Options and Operational Challenges in the 
Management of a Joint Implementation Regime in CRITERIA, supra note 18, at 47 (discussing 
the decline in funds available for public expenditures [as of 1994]). 
299 See William R. Moomaw, Achieving Joint Benefitfrom Joint Implementation, in CRITERIA, 
supra note 18, at 13; Sid Embree, Investing in Less Greenhouse Gas Intensive Development: 
What Joint Implementation Could Be?, in OPPORTUNITIES AND ApPREHENSIONS, supra note 
161, at 90-91. Sid Embree argues that joint implementation will not disrupt other aid flows. See 
id. But the problem raised above is more fundamental. Surely if the developed countries are 
fully meeting their obligations under the Climate Change Convention, little need should exist 
for joint implementation. Implicitly repudiating this obligation remains a problem. 
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which are in addition to those that the developed countries make at 
home. 
Furthermore, treating the obligation to fund full incremental cost 
as merely a formalistic requirement may undermine the normative 
community that must develop the treaty.300 Claiming credits for ac-
tivities that developed countries had promised to perform without 
credits amounts to treating the funding obligation as a mere techni-
cality of no importance. But this funding commitment forms part of 
the normative structure that led the developing countries to accept 
common (albeit differentiated) responsibilities.30l Undermining this 
norm may lessen developing countries' sense that they have an obli-
gation to comply with the part of the norm that poses political difficul-
ties for them.302 
Trading away this obligation to fund adds insult to the injury of any 
funding shortfalls.303 Providing inadequate funding obviously under-
mines the treaty's effectiveness. But countries understand that a 
failure to fully meet an obligation does not amount to a repudiation of 
the obligation.304 Creating a structure that fails to treat the obligation 
seriously, however, comes perilously close to repudiation and may 
therefore undermine the entire regime.305 
B. Trading and Democratic Accountability 
Proponents of the free lunch theory of emissions trading suggest 
that trading enhances democratic decision-making by focusing public 
attention on the right question, the quantity of desired total emission 
300 I use the term "normative community" to capture the idea that those involved in creating 
the international regime governing climate change share a set of expectations and some knowl-
edge that contributes to the evolution of legal norms developing the regime. See generally 
JURGIELEWICZ, supra note 8 at 100-08 (describing international legal regimes); Rose, supra 
note 7, at 32 (discussing how stories of a common past and history may help persuade "a social 
and moral community" to cooperate in resource management). 
301 See GUPTA, supra note 160, at 119 (Brazilian officials called joint implementation "fraudu-
lent and dishonest" while pointing out that developed countries have an obligation to transfer 
technology under the Framework Convention.). 
8m! See generally Activities Implemented Jointly under the Pilot Phase: Submission by the 
Group of 77 and China, Note by the Secretariat, FCCC/SBSTA, 6th Sess., U.N. Doc. 
FCCC/SBSTAlI997/Misc. Doc. 5 (1997). 
303 In order to address this problem some have proposed only allowing joint implementation 
after investing countries have allocated .7% of their GNP to official development assistance. See 
JOINT IMPLEMENTATION, supra note 161, at 49. 
304 See KRATOCHWIL, supra note 7, at 63 (discussing the importance of the justification and 
explanation for violations of treaty regimes). 
305 Nazrov Dubash has argued that the existence of joint implementation opportunities will 
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reductions.306 Public decision-making, however, can focus on the total 
quantity of net emission reductions whether or not the government 
chooses to use emissions trading as a means of meeting the chosen 
quantity of emission reductions.307 
The free lunch theory's narrow focus upon democratic decision-
making ignores the issue of democratic accountability for implement-
ing public decisions.8Os I have argued elsewhere that emissions trading 
may layer the complexities of emissions trading, which usually are 
formidable, on top of the complications involved in setting and enforc-
ing emission limitations.309 This complexity may make citizen partici-
pation in designing and implementing an emissions trading program 
even more difficult than citizen participation in designing and imple-
menting a comparable traditional regulation written by the same 
institution. To evaluate the issue of democratic accountability for 
implementing decisions made in the international arena, we need 
some understanding of enforcement and democratic accountability in 
that setting. 
In order for an international environmental regime to succeed, 
three steps must take place. First, a group of states must create in-
ternationallaw. Professor Harold Koh refers to this as "norm" enun-
ciation.310 Second, nations must adopt national laws and programs to 
increase the incentives to inadequately fund the financial mechanism under the Framework 
Convention. See Nazrov K. Dubash, Commoditizing Carbon: Social and Environmental Impli-
cations of Joint Implementation, in OPPORTUNITIES AND ApPREHENSIONS, supra note 161, at 
77. 
306 See Ackerman & Stewart, supra note 4, at 189 (when environmental statutes come up for 
revision, citizens may focus on the question of the appropriate quantitative reduction in pollution 
rights). 
307 See Driesen, supra note 2, at 328 (explaining that Congress enacted quantitative limits on 
pollution in several places in the 1990 Amendments to the Clean Air Act). 
308 While Ackerman and Stewart fail to discuss public involvement in implementation of 
agreed upon reductions, they do discuss enforcement from a bureaucratic perspective. See 
Ackerman & Stewart, supra note 4, at 181--83. They argue that the auction of rights to pollute 
would increase the incentives for agencies to effectively monitor and enforce pollution laws. See 
id. As I have pointed out elsewhere, this argument does not necessarily apply to trading systems 
without an auction of pollution rights. See Driesen, supra note 2, at 320-21 n.150. I have also 
argued that this argument does not withstand careful analysis in light of the history of emissions 
trading. See id. Environmentalists have secured effective monitoring of sulfur dioxide emissions 
in the acid rain program by bargaining hard for it as a condition for supporting the program. 
In most other cases, emissions trading has proceeded without adequate monitoring. 
309 See Driesen, supra note 2, at 329-30; see also Barry D. Nussbaum, Phasing Down Lead in 
Gasoline in the United States, in OECD CLIMATE CHANGE: DESIGNING A TRADABLE PERMIT 
SYSTEM 27-28 (1992) (explaining why bubbles are more complex than traditional regulations). 
310 Koh, Why Nations Obey?, supra note 119, at 2639 (discussing norm "enunciation" or 
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implement the internationally agreed upon norms.311 Third, the na-
tionallaws and programs must induce private actions that protect the 
environment.3l2 One can evaluate a substantive international legal 
regime's ability to foster democratic accountability based on its ten-
dency to hinder or help public efforts to hold officials responsible for: 
(1) adequate international norm enunciation; (2) national compliance; 
and (3) private actions implementing the norms.3l3 
Emissions trading may interfere with accountability in several 
ways. First, it may disrupt the process of translating general inter-
national goals into specific concrete national commitments. 3l4 Second, 
it may make it more difficult to hold government officials accountable 
for meeting agreed upon national commitments. Finally, it may un-
dermine the overarching international principle of national responsi-
bility for private sector emissions emanating from a country's terri-
tory, an important overarching international norm tending to support 
accountability. Below, I discuss these threats to democratic account-
ability in the context of the Climate Change Convention. 
''interpretation''). See generally Koh, Transnational, supra note 119. This norm enunciation step 
constitutes one step of a three phase legal process through which nations come to obey inter-
national legal rules. See Koh, Why Nations Obey?, supra note 119, at 2646. Professor Koh plans 
to elaborate on this process in a forthcoming book. See id. at 2646 n.237. This article's legal 
process description is intended to describe fairly simply what must occur for an international 
environmental regime to function. I make no claim to provide a universally applicable descrip-
tion of international legal process. Indeed, international environmental law may be different 
from other international legal regimes in that it requires not just restraints on state action, but 
effective affirmative state actions to secure private actions affirmatively contributing to the 
objectives of international agreements. See JURGIELEWICZ, supra note 8, at 111-12 (discussing 
the generation of norms through international regimes). 
3lI See Koh, Transnational, supra note 119, at 204 ("Law-abiding states internalize interna-
tionallaw by incorporating it into their domestic legal and political structures .... ") [emphasis 
in original]; THOMAS M. FRANCK, FAIRNESS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INSTITUTIONS 
373-76 (1995) (discussing relationship between international law and national action). 
312 See JAMES CAMERON, JACOB WERKSMAN, & PETER RODERICK, IMPROVING COMPLIANCE 
WITH INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 53 (1996). 
313 See Weiss, supra note 25, at 695-96 (explaining that effective implementation requires state 
implementation and effective private responses); JURGIELEWICZ, supra note 8, at 113 (explain-
ing how international regimes foster "accountability of states" to their own populations, other 
states, and the international public), 248 (pointing out that ''laws heighten public expectations"); 
INSTITUTIONS FOR THE EARTH: SOURCES OF EFFECTIVE INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL 
PROTECTION 246-47 (1993) (public support was critical to adoption and implementation of 
effective regulations addressing oil pollution). 
314 Democratic accountability does playa role in this process. See PATERSON, supra note 85, 
at 61-62 (describing how the United States modified its position on climate change after George 
Bush endured public criticism for his initial position). 
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Many international treaties fail to realize their objectives because 
they do not articulate precise enough internationallaw.Bl5 This lack of 
precision may make it difficult to hold national officials accountable 
for favoring good or bad international legal rules.Bl6 Perhaps more 
importantly, these imprecise laws tend to foster national failures to 
take concrete actions to meet the regime's goals. Bl7 The public may 
have difficulty holding national government officials accountable for 
violating an international legal norm, if the norm does not clearly 
explain what international law demands of a country.BIB 
The Framework Convention articulates a broad normative idea 
that nations should avoid dangerous climate change.Bl9 It translates 
this broad norm into a developed country "aim" of returning green-
house gas emissions to 1990 levels by the year 2000.320 This locution 
makes it difficult to give national leaders either credit or blame for 
committing to stabilize emissions (or deciding not to do anything). The 
315 See MABEY, supra note 55, at 10 (while the Montreal Protocol "enforced substantive 
controls" many other multilateral agreements did not); Ardia, supra note 38, at 504 ("Few 
international environmental agreements contain substantive commitments .... "); Compliance 
With International Environmental Treaties: The Empirical Evidence, 92 AM. SOC'y INTL L. 
PROC. 234 (1997) [hereinafter Compliance]; cf Giselle Vigneron, Compliance and International 
Agreements: A Case Study of the 1995 United Nations Straddling Fish Stocks Agreement, 10 
GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REV. 581 (1998) (describing compliance mechanisms and concluding that 
we do not have sufficient data to evaluate actual compliance with this agreement yet); Rebecca 
Becker, MARPOL 79/78: An Overview in International Environmental Enforcement, 10 GEO. 
INT'L ENVTL. L. REV. 625 (1998) (concluding that in spite of fairly specific provisions in the 
International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, enforcement has been 
uneven). 
316 See Christopher C. Joyner, Biodiversity in the Marine Environment: Resource Implica-
tions for the Law of the Sea, 28 VAND. J. 'lRANSNATL L. 635, 650 (1995) (arguing that the United 
Nations Convention on Biological Diversity lacks specific provisions that would "control parties 
whose nationals violate norms associated with" preserving marine biodiversity). 
317 See Developments, supra note 35, at 1504-07 (discussing the problem of vague obligations 
failing to bind states). On the other hand, some evidence exists that ambitious, non-binding 
instruments may have more influence on behavior than modest binding agreements. See Com-
pliance, supra note 315, at 241-50. Those who propose new models based on this seem to agree 
that the Climate Change Convention needs binding commitments, but that stronger non-binding 
commitments should supplement these binding commitments. See id. at 248-49. 
318 See id. at 238 (explaining that vague language in the Convention on Biodiversity makes it 
"quite hard to determine when a state ... has ... committed an internationally wrongful act"); 
Koh, Why Nations Obey?, supra note 119 at 2640 (noting the role of non-governmental organi-
zations in norm "interpretation"). 
319 See Framework Convention, supra note 9, art. 2, 31 I.L.M. at 854. 
320 Id. art. 4(2)(b), 31 I.L.M. at 857. 
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phrasing makes it difficult to state whether the leaders have agreed 
to a binding limit stabilizing emissions or not.321 The mention of a 
concrete target certainly suggests a serious commitment. But the use 
of the term "aim" might suggest something more akin to a goal than 
a binding commitment. 
Furthermore, this ambiguity made it difficult to hold nations ac-
countable for emission increases after the adoption of the Framework 
Convention. It is difficult to argue that developed countries that 
increased their emissions (such as the United States) violated an 
international agreement. Hence, the Framework Convention had lit-
tle normative force as a generator of concrete actions. 
Annex B to the Kyoto Protocol, however, seems to help clarify 
national obligations under the Climate Change Convention.322 It es-
tablishes national quantified emission limitations, stated as a percent-
age reduction in greenhouse gas emissions below 1990 levels. Article 
3, section 1 clearly establishes these limits as binding, stating that the 
developed country parties "shall . . . ensure that their ... emissions 
of ... greenhouse gases ... do not exceed their assigned amounts."323 
This means that while holding the international community account-
able for any particular accomplishment is difficult, the Protocol, ab-
sent trading, establishes a clear basis for holding each developed 
nation accountable for meeting a quantifiable national commitment.324 
The national caps in Annex B seem to translate an amorphous inter-
national goal, preventing dangerous climate change, into fairly spe-
cific national obligations aimed at moving toward this goal.325 
321 See JOINT IMPLEMENTATION, supra note 161, at 77 (discussing interpretation of the ''tar-
get"); Dr. Ranee Khooshie Lal Panjabie, supra note 2, at 528-29 (referring to "constructive 
ambiguities" in these articles). 
322 See Kyoto Protocol, supra note 10, Annex B, 37 I.L.M. at 42. The Kyoto Protocol, however, 
did not establish a specific aggregate emission limitation for developed counties' emissions. 
Instead, article 3, section 1 of the Protocol requires these parties to return their greenhouse 
gas emissions to country-specific levels set out in an annex to the agreement "with a view to 
reducing their overall emissions ... by five percent." [d. art. 3(1), 37 I.L.M. at 33. This "overall 
emissions" provision suffers from the same vice as the earlier "aim" to stabilize language, 
ambiguity about whether a binding commitment exists. [d. Hence, no hard cap exists for 
aggregate emissions from developed countries. 
323 [d. art. 3(1), 37 I.L.M. at 33. 
324 The Protocol, however, remains vague about when these countries must achieve these 
reductions. It requires that the parties must achieve this level between 2008 and 2012. See id. 
art. 3(7), 37 I.L.M. at 34. This means it will be impossible to recognize a failure to meet the 
target until 2012. 
325 I qualify the term "specific" with the word "fairly" because the limit applies to a basket of 
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However, these seemingly concrete physical national obligations 
vanish before the eyes of a careful reader, because of provisions 
designed to facilitate trading. In fact, the treaty may instead create 
a much less specific "virtual" obligation, a developed country's obliga-
tion to either make the required reduction or earn credits abroad 
deemed equivalent to the specified reduction under rules yet to be 
defined.326 Indeed, the Kyoto Protocol may be read as not requiring 
any emission reductions at all, to the extent it allows tree planting to 
substitute for emission reductions.327 The Kyoto Protocol now contains 
more amorphous commitments than the Protocol would have if the 
countries of the world had agreed to the reductions specified in Annex 
B without trading. 
This vagueness creates real difficulties in determining what pre-
cisely the parties have agreed to do. A post-Kyoto dispute concerning 
trading of so-called "hot air" illustrates this vagueness.328 Because of 
the economic collapse of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Un-
ion, emissions have fallen in this area since 1990, in spite of antiquated 
energy systems.329 A dispute has arisen about whether other devel-
oped countries may purchase credits reflecting this downturn in emis-
sions in lieu of physical national compliance.3ao 
If the COP allows trading of "hot air" credits, the developed coun-
tries will likely realize less aggregate emission reductions than na-
tional compliance without trading would generate.331 But to the extent 
the five percent aggregate developed country reduction target in the 
Kyoto Protocol already takes the economic downturn of countries in 
greenhouse gases, including some that are not very well monitored. Hence, the limit is more 
amorphous than a limit on a single gas would be. 
326 See Kyoto Protocol, supra note 10, arts. 3(10-12), 4, 6,12,17,37 I.L.M. at 34-35, 38, 40; cf 
Breidenich et al., supra note 100, at 327 (stating on the one hand that the Protocol establishes 
a clear, mandatory set of targets, but on the other hand, allows those targets to be increased). 
327 See Kyoto Protocol, supra note 10, arts. 3(3), (7), 6(1)(b), 37 I.L.M. at 33, 35-36. 
iI28 See CHRIS ROLFE, TuRNING DOWN THE HEAT: EMISSIONS TRADING AND CANADIAN 
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE KyOTO PROTOCOL 60, 310-12 (1998); U.N. Researcher Faults EU 
Opposition to Emission Trading for Kyoto Compliance, 21 Int'l Env't. Rep. (BNA) 415 (Apr. 
28,1998). 
329 See ROLFE, supra note 328, at 311 (Russian emissions are currently only 74% of 1990 
emissions, and they are only projected to increase to 80 or 90% of 1990 levels by 2010). 
330 See Commission Outlines 'Step-by-Step' Planfor Emissions Trading Under Kyoto Proto-
col, 21 Int'l Env't. Rep. (BNA) 551 (June 10, 1998) (describing European opposition to hot air 
credits). I use the locution "purchase credits" to encompass both purchase of emission reduction 
units under article 6 and bubbling under article 4. 
331 ROLFE, supra note 328, at 311 (Hot air trading "will allow nations buying the rights to 
increase their emissions while the nations selling them do nothing to reduce their emissions."). 
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transition to market economies into account, the developed countries 
may realize this five percent target, even if they trade "hot air."332 
Accepting this use of hot air involves interpreting the treaty as using 
the five percent target, rather than the results of each nation comply-
ing with its binding national cap, as the measuring rod of effective 
implementation. But the Protocol creates no binding obligation to 
meet the five percent target. Rather, it states that the developed 
countries "shall, individually or jointly ensure that their aggregate ... 
emissions ... do not exceed their assigned amounts ... with a view 
to reducing their overall emissions of such gases by at least 5 per-
cent."333 This language resembles the amorphous language expressing 
the Framework Convention's aim to stabilize emissions at 1990 levels 
by the year 2000.334 If compliance with this language provides the 
measuring rod for assessing implementation of the Kyoto Protocol, 
the world has made little progress in clarifying the Framework Con-
vention. 
One might hypothesize that the Kyoto Protocol clearly requires 
that developed countries at least collectively ensure that their aggre-
gate emissions equal the aggregate of their national targets.335 But to 
the extent the COP allows developed countries to claim credits for 
reductions in developing countries under Article 12, developed coun-
try emissions will likely exceed the aggregate limits as well.336 The 
provisions introduced to facilitate trading make definite simple state-
ments about what precisely the parties have agreed to accomplish 
very difficult. This hinders public understanding of the agreement and 
accountability. 
The logic of the idea of emissions trading may lead to imprecise law 
making. Emissions trading involves indifference to the location of 
reductions.337 Government officials eager to avoid accountability may 
treat the emissions trading idea as an opportunity to avoid making 
specific decisions about where reductions will come from. Indeed, 
832 See Kyoto Protocol, supra note 10, art. 3(1), 37 I.L.M. at 33; U.N. Researcher Faults EU 
Opposition to Emission Trading for Kyoto Compliance, 21 Int'l Env't. Rep. (BNA) 415 (Apr. 
28, 1998); cf Breidenich et aI., supra note 100, at 320 (emission reduction is equivalent to 5.2 
percent only if one does not take into account the 1995 base year used for HFCs, PFCs, SF6, 
and the possible use of the Clean Development Mechanism). 
888 Kyoto Protocol, supra note 10, art. 3(1), 37 I.L.M. at 33 (emphasis added). 
884 See Framework Convention, supra note 9, art. 4(2)(a), (b), 31 I.L.M. at 856-57. 
385 See Kyoto Protocol, supra note 10, art. 3(1), 37 I.L.M. at 33. 
886 See id. art. 12(3)(b), 37 I.L.M. at 38; Breidenich et aI., supra note 100, at 320. 
887 See Driesen, supra note 2, at 332. 
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emissions trading may help officials avoid specificity about what must 
be done. They may avoid specifying which pollutants polluters must 
reduce or even whether pollution must be reduced at all. To the extent 
that national leaders avoid decisions, environmental law will become 
vague and more difficult to enforce. 
Almost all environmental legal regimes involve a series of steps 
translating general requirements into concrete decisions to require 
specific emission reductions of specific polluters.338 If trading fosters 
vague law, it may seriously disrupt these environmental legal re-
gimes. 
One may design a trading program specific enough to induce a 
specific response. The acid rain program, for example, contains unusu-
ally specific decisions allocating specific numbers of allowances to emit 
sulfur dioxide to specific facilities, but then authorizes trading of these 
allowances.339 Nevertheless, the trading idea has a tendency to en-
courage vague law. 
2. Trading as an Impediment to Accountability for Meeting 
Commitments 
Trading may make it difficult to hold any given national government 
accountable for meeting treaty commitments. The degree of the un-
dermining of accountability, however, depends upon the particulars of 
the trading program. 
The Kyoto Protocol allows developed countries, rather than private 
parties, to transfer "emission reduction" units amongst themselves.34o 
This comports with the Protocol's overall structure. The Protocol does 
not create obligations for any particular private party. It only creates 
obligations for countries. Individual nations choose how to translate 
these national obligations into programs aimed at particular sources 
of emissions. Hence, the treaty relies upon national government offi-
cials taking responsibility for inducing appropriate private actions to 
reach an aggregate national target. 
338 See, e.g., David M. Driesen, Should Congress Direct the Environmental Protection Agency 
to Allow Serious Harms to Public Health to Continue?: Cost-Benefit Tests and National 
Ambient Air Quality Standards Under the Clean Air Act, 11 TuLANE ENVTL. L. REV. 217, 219 
(1998) (explaining that states decide which pollution sources to address and how stringently to 
regulate their emissions in order to meet national ambient air quality standards under the Clean 
Air Act). 
339 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 7651c(e) tbl. A, 7651d(g) tbl. B (1994) (allocating allowances to particular 
emitting units). See generally Van Dyke, sU'P"a note 225. 
340 See Kyoto Protocol, sU'P"a note 10, art. 3(10-12), 37 I.L.M. at 34. 
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The Kyoto Protocol also requires developed country parties to 
subtract or add transferred units to their "assigned amount."341 Sup-
pose that the country of "Small" emitted 100 million metric tons of 
emissions in 1990 and must make a five percent cut under Annex B 
of the Kyoto Protocol, a five million ton reduction. If that country 
purchases a million tons of carbon credits abroad, this accounting 
provision would allow Small to substract the one million tons of credits 
from its five million ton assigned reduction, yielding a requirement to 
reduce domestic emissions by only four million tons. Conversely, if 
Small sold one million tons of credits, it would have to add a million 
tons to its five million ton assigned reduction and make a six million 
ton domestic reduction. 
If the COP interprets this provision to require this adjustment 
prior to carrying out joint implementation activities, this would help 
preserve national accountability.342 Each developed country would 
have to meet a target adjusted to account for expected trades and 
could be held accountable for physically meeting the adjusted target, 
whether the trades occur or not. As long as an international body does 
the math necessary to adjust the targets properly, this may not 
greatly complicate national accountability. 
Trading may, however, proceed in a way that would make national 
accountability very difficult. For example, the COP could plausibly 
interpret the Kyoto Protocol not to require specific a priori national 
decisions about the amount of credits to purchase or sell, since most 
of the provisions for adjusting accounts do not explicitly state when 
the accounting should occur (or who should monitor it).343 
Rules that adjust national accounts after the fact might make it 
very difficult for the public to reliably monitor national implementa-
tion in a timely manner.344 Suppose, for example, that the country of 
341 [d. 
342 The Kyoto Protocol provides for advanced transfer under article 4, when countries agree 
to implement their commitments jointly. See id. art. 4(1), (2), 37 I.L.M. at 34. But articles 6 and 
12 provide for transfer of "emission reduction units" and "certified emission reductions" without 
explicitly requiring advanced adjustment of targets. See id. arts. 6, 12, 37 I.L.M. at 35, 38. See 
Vellinga & Heintz, supra note 283, at 8 (proposing separate accounting for joint implementation 
projects and dual commitments to funding reductions abroad and making some at home). 
343 See Kyoto Protocol, supra note 10, arts. 3(10), (11), 6, 12, 37 I.L.M. at 34, 35, 38; see also 
id. art. 17 (postponing decision on "accountability" for emissions trading); cf id. art. 4(1-2), 37 
I.L.M. at 34. 
344 See generally JURGIELEWICZ, supra note 8, at 113 (explaining that international regimes 
must make states accountable by "rendering their performance transparent to scrutiny by the 
international community"). 
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Big writes a plan that credibly provides for its required five percent 
reduction, but states that some unspecified amount of these reduc-
tions may come from the country of Small. Small submits a plan to 
realize its five percent reduction, but states that it may sell some 
credits to Big. If the emission reductions called for under Small's plan 
earn credits in Big, non-compliance occurs because of double counting. 
For example, suppose that both countries emit 100 million metric 
tons of carbon dioxide in 1990. Absent trading, Big would reduce its 
emissions by 5 million tons to 95 million tons (a five percent cut) and 
Small would reduce its emissions by 5 million tons to 95 million tons 
in order to comply, thus reducing their aggregate to the 190 million 
ton level. If Big claims credit for 5 million tons of Small's reductions 
made as part of Small's treaty compliance, then Small would still emit 
95 million tons at the end of the compliance period, since it would 
make the reductions it planned to make. But Big would emit 100 
million tons at the end of the period, because its credits would justify 
not making any physical reductions. Trading would then only bring 
aggregate emissions down to the 195 million ton level, a level 5 million 
tons higher than the level a non-trading program would achieve. 
Double counting would reduce program performance. 
Nobody (including the officials writing the plans) can tell whether 
national plans count the same emission reduction twice, unless the 
plans state which emission reductions will be traded and which will 
count toward domestic compliance. Hence, absent a priori decisions 
about transfers or systematic rules prohibiting and checking for dou-
ble counting, one cannot use a national plan reliably to evaluate likely 
compliance. 
Indeed, trading undermines national accountability by making it 
theoretically impossible for a country to ensure its own compliance 
with the virtual emission reduction obligation. Absent trading, coun-
tries can, by simply monitoring their own emissions and implementing 
adequate measures, make sure that they meet their emission reduc-
tion obligations. To the extent that they use trading to meet their own 
obligations, they may depend on monitoring and oversight abroad to 
ensure that the country from which they purchased credits actually 
makes the reductions. Failures outside of the national jurisdiction can 
prevent national compliance. Furthermore, countries using even well-
monitored credits cannot know whether these credits are surplus to 
the generating country's national compliance efforts (and therefore 
legitimately tradable), without evaluating another country's plans and 
compliance efforts. At the end of the compliance period one could, in 
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theory, determine whether the developed countries achieved the cuts 
envisioned by the treaty in the aggregate.345 But by then, it's too late 
to correct failures. 
Furthermore, national governments may lack sufficient incentives 
to respond to public demands to monitor joint implementation prop-
erly, because they can readily escape responsibility for failures by 
blaming them on private companies or the other country involved in 
joint implementation.346 Even if one determined precisely what went 
wrong after the fact (which would require a lot of effort and coordi-
nation),347 a problem would exist about who should accept responsibil-
ity, the credit purchasing or the credit generating country.348 
International trading also creates a perverse incentive with respect 
to monitoring. Credit users can save money by purchasing credits 
from jurisdictions incapable or unwilling to properly monitor credit 
generating activity.349 Even if a given pollution reduction activity 
costs the same amount in two jurisdictions and generates identical 
actual emission reductions, an incentive exists to make reductions in 
the jurisdiction where one can exaggerate the number of credits and 
escape effective oversight.3OO This undermines accountability, because 
345 See Kyoto Protocol, supra note 10, art. 3(1), 37 I.L.M. at 33. 
346 It would take an enormous effort just to determine precisely what happened. One would 
have to look at each joint implementation project and determine whether it was double counted 
or failed to deliver the reductions attributed to it. This would involve review of compliance data 
and a careful review of the project's place in several nation's plans. 
347 See Rolf Selrod & Asborn 'lbrvanger, What Might be the Minimum Requirements for 
Making the Mechanism of Implementation Under the Climate Convention Credible and Op-
erational, in OPPORTUNITIES AND APPREHENSIONS, supra note 161, at 6-7 (discussing possible 
''leakage'' problems). 
348 See GUPTA, supra note 160, at 130 (asking whether the host country or the investing 
country will be responsible for project failure); Joint Liability System Proposed for Buyers, 
Sellers in Global Trading System, 29 Env't Rep. (BNA) 353 (June 12, 1998). The COP could 
address this problem by writing clear legal rules about responsibility for shortfalls arising from 
joint implementation. These rules could also spell out responsibilities for making sure that 
double counting did not occur and that credits reflect real emission reductions that would not 
occur otherwise. 
349 See Stavins, supra note 116, at 312 (discussing the incentive for parties to a joint-imple-
mentation project to exaggerate its value). 
350 See MABEY, supra note 55, at 25; A. Markandaya, JI: The Way Forward or A Negotiator's 
Nightmare, in OPPORTUNITIES AND ApPREHENSIONS, supra note 161, at 39-40 (discussing 
incentive to inflate baselines so as to exaggerate reductions). Dr. Markandaya argues that 
payments based on the level of reductions could reduce the incentive to exaggerate reductions. 
As explained below, this argument is incorrect to the extent it suggests that the market by 
itself would reduce the incentive to exaggerate reductions. Effective oversight by international 
institutions, if that is possible, might reduce the incentives to exaggerate. 
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nations may plausibly claim compliance based on trades they do not 
monitor.35t 
Proponents of trading sometimes disclaim any need for government 
oversight by invoking free market metaphors. People purchase blue 
jeans without the government monitoring every transaction and qual-
ity remains good. A few trading proponents may imagine that the 
"invisible hand" of the free market might ensure proper generation 
and use of environmental credits without effective government over-
sight. 
The free market tends to produce good blue jeans because the 
purchasers care about the quality of the product. The purchaser buys 
the product specifically to obtain the benefits good blue jeans provide. 
If the blue jeans start falling apart in the first month of wearing, 
customers will stop purchasing jeans from that company. Because 
companies want customers to continue purchasing their jeans, they 
tend to make good blue jeans. 
Emissions trading by private parties divorces purchase from inter-
est in the quality of the "goods," absent government oversight. Pri-
vate parties usually do not purchase emission reduction credits be-
cause they want to realize real environmental improvement. If that 
were a sufficient motivation to purchase reduction credits, no need 
would exist to allow the use of credits to fulfill local emission reduction 
obligations. Instead, companies would simply engage in voluntary 
cleanup without emissions trading. 
Rather, companies purchase credits because they can use them to 
fulfill an environmental obligation that they would otherwise have to 
fulfill with more expensive domestic measures.352 The emission credit 
"goods," no matter how shoddy, are adequate for the companies' 
purposes if the government accepts them. 
Indeed, from the purchaser's point of view, the best credits are the 
cheapest. The cheapest credits reflect no conscious effort to improve 
301 Professor Stavins claims that allocating more permits to permit sellers in an emissions 
trading scheme would somehow "address" the enforcement difficulty that emissions trading 
might create. See Stavins, supra note 116, at 310. He argues that this allocation would make 
sellers "vulnerable to enforcement actions by the (enforcing) coalition of countries." He does not 
explain why an enforcing coalition of countries would emerge or how they could enforce reduc-
tions. Indeed, he seems to admit that the "enforcing coalition" would likely be the developed 
countries who purchase credits, and that the very scheme he advocates creates an incentive for 
them not to enforce. Id. The buyers would have an interest in allowing fraud so as to reduce 
the costs of purchasing credits. 
362 Companies may also carry out joint implementation because they anticipate using the 
credits later. See Joint Implementation, supra note 161, at 74. 
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the environment, for they cost nothing to generate. Routine economic 
activity generates incidental emission reductions and increases all the 
time, even with no environmental efforts going on, public or private. 
Plants generate emission reductions routinely in response to market 
signals, by reducing production when orders fall off, closing unprofit-
able facilities, and replacing outmoded equipment with newer equip-
ment. asa Absent very restrictive rules, polluters in an emissions trad-
ing system may purchase credits reflecting these incidental 
reductions occurring elsewhere.354 They need not, however, assume 
debits for increases that occur elsewhere when business picks up or a 
new plant opens up. 
This problem of credits for doing nothing does not matter very 
much in a comprehensive cap and trade system. Such a system pro-
hibits all relevant private parties from emitting pollution without 
permits and limits the quantity of permitted emissions to reflect 
environmental goals. But the Climate Change Convention does not 
directly limit the emissions of any individual polluter, much less all of 
them.a55 Trading under the Climate Change Convention, absent a very 
strong set of rules and implementing institutional arrangements, may 
well allow incidental reductions that occur as overall global emissions 
rise to justify taking fewer specific actions to reverse the trends.as6 
The issue of what constitutes effective government oversight in 
this context, of course, gives rise to endless debate.as7 My point here, 
however, is limited. Emissions trading across jurisdictional lines tends 
to undermine political accountability. The precise extent of this prob-
353 See Driesen, supra note 2, at 315. 
354 In the climate change context, Russia, the Ukraine, and Eastern European nations have 
abundant credits available that reflect no pollution control effort, because of the collapse of their 
economies after 1990. See ROLFE, supra note 328, at 311 (describing claiming credit for credits 
generated by economic collapse as "hot air"); U.N. Researcher Faults EU Opposition to Emis-
sion Tradingfur Kyoto Compliance, 21 Int'l Envt. Rep. (BNA) 415 (Apr. 28,1998). 
355 See Navroz K. Dubash, Commoditizing Carbon: Social and Environmental Implications 
of Joint Implementation, in OPPORTUNITIES AND ApPREHENSIONS, supra note 161, at 52-56 
(explaining the difference between a tradable carbon permit system and joint implementation). 
356 See Rolf Selrod & Asbjorn Torvanger, What Might be the Minimum Requirements fur 
Making the Mechanism of Implementation under the Climate Change Convention Credible and 
Operational, in OPPORTUNITIES & ApPREHENSIONS, supra note 161, at 5 (the emissions growth 
rate can be positive even if countries implement some measures reducing emissions); see also 
Chiranjeev Bed, No-Regrets Under Joint Implementation, in OPPORTUNITIES & ApPREHEN-
SIONS, supra note 161, at 103-07 (arguing that allowing credit for "no-regrets" options, cheap 
or profitable reduction opportunities will lower "overall abatement"). 
357 See, e.g., OPPORTUNITIES & ApPREHENSIONS, supra note 161, at 1-12, 99-103; Green & 
Sands, supra note 159, at 82-85. 
68 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS [Vol. 26:1 
lem depends upon the particulars of the trading system adopted.358 
But the general tendency exists. And the debate about joint imple-
mentation under the Climate Change Convention has not adequately 
addressed these issues.359 
This tendency has important long-term implications. The weaken-
ing of accountability may, in the long-term, undermine international 
environmental law. If international environmental law generates a 
series of seemingly concrete, but ultimately elusive obligations, it will 
lose its effectiveness over time.3OO Defections from international trea-
ties may rise and nations seeking resolution of international environ-
mental problems may turn to unilateral remedies, such as trade sanc-
tions, or in extreme cases, even war.361 Alternatively, important global 
problems may simply go unaddressed, because the law fails to gener-
ate concrete solutions to them. 
3. Interference with a Principle of National Responsibility for 
Private Sector Emissions 
International law traditionally involves law governing relationships 
between sovereign states.362 The idea of sovereignty has a territorial 
basis. Nations have the right and responsibility to control activities 
within their borders.363 These general principles of international law 
give rise to specific principles of national responsibility in the inter-
358 See generally Marchant, supra note 234, at 628 (the effectiveness of an emissions trading 
program depends upon its legal, technical and administrative details). 
359 In this respect, the evolution of the climate change convention so far is not encouraging. 
The Kyoto Protocol lacks any institutional or procedural detail on how compliance with trading 
provisions will be assessed. See Werksman, supra note 128, at 13-14 (identifying this defect in 
pre-Kyoto proposals). See generally Kyoto Protocol, supra note 10. 
360 Indeed, most environmental agreements already fail to accomplish much, in part because 
of weaknesses in monitoring and enforcement provisions. See Ardia, supra note 38, at 504-05. 
361 See Sean T. Fox, Responding to Climate Change: The Casefor Unilateml Trade Measures 
to Protect the Global Atmosphere, 84 GEO. L.J. 2499 (1996) (arguing for the use of trade sanctions 
to promote efforts to address climate change); David M. Driesen, The Congressional Role in 
International Environmental Law and its Implications for Statutory Interpretation, 19 B.C. 
ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 287, 303-08 (1991) (describing some of the history and theory of unilateral 
action). 
36ll See generally Koh, Why Nations Obey?, supra note 119, at 2603-14 (discussing the evolu-
tion of the concept of international law). Of course, non-governmental organizations and other 
non-state actors have become increasingly important in the development of international re-
gimes. See, e.g., Chiara Giorgetti, The Role of Non-Governmental Organizations in the Climate 
Change Negotiations, 9 COLO. J. INTL ENVTL. L. & POL'y 115 (1998). 
363 See Ardia, supra note 38, at 499 ("Historically, customary international law has provided 
that a sovereign state has jurisdiction to prescribe and enforce its laws ... within its territorial 
borders."). 
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national environmental area. International environmental law estab-
lishes a general national duty to make sure that private sector activi-
ties on a nation's soil do not cause serious environmental harms to 
neighboring countries, a territorial responsibility principle.364 
The assignment of specific national emission reduction targets is 
consistent with the territorial responsibility principle. Nations as-
sume responsibility for reducing harmful emissions from their terri-
tory. 
Trading relaxes this territorial principle. Nations may allow harm-
ful emissions to emanate from their territory, if they earn credits 
somewhere else. This may represent a fairly serious departure from 
a norm of national responsibility for consequences of actions taking 
place within a nation's territory.365 
Perhaps greater global integration invites a broader ethic of re-
sponsibility. For example, countries could be held responsible for all 
of the environmentally destructive activities their nationals partici-
pate in or finance regardless of location under a "financial responsibil-
ity principle." But allowing a country to claim credits for reductions 
the country or its nationals finance abroad, without requiring it to 
assume responsibility for emission increases the country or its nation-
als finance abroad, does not advance a "financial responsibility princi-
ple," or any other discernible ethic of national responsibility. 
Since the Climate Change Convention does not require countries 
to assume debits for emission increases or rainforest destruction that 
they finance, it does not advance any competing ethic.366 The Conven-
tion's embrace of emissions trading departs from the principle of 
national responsibility for emissions within the national territory. 
Countries' willingness to hold their nationals accountable to the 
international community rests in no small measure upon their accept-
ance of the national responsibility principle. If international emissions 
trading becomes widespread and undermines this principle, it will 
364 See Trail Smelter Arbitration (U.S. v. Can.), 3 R.I.A.A. 1911, 1933 (1938) (Canadians 
ordered to pay damages for pollution caused by a privately owned smelter); 3 R.I.A.A. 1938, 
1966 (1941) (establishing pollution control regime for the same smelter); Declaration of the 
United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, June 16, 1972, prine. 21, 11 I.L.M. 1416, 
1420 (states must ensure that activities within their jurisdiction do not damage areas beyond 
their jurisdiction). See generally Arthur K. Kuhn, Comment, The Trail Smelter Arbitration-
United States and Canada, 32 AM. J. INT'L L. 785 (1938). 
365 Cf Green & Sands, supra note 159, at 83-84 (discussing whether emissions trading conflicts 
with state sovereignty over natural resources). 
366 Cf GUPTA, supra note 160, at 118 (citing Indonesian views that a debiting system should 
accompany the crediting system). 
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make it very difficult to hold nations accountable for pollution emitted 
in their countries, most of which comes from private activity. Weak-
ening the national responsibility principle would make it very difficult 
to negotiate and implement international agreements effectively ad-
dressing international environmental problems.367 
C. The Broader Significance of the Cheap Fix Theory of 
Emissions Trading 
Emissions trading in the climate change context may constitute a 
cheap fix, because it delays innovations, undermines important prin-
ciples at the heart of international agreements to address climate 
change, and undermines democratic accountability.36B The cheap fix 
nature of trading under the Climate Change Convention carries im-
portant lessons for the theory of emissions trading generally. 
Emissions trading also constitutes a cheap fix if applied to other en-
vironmental problems. Emissions trading tends to produce less inno-
vation than systems without trading. Simply put, innovation may re-
quire large investments and emissions trading's objective is to lower 
short-term investment in environmental protection, without sacri-
ficing short-term environmental progress. Furthermore, trading may 
facilitate avoidance of inexpensive, but politically difficult, change. 
Emissions trading also tends to undermine democratic account-
ability for environmental problems. It does this systematically in all 
cases by complicating monitoring and enforcement.369 The severity of 
this problem depends on the particulars of the trading program.370 
Indeed, few difficulties arise if a single jurisdiction controls the pro-
gram, an adequately staffed agency supervises trades, and the pro-
gram requires reliable emissions monitoring. But trading programs 
that cross jurisdictional lines, involve transactions that are difficult to 
monitor, or are not supported by adequate agency tracking resources, 
pose a real threat to accountability.371 Trading always poses more 
367 See generally Yamin, supra note 180, at 5 (stating that certain uses of the trading system 
"would ... sink the entire Climate Change Convention Process by robbing it of all credibility"). 
368 See generally Navroz K. Dubash, Commoditizing Carbon: Social and Environmental 
Implications of Joint Implementation, in OPPORTUNITIES AND ApPREHENSIONS, supra note 
161, at 77-80 (arguing joint implementation will jeopardize the long-term effectiveness of the 
Framework Convention). 
369 For a more detailed explanation of this point, see Driesen, supra note 2, at 310 n.l00. 
37°Id. at 311, 319-22. 
371 See Green & Sands, supra note 159, at 82-85 (describing some of the difficulties that 
confront international emissions trading in the climate change context). 
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difficulties for monitoring and enforcement than a comparable non': 
trading program.372 
Emissions trading may undermine the developed country leader-
ship principle in the Climate Change Convention and hence the future 
development of this treaty. This point about the particulars of the 
Climate Change Convention leads to several more general conclu-
sions. 
First, trading must comply with the laws under which it operates. 
Otherwise, it will tend to undermine the law. The potential of trading 
to conflict with the legal principle of developed country leadership in 
the Climate Change Convention provides an example of this problem. 
Violation of the provisions providing for leadership would weaken the 
entire regime. 
Second, whenever the geography of emission reductions raises eq-
uity concerns, trading without constraints that adequately address 
those concerns may create injustice. These injustices can destabilize 
the law, undermine support for sound economic incentive programs, 
and interfere with environmental progress. Most trading proponents 
recognize the need to avoid trading that creates "hotspots," concen-
trations of pollutants with locally significant effects. For example, one 
cannot ethically justify allowing local pollution to cause cancer in 
Baton Rouge, Louisiana, by claiming a credit for a reduction in New 
Jersey. 
The climate change example shows that the geographic principle 
involved is much broader than the principle that trading should not 
create hotspots. When the geography matters to the equities of shift-
ing reductions, trading without adequate geographic constraints may 
undermine the sense of shared responsibility and community needed 
to make environmental protection effective in the long-run.373 Equity 
may properly restrain the location of reductions either because of the 
localized effects of the pollution reductions or because equity makes 
geographically specific assignments of responsibility important. 
The points about innovation and accountability show that emissions 
trading is always a cheap fix. The points about equity and geography 
should constrain trading generally and may give rise to overlooked 
long-term problems in some contexts. 
872 See Driesen, supra note 2, at 310 n.100. 
873 See Yamin, supra note 180, at 4-5 (discussing the equity concerns of developing countries 
aroused by the allocation of emission reduction burdens in the context of joint implementation 
at Kyoto). 
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III. How TO THINK ABOUT CHEAP FIXES 
Even if a homeowner recognizes that patching the roof constitutes 
a cheap fix, she does not automatically replace the roof every time it 
leaks. She may quite rationally decide that the cheap fix makes more 
sense than replacing the roof in some circumstances. 
Similarly, recognizing that trading is a cheap fix rather than a free 
lunch does not establish that policy makers should abandon all emis-
sions trading. Rather, the cheap fix theory re-frames the analysis of 
proposals to employ emissions trading. It introduces questions about 
innovation, democratic accountability, equity, and the relationship of 
technical fixes to long-term values. 
The particular cheap fix problem examined in this article, emissions 
trading, is an example of a pervasive, but understudied, legal and 
policy problem. Cheap fix problems arise all the time in many different 
contexts, and a full theory of how to think about cheap fixes would 
require another article. But this part will seek to contribute some-
thing to this task. 
This part will first explain why legal scholarship that successfully 
identifies cheap fix problems may make a substantial contribution to 
policy discussions. Second, this part will outline a barebones theory 
of how to think about the choice between cheap fixes and more en-
during solutions with more short-term costs. Third, this part will 
apply these principles to the problem of joint implementation under 
the Climate Change Convention. It explains how one might use trad-
ing to lower short-term costs without unduly damaging the long-term 
future of the effort to address global climate change and develop 
effective international environmental law. Abandoning the free lunch 
theory of emissions trading leads to a more thorough and thoughtful 
consideration of particular proposed applications of trading, rather 
than to either the automatic rejection or acceptance of proposed trad-
ing programs. 
A. Identifying Cheap Fix Problems as a Central Task for Legal 
Scholarship Addressing Legislative Problems 
Cheap fix problems arise all of the time. But policy makers and 
scholars may fail to recognize cheap fix problems or to address them 
adequately. 
For example, the framers of the United States Constitution adop-
ted a cheap fix to the problem of how to address slavery. They agreed 
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to perpetuate slavery and treat slaves as less than full citizens.374 
Specifically, Article I, section 9 of the Constitution prohibited the 
abolition of the international slave trade until 1809.875 Article IV, 
section 2 prohibited states from emancipating fugitive slaves.376 And 
Article I, section 2 of the constitution treated each slave as three-
fifths of a person for purposes of representation in the House of 
Representatives and the apportionment of federal taxes.377 This com-
promise helped facilitate the agreement of southern states to enter 
the union.378 
We have paid, and continue to pay, a very heavy price for this cheap 
fix.379 The failure to implement an adequate solution to slavery led to 
a civil war and contributed to enormous problems that still plague 
US.3BO 
Some leaders at the time understood that slavery was unjust.SSl But 
identification of an injustice does not amount to identification of a 
"cheap fix." Rather, writing that identified the perhaps less apparent 
long-term problems that slavery would create would show that its 
perpetuation was a cheap fix. 
Tax scholars for a number of years have complained about the use 
of the tax code to enact politically cheap fixes to societal problems.382 
374 See WILLIAM WIECEK, THE SoURCES OF ANTISLAVERY CONSTITUTIONALISM IN AMER-
ICA: 1760-1848 62 (1977). 
375 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9. 
376 [d. art. IV, §2. 
377 [d. art. I, § 2 states: 
Representatives and direct Taxes shall be apportioned among the several States which 
may be included within this Union, according to their respective Numbers, which shall 
be determined by adding to the whole Number of free Persons, including those bound 
to Service for a Term of Years, and excluding Indians not taxed, three fifths of all 
other Persons. 
[d. (emphasis added). 
The provision uses the locution "other Persons" to refer to slaves. The provision requires 
adding the "whole Number of free Persons" to three fifths of "other Persons," meaning the 
Persons not free. Constitutional scholars agree that the Framers intended this. See, e.g., 
WIECEK, supra note 376 at 65-70. Professor Wiecek identifies several other provisions that 
addressed slavery as well. See id. at 62-63. 
378See DERRICK BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED: THE ELUSIVE QUEST FOR RACIAL 
JUSTICE 30 (1987); WIECEK, supra note 376, at 68-72. 
3'19 See BELL, supra note 378, at 26,28-29,32,37. 
380 See id.; see also WIECEK, supra note 374, at 15. 
381 See BELL, supra note 378, at 28, 35 (quoting Thomas Jefferson, Abigail Adams, and Luther 
Martin). 
382 See, e.g., MICHAEL J. GRAETZ, THE DECLINE (AND FALL?) OF THE INCOME TAX 258-59 
(1997) (pointing out that eliminating various deductions, credits, and exemptions to simplify 
taxes might be unlikely because these breaks were enacted ''to achieve important economic or 
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Lawmakers often like to further favored values by granting tax cred-
its or deductions for behavior deemed desirable.383 
Tax scholars pointed out that the use of exemptions, deductions, and 
credits for a wide variety of social purposes tends to complicate the 
tax code over time.384 This may undermine voluntary compliance and 
augment general distrust of government in the long-term, even if each 
exemption enacted serves valid societal goals.386 
Professor Michael Graetz has recently argued that this balkaniza-
tion of the tax code has helped undermine the very idea of a progres-
sive and broadly applicable income tax as the principle means of 
funding government.386 Whether or not any of the particular cheap 
fixes are desirable, tax scholars have performed an important service 
in identifying the long-term problem of cheap fixes tending to compli-
cate and undermine the tax code. 
Identification of cheap fix problems should be a central task of 
scholars studying legislation and treaties.387 Scholars' ability to reflect 
social purposes"). Professor Graetz, however, criticizes other tax breaks as aimed at scoring 
political points or satisfying special interests. See id. at 192, 270 (discussing a recent $500-per-
child income tax credit), 290 (discussing special interest tax breaks). 
383 See id. at 258--59 (discussing various examples and stating that "hardly a day passes 
without some politician suggesting a new tax cut for people and companies that behave in 
certain ways"). 
384 See id. 
385 See id. at 269-70 (discussing how short term politics trump long-term goals for the tax 
code, like that of simplicity). 
3116 See GRAETZ, supra note 382, at 3, 7--8 (identifying the "foolish and unnecessary complexi-
ties" of the tax code as one of four factors undermining the income tax). 
387 In recent years the value and importance of studying the substance of legislation has 
received increased recognition. See, e.g., David M. Driesen, The Societal Cost of Environmental 
Regulation: Beyond Administrative Cost-Benefit Analysis, 24 ECOLOGY L.Q. 545 (1997) (dis-
cussing the role of cost-benefit analysis in pollution control law); STEPHEN G. BREYER, BREAK-
ING THE VICIOUS CIRCLE: ToWARD EFFECTIVE RISK REGULATION (1993) (critiquing regula-
tion); Edward Rubin, The Concept of Law and the New Public Law Scholarship, 89 MICH. L. 
REV. 792, 792 (1991) (noting that the judiciary is an ''increasingly secondary legal institution" 
and discussing some of the differences between judicial and legislative decisionmaking); Cass 
Sunstein, Administrative Substance, 41 DUKE L.J. 572, 607-09 (1991) (calling for "substantive" 
administrative law, including critiques of legislation and administrative rules); Robin West, 
Progressive and Conservative Constitutionalism, 88 MICH. L. REV. 641 (1990) (advocating a 
focus upon legislative legal discourse because it is potentially more progressive); Howard Latin, 
Ideal Versus Real Regulatory Efficiency: Implementation of Uniform Standards and "Fine-
'Puning" Regulatory Reforms, 37 STAN. L. REV. 1267, 1291-92 (1985) (critizing regulatory critics 
who fail to dinstinguish claims that various reforms will meet existing statutory goals better 
from claims that the statutory goals are inappropriate); cf Ernst Freund, A Course in Statutes, 
4 AM. L. SCH. REV. 503 (1919) (calling, in 1919, for courses in legislation that rely upon materials 
other than just cases). 
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upon the broader purposes of a law and its history and direction 
enable them to identify long-term values (and threats to them) that 
others, including legislators, may overlook. 388 Since ample incentives 
exist to pay attention to short-term problems even without legal 
scholarship, this may represent a substantial contribution. Moreover, 
legislators often may legislate without sufficient foresight, because of 
the immense pressures to attend to the considerations of the moment. 
Cheap fix scholarship may help clarify what precisely a body of law 
should do in the long run. 
Identification of cheap fixes may seem similar to the identification 
of "hidden costs" as a first step in finding "efficient" solutions to 
societal problems. When economists identify important disadvantages 
to any solution, they create an illusion of certainty by characterizing 
the disadvantage as a cost (sometimes hidden). This word, "cost," 
suggests that the disadvantage identified, a) is amenable to quantifica-
tion, and b) can be "weighed" against other "costs" and "benefits" 
without any reasoned explanation of the weighing. It also draws 
attention away from the shape and dimension of the particular disad-
vantage under consideration.3s9 
Legal scholars can identify cheap fixes and important long-term 
problems whether or not they wish to pursue efficiency as a goal. 
Indeed, they may perform a valuable service by spelling out institu-
tional and societal ramifications of cheap fixes, rather than simply 
stating that they are a cost and sending them out to a weighing station 
in the sky.390 
B. Thinking About Cheap Fixes 
While identifying cheap fixes may prove helpful, legal scholars may 
want to contribute to the process of choosing between cheap fixes and 
more enduring solutions to societal problems. This subsection ad-
dresses some elements of this weighing. 
388 See generally Rubin, supra note 387, at 818 (arguing that "New Public Law" scholarship 
can anticipate issues). 
389 See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, LEGAL REASONING AND POLITICAL CONFLICT (1996) 98 (under-
standing a number of different things as "costs" may obscure important qualitative distinctions). 
390 See Holly Doremus, Restoring Endangered Species: The Importance of Being Wild (forth-
coming 1998) (arguing that the Department of Interior has overlooked the long-term benefits 
of using a politically difficult approach that educates the public about the value of wild animals). 
See generally Lawrence Lessig, Social Meanings and Social Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2181 
(1996) (discussing the advantages of considering the meaning of legal rules). 
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The thoughtful homeowner considers whether patching a leaky roof 
may cost more in the long run than replacing it. This involves guessing 
about the future of the roof. Surely, the homeowner should consider 
the cost of patching or replacing the roof. But this is not the central 
difficulty. The central difficulty involves predicting whether the roof, 
if patched, will spring a leak elsewhere anytime soon. 
Policy makers must also compare the costs of cheap fixes and more 
enduring solutions, if the problem is mostly about money. These de-
cisions may depend upon expert advice about the future consequences 
of decisions, comparable to the advice a roofer would give about 
whether a roof of a given age and condition is likely to leak again soon. 
Legal scholars may have something worthwhile to say about the 
future economic consequences of decisions, at least when an analysis 
of legal rules plays an important role in predicting future economic 
consequences. 
A stable long-term homeowner with adequate income will probably 
choose the best long-term solution to a problem. But, the incentives 
for public officials operate differently. Public officials have incentives 
to choose solutions that maximize perceived public benefits during 
their term in office.391 They may not be around when the public expe-
riences the consequences of cheap fixes. Hence, they may have some 
incentive to act more like a short-term tenant than a long-term home-
owner, spending only what is necessary to get by in the short term. 
However, the analogy between homeowners and policy makers fails 
to capture an important dimension of the cheap fix problem. Policy 
decisions for a society frequently have implications that cost-benefit 
analysis tends to obscure rather than illuminate. 
Law does not function solely as a means of ordering the allocation 
of resources and the distribution of wealth. Rather, law may help 
shape norms that may influence the behaviors of members of a soci-
ety.392 These norms may contribute to building a sense of community 
and shared purpose.393 This sense of shared community and purpose 
may play an important role in enabling a community to remain cohe-
391 See Philip P. Frickey, Legislative Processes and Products, 46 J. LEGAL EDUC. 469, 471 
(1996) (public choice theory supposes that politicians' principal motivation is to secure reelec-
tion). 
392 See SUNBTEIN, supra note 389, at 108-10 (rules help coordinate behavior, establish new 
social practices, and create consistent action dedicated to a long-term end); Rose, supra note 7, 
at 34-37 (discussing the normative message various environmental management systems con-
vey). 
393 See SUNBTEIN, supra note 389, at 109 (discussing the "expressive function" of rules). 
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sive enough to address long-term problems that resist easy solu-
tions.394 Or, the erosion of norms reflecting the values and aspirations 
uniting people may contribute to alienation and destruction of com-
munity.395 Scholars may analyze proposed laws with these considera-
tions in mind. 
Hence, the justice inherent in policy choices may matter to law in 
subtle and complex ways. An analysis comparing cheap fixes to more 
enduring solutions may need to clarify and discuss the likelihood that 
specific decisions will further important societal values and the likeli-
hood that they will build (or destroy) a sense of community. This 
analysis may help clarify the nature of the choice between cheap fixes 
and more enduring solutions. 
Legal scholars may have a great deal to contribute to this process 
of evaluating the values at stake in competing policy choices. Aca-
demic lawyers may explain the link between proposed legal rules and 
broader societal purposes with some precision.396 Academic lawyers 
have training in thinking about the purposes and meaning of legal 
rules.397 
Scholars must understand that decision makers often have seem-
ingly compelling reasons to prefer cheap fixes. They always face 
enormous pressure to find solutions that satisfy enough powerful 
political interests to actually win enactment.39B 
Because legislators always face powerful pressures to adopt cheap 
fixes, legal scholars may feel that writing about cheap fixes may serve 
the interests of truth, but have very little influence upon real deci-
sion-making. This may be true. Even when this is true in the short 
run, writing about cheap fix problems may call attention to important 
long-term values and shift debates over time in important ways.399 
This may help create the impetus for better decisions about when to 
adopt cheap fixes and when to pursue more enduring solutions. In-
deed, recognition of the dilemma may sometimes lead to solutions that 
394 See KRATOCHWIL, supra note 7, at 70 (explaining that norms enable parties with conflicting 
goals to sustain a discourse and negotiate solutions). 
395 Cf id. at 90-91 (explaining how norms tend to discourage profitable defections from efforts 
to meet collective goals). 
396 See Rubin, supra note 387, at 826. 
397 See id. (discussing lawyers' understanding of relations between normative choices and legal 
rules). 
398 See Frickey, supra note 391, at 471-72. 
399 See RICHARD A. POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW 471-72 (1995) (the fact that a new approach 
to law may take a generation or more to alter professional thinking does not make it useless). 
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serve existing needs adequately, while avoiding unnecessary damage 
to long-term interests that have received insufficient consideration in 
policy-making debates. 
C. Trading Under the Climate Change Convention: A Proposal 
The Clinton Administration's position on climate change may well 
illustrate this tendency to choose cheap fixes in order to increase the 
likelihood of enactment. The administration would like the Senate to 
ratify the Kyoto Protocol and may need legislative cooperation to 
adopt implementing legislation.4oo Since many legislators favor "free 
market mechanisms," use of emissions trading may constitute a "sell-
ing point" in Congress for treaty ratification. 
Emissions trading may help "sell" the Kyoto Protocol to Congress 
regardless of the details of the particular trading program used. Poli-
ticians' responses to economic incentive programs may have little to 
do with the actual merits of particular programs and much more to 
do with particular politicians' ideologies.401 This means that emissions 
trading may function as a selling point whether the particular pro-
gram is wholly fraudulent, a sound cheap fix with very bad long-term 
consequences, or a cheap fix designed to minimize interference with 
long-term values. 
This subsection shows how to design an emissions trading program 
that seizes many of the benefits of a cheap fix, without great harm to 
long-term values. This proposal seeks to reconcile the Framework 
Convention's cost-effectiveness and leadership principles and to mini-
mize emissions trading's threat to democratic accountability. Even 
those that favor other proposals should recognize that the cheap fix 
theory helps identify important questions that any proposal should 
address. 
400 The executive branch has some authority to address climate change on its own pursuant 
to existing legislation. See Woodward, supra note 15, at 223-30 (explaining that the executive 
branch may have authority to address climate change pursuant to the National Environmental 
Policy Act and the Clean Air Act). But some proposals to address climate change would require 
fresh legislation. See id. at 233-38 (discussing legislation proposed in the late 1980s and advo-
cating passage of legislation aimed specifically at global warming). 
401 See Robert N. Stavins, What Can We Learn from the Grand Policy Experiment: Positive 
and Normative Lessons from S02 Allowance Trading 10 (1997) (unpublished manuscript on file 
with the author); cf Nathaniel O. Keohane et al., The Choice of Regulatory Instruments in 
Environmental Policy, 22 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 313 (offering a complex economic model to 
explain legislative preferences for various regulatory instruments). 
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1. Focus Upon Innovation 
One could require that joint implementation projects that generate 
credits toward compliance with quantitative limitations involve ad-
vanced technology.402 This would effectively blend the leadership and 
cost-effectiveness principles, creating cost-effective leadership.403 
This idea comports well with the precise language creating the 
cost-effectiveness principle in the Framework Convention. Article 3, 
section 3 adopts a principle of "taking into account that policies . . . 
should be cost effective so as to ensure global benefits at the lowest 
possible cost."404 A policy which tends to avoid innovation through 
400 See H. Merkus, The Framework Convention of Climate Change: Some Thoughts on Joint 
Implementation, The Hague, Ministry of Housing, Physical Planning and the Environment, 
CCDlPaper (1992). Professor Tsjalle van der Burg argues for acceptance of a joint implementa-
tion project and a replaced project whose "static advantages ... , taken together, outweigh their 
negative dynamic effect on technology development or on transfer and diffusion of technolo-
gies." JOINT IMPLEMENTATION, supra note 161, at 102. 
Professor van der Burg argues that this weighing should be based on the greenhouse gas 
"effect" of the loss of innovation and technological diffusion. Id. at 103. He recognizes that 
estimating the value of the lost technological innovation poses enormous difficulties, but never-
theless recommends that GHG certificates for individual projects that substitute less innovative 
for more innovative reduction techniques be subject to a numerical discount. This proposal is 
quite impractical absent a demonstration that one can reasonably estimate the amount of 
greenhouse gas emissions the advanced technology will yield in future applications with little 
administrative cost. Indeed, this would not suffice-one would have to be able to calculate the 
joint implementation's contribution to this future benefit stream numerically. 
The problem, however, goes beyond the impracticality of such a proposal. Any joint imple-
mentation project that substitutes a standard technology for an advanced technology is worse 
than no joint implementation project at all in terms of its effect on greenhouse gases. Properly 
conducted joint implementation will yield the same number of net reductions as single country 
implementation without a joint implementation project. Hence, any net technological disadvan-
tage will justify forbidding such projects environmentally. There is no need for precise weighing. 
The case for allowing joint implementation tending to discourage innovation must rely upon 
the cost effectiveness principle in the treaty. There is no good case for it environmentally. The 
cost effectiveness value is discussed above. 
403 See Irving M. Mintzer, Institutional Options and Operational Challenges in the Manage-
ment of a Joint Implementation Regime in CRITERIA, supra note 18, at 47 (since Article 3 of 
the Framework Convention urges governments to take cost effectiveness "into account," cost 
effectiveness cannot be the sole criterion for project selection). 
404 Framework Convention, supra note 9, art. 3(2), 31 I.L.M. at 854 (emphasis added). The 
New Delhi Statement of the Global Environmental Facility echoes this emphasis, calling on the 
GEF to "stimulate" technology transfer and adoption. New Delhi Statement of the First GEF 
Assembly, April 3, 1998, 21 Int'l Envt. Rep. (BNA) 396 (Apr. 15, 1998). It states that the GEF 
"should increase efforts towards ensuring the sustainability of the global environment benefits 
generated by GEF-financing .... " Id. Furthermore, the statement provides that "GEF activi-
ties should be based on national priorities designed to support sustainable development and the 
global environment." Id. Arguably, retrofits or construction of coal-fired power plants do not fit 
this criteria, while more innovative energy projects may meet this criteria. 
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emissions trading does not ensure global benefits. Global benefits may 
require innovation in order to make it possible for developing coun-
tries to assume significant binding reduction commitments. Moreover, 
the next sentence in section 3 states that climate change policies 
should "take into account different socio-economic contexts."406 A fo-
cus on advanced technology appropriately reflects the capabilities of 
developed countries and the fact that developing countries may need 
advanced technology to meet climate change goals without lowering 
living standards. The drafters of the Framework Convention consid-
ered these differences in capabilities and needs important elements 
of the "different socio-economic contexts" that the treaty refers to.406 
More obviously, the focus on advanced technology helps implement 
the leadership principle. It creates a global partnership to advance 
the state of the art.407 
A program confined to advanced technology will not meet short-
term goals as cheaply as an approach that allows joint implementation 
projects based on standard technology. But it may lower the long-
term costs of avoiding dangerous levels of greenhouse gas concentra-
tions in the atmosphere. 
This focus on advanced technology probably will not prevent devel-
opment of a viable market. Most of the activities implemented jointly 
and reported to the Secretariat of the Framework Convention on 
Climate Change as part of the pilot phase involved either renewable 
energy or energy efficiency enhancing projects.408 On the other hand, 
the Framework Convention would not allow forestry related projects, 
which form a substantial part of the United States pilot projects, to 
become creditable.409 
This elimination of forestry projects from joint implementation 
greatly lessens the potential for trading concrete benefits for ephem-
eral ones. Forestry credits raise the specter of protecting one piece 
of land for credit, only to see timber demand devour another piece of 
406 See Framework Convention, supra note 9, art. 3(2), 31 I.L.M. at 854. 
406 See Bodansky, supra note 2, at 499, 502-03. 
407 See Mintzer, supra note 403, at 44 (Joint implementation regime will be judged by its ability 
to promote transfer of environmentally sound technology "in preference to recycling the same 
polluting conventional technologies that have contributed to the current state of global risk."). 
408 See Pilot Phase Report, supra note 169, at 7. 
400 See Joint Implementation, (visited June 28, 1998) <http://www.state.gov/www/globaVoesi 
97cJimate_report/part4d.html#joint> in Climate Action Report: 1997 Submission of the United 
States of America Under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Dep't 
of State Pub. no. 10496 (1997) [hereinafter 1997 State Department Report] (showing that a large 
number of forestry projects are part of the pilot effort). 
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land more rapidly with no net climate benefit. It creates an incentive 
for countries to allow deforestation, in order to make room for fresh 
tree planting activities for credit. Finally, no international agreement 
exists about how precisely to measure carbon sequestration benefits 
from forestry projects. Of course, this does not mean that forestry 
protection is a bad idea, it just means that the uncertainties involved 
make it a poor commodity for trading. 
2. Geography 
This first international experiment with trading should focus upon 
trading emission reductions among developed countries. This avoids 
undercutting the fiscal leadership principle, which requires funding 
reductions in developing countries in addition to, not as a substitute 
for, reductions in developed countries. 
Furthermore, since developing countries do not have emission caps, 
trade with them poses especially difficult accounting issues.41° The 
United States, a single jurisdiction with a fairly sophisticated bu-
reaucracy, has never succeeded in making a program without an 
emissions cap work properly.4I1 It seems unlikely that fragile interna-
tional institutions, or a combination of uncoordinated national agen-
cies of widely varying capacity, could make such a system work prop-
erly. 
In particular, trading outside a cap may well encourage countries 
to claim credits for incidental emission reductions, reductions that 
would occur even in the absence of efforts to comply with the Climate 
Change Convention.412 If this occurs, it will lower the performance of 
the treaty as a whole. 
The Kyoto Protocol seeks to address this problem of incidental 
reduction claims by requiring that credit generating projects provide 
"a reduction in emissions by sources, or an enhancement of removals 
by sinks, that is additional to any that would otherwise occur."413 This 
language does not adequately address the problem. The requirement 
that developed countries only receive credit for reductions "addi-
410 See Stavins, supra note 116, at 311 (When joint implementation occurs between developed 
and developing countries without developing country binding targets "it will be difficult to 
determine the emission-reduction effects of a specific joint implementation project."). 
411 See Driesen, supra note 2, at 311-21. 
412 See Stavins, supra note 116, at 311-12 (low-cost abatement projects may be carried out 
without joint implementation). 
413 Kyoto Protocol, supra note 10, art. 6(1)(b), 37 I.L.M. at 35. 
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tional" to those that "would otherwise occur," even interpreted 
broadly, does not adequately address problems of demand shifts when 
trades occur outside a cap. Even if a given emission reduction would 
not occur without a given project, the project may trigger a demand 
shift that will be difficult to account for. For example, suppose that a 
U.S. utility pays a Brazilian power plant to shut down, thus generat-
ing an "additional" emission reduction. This shutdown might not have 
occurred without the payment, but it may still trigger an emission 
increase at a nearby power plant. If the U.S. power plant claims a 
credit for the decrease, the United States will produce fewer emission 
reductions, even though Brazilian net emissions have not changed at 
all. 
A narrow construction of the "additionality" requirement may al-
low credits for things that would have happened without any pollution 
control demands. For example, suppose that a company sells burners 
to coal-fired power plants and receives both payment and emission 
credits from developing countries that have older plants with less 
modern burners. It may be that this project would occur with or 
without pollution reduction credits. The equipment sale may produce 
enough profit to justify the project even without a credit. Such a sale 
might meet the "additionality" requirement, since the project might 
produce an emission reduction additional to what would occur without 
the project. This problem could, in principle if not in practice, be 
solved by requiring that no credit be granted for projects that gener-
ate revenues for the purchaser of credits. But prominent commenta-
tors, whose views I discuss in the margin, have argued against strict 
implementation of an "additionality" requirement.414 The "additional-
414 Professors Arts, Peters, Schrijver, and van Sluijs have opposed use of additionality con-
straints to bar the use of credits from profitable projects. Indeed, they claim that "profitability" 
constitutes "a necessary condition" for private participation in joint implementation. JOINT 
IMPLEMENTATION, supra note 161, at 44. This statement is incorrect. Polluters with emissions 
control obligations face expenses and have an incentive to invest in projects that cost less than 
meeting their obligations domestically, even if the projects produce no profits. See id. at 47. 
Countries may also create an incentive by subsidizing projects abroad. In either case, profita-
bility is not necessary to encourage joint implementation. See id. 
Insofar as private companies carry out projects because doing so is profitable, no credit is 
needed to entice participation and strict criteria for granting credit will have no effect on private 
capital investment. Cf id. (claiming that strict criteria for credit will reduce capital investment 
in joint implementation). 
In practice, it may be very difficult to properly implement the "additionality" requirement. 
Accord JOINT IMPLEMENTATION supra note 161, at 52 ("[S]trict proof of additionality will often 
be exceedingly difficult."), 80. In principle, it requires one to establish a baseline quantifying 
"what would ... occur" absent an emission reducing project. Indeed, this hypothetical baseline 
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ity" requirement probably will deter taking advantage of some natu-
rally occurring decreases that have no relationship to foreign expen-
ditures. It may simplify national accounting for emission reductions 
in conjunction with caps. But this constraint does not suffice to obvi-
ate the need for a cap as a prerequisite for trading. 
may not suffice to stop emission- increasing projects from generating credits. Suppose, for 
example, that India wishes to build a new power plant to facilitate economic growth. Foreign 
investors may help build the facility. A supplier may well claim a credit for supplying equipment 
by claiming that but for its contribution, the plant would be built with less efficient equipment. 
Hence, projects which increase emissions generate credits justifying avoidance of reductions, 
and potentially of innovation, in developed countries. 
Nevertheless, Professors Arts, Peters, Schrijver, and van Sluijs argue against strict imple-
mentation of an additionality requirement, because the "first priority must be to reduce (or 
absorb) [greenhouse gas emissions] GHG." [d. This argument confuses a foregone opportunity 
to earn credit with a foregone emission reduction. If a credit for joint implementation is denied, 
then the country that sought to purchase the credit must make the reduction domestically. No 
loss of emission reductions occurs. On the other hand, granting a credit for a reduction that 
would occur anyway does involve a loss of emission reductions. See id. at 79 (recognizing that 
use of credits for a project that "would have been done even in the absence of joint implemen-
tation could increase total emissions"). 
Professor Tsjalle van der Burg argues that the "probability" that a project might not be 
additional can be safely ignored. [d. at 84-89. This argument actually amounts, at bottom, to 
assuming the problem away. He assumes that the greenhouse gas "effect of the project" (or the 
"additionality of the project") has no correlation with the total future "greenhouse gas concen-
tration" (presumably meaning atmospheric concentrations). [d. at 88. In other words, any given 
set of emission reductions has no correlation with future greenhouse gas concentrations. The 
entire premise of the treaty (and a sound one, if the history of environmental progress is any 
guide) is that a series of actions that really reduce emissions will generally lower atmospheric 
concentrations of target gases. See Controls Would Cut Methane in Atmosphere, Scientists Say, 
29 Env't Rep. (BNA) 354 (June 12, 1998). 
Having assumed away the problem, he then states that the "uncertainties related to many 
other individual phenomena" (such as car purchases and other decisions that can affect emis-
sions) counterbalance ''the uncertainty about" the greenhouse gas "effect of the project." JOINT 
IMPLEMENTATION, supra note 161, at 88. This amounts to an argument that since a large 
number of decisions effect total concentrations, government officials do not need to ensure that 
society actually realizes any given legally required emission reduction. This argument justifies 
general sloppiness. Since any successful program will consist of a large number of small (but 
cumulatively significant) activities reducing emissions, sloppiness with respect to individual 
projects on such general grounds would seriously risk failure of the program as a whole. 
Finally, Professor Tsjalle van der Burg argues that strict additionality requirements might 
rule out very cost effective projects. See id. at 90-91. This does not seem like a strong argument. 
Very cost effective projects may attract financing without the benefit of joint implementation. 
See Stavins, supra note 116 at 311-12 (low cost projects may be carried out without any policy 
intervention). So, it seems like a bad idea to give up emission reductions to finance them, unless 
they surely constitute reductions that would not occur without joint implementation. 
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3. Accountability 
One could limit the amount of trading that can occur in order to 
address accountability issues.415 This would make it easier to track 
trading. 
The joint implementation pilot projects have failed to demonstrate 
the feasibility of international emissions trading. International bodies 
have not yet verified that the pilot projects undertaken so far have 
generated the claimed reductions.416 Nor has the United States, a 
leading proponent of trading, verified that its pilot joint implementa-
tion projects have produced the projected environmental benefits.417 
Because the pilot phase began fairly recently, it has not yet shown 
that using credits from joint projects in lieu of domestic implementa-
tion will advance treaty goals.418 This fact, together with emissions 
trading's mixed record in general, should caution against a wide ex-
pansion of trading before demonstration of institutional capacity to 
monitor and account for trades. Clear decisions about who will ac-
count for and monitor these trades must precede actual trading. At 
least, ensuring that the volume of trading is low enough so as not to 
overwhelm the understaffed bodies that must monitor and account 
for trading seems a wise precaution, in light of the lack of precedent 
for an effective international trading system.419 
Precedent exists for numerical limits to trading volume. EPA has 
written a rule allowing chemical plants, which often contain hundreds 
of pollution sources, to trade emission reductions among these 
sources.420 EPA recognized that numerous transactions might over-
415 See generally JOINT IMPLEMENTATION, supra note 161, at 52 (recommending a limit on 
transactions as a means of addressing fear that trading will cause countries to use "only existing 
technology"); U.S. Opposes Cap on Amount of Trading Allowed to Meet Domestic Emission 
Goals, 29 Env't Rep. (BNA) 253 (May 29, 1998); EU Proposal on Emission Trading System 
Would Cap Amount Nations Can Buy, Sell, 29 Env't Rep. (BNA) 352 (June 12, 1998). 
416 See Pilot Phase Report, supra note 169, at 5 (discussing the inadequacy of national data). 
417 See 1997 State Department Report, supra note 409, at 1 (claiming that project emissions 
"will be," not have been, verified). The United States government has reviewed estimates of 
baselines and projected future benefits. Moreover, some private evaluations of actual (as op-
posed to projected) accomplishments exist. 
418 See, e.g., Report on the In-depth Review of the National Communication of the United 
States of America, FCCC/IDR, at 17, U.N. Doc. FCCC/IDR.lIUSA (1996) (most U.S. joint 
implementation projects will not reduce greenhouse gas emissions until 1997 or 1998 and will 
not have their full impact before 2000). 
419 See Marchant, supra note 234, at 641 (private trades between sources in different countries 
pose "insurmountable difficulties" because of the lack of adequate international institutions or 
machinery to monitor or enforce trades); CAMERON ET AL., supra note 312, at 231-32 (pointing 
out that "full-fledged" joint implementation has never been used). 
420 See 40 C.F.R. pt. 63.150 (1997). This regulation only authorizes trades within a plant, so 
this constitutes a geographically narrow form of emissions trading, sometimes called a bubble. 
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whelm government agencies with limited resources to verify emission 
estimates.421 It limited the number of pollution sources that could 
trade in order to address this problem.422 
Even limited trading does allow the few pollution sources with 
exceptionally expensive control options to avoid controls.423 Hence, 
limited trading will serve a substantial purpose. 
A stringent numerical limit on trading also makes sense of the 
conflicting language governing the question of whether credits from 
trades may count toward meeting quantitative limits set in the Kyoto 
Protocol. Article 17 states that developed countries "may participate 
in emissions trading for the purposes of fulfilling their" Article 3 
commitments, but that this "trading shall be supplemental to domes-
tic actions for the purposes of meeting quantified emissions limitation 
and reduction commitments under that Article."424 These provisions 
can be reconciled by assuming that trading is "supplemental to do-
mestic actions" to the extent that the country using credits from 
abroad relies principally upon domestic measures to meet treaty com-
mitments.425 The negotiating history of the Kyoto Protocol supports 
such a reading.426 This implies a strict quantitative limit on the amount 
of credits one can use to meet the Kyoto Protocol's quantitative tar-
gets. It may be wise to confine this first experiment with international 
trading to emissions that can be reliably quantified, such as carbon 
dioxide.427 This will increase the likelihood of success.428 
421 See National Emissions Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants for Source Categories; 
Organic Hazardous Air Pollutants from the Synthetic Organic Chemical Manufacturing Indus-
try and Other Processes Subject to the Negotiated Rule for Equipment Leaks, 59 Fed. Reg. 
19,402, 19,428-29 (Apr. 22, 1994). 
422 See id. at 19,521 (codified at 40 C.F.R. 63.150(f)(1)(1997». 
423 See, e.g., id. at 19,429 (explaining that most sources will not find a large number of 
opportunities for cost-effective credits). 
424 Kyoto Protocol, supra note 10, art. 17, 37 I.L.M. at 40. 
425 The interpretation of this provision is an open question that the COP hopes to resolve in 
Buenos Aires in November of 1998. See Key Issues Outlinedfor Upcoming Talks on Interna-
tional Emission Trading System, 21 Int'l Envt. Rep. (BNA) 414 (Apr. 29, 1998). 
426 See Negotiators Optimistic on Treaty Including Emissions Trading, Joint Implementa-
tion, Nat'l Env't Daily (BNA), Dec. 5, 1997, available in LEXIS, BNA Library, BNAEVR file 
("[T]he European Union does not want trading to substitute for domestic action to reduce 
greenhouse emissions."); Emission Trading, Joint Implementation Specified in Draft Text for 
Revised Treaty, 28 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1206 (Oct. 17, 1997) (draft contemplates that domestic 
measures "should provide the main means of meeting commitments"). 
427 See Marchant, supra note 234, at 646-47 (discussing the means of estimating carbon dioxide 
emissions). 
428 Accord id. at 650-52 (explaining that other gases are more difficult to monitor), 659--60 
(discussing the problems in estimating the impacts of forestry projects); cf William R. Moomaw, 
Achieving Joint Benefitsfrom Joint Implementation in CRITERIA, supra note 188, at 12 (noting 
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Furthermore, the COP should establish clear rules assigning re-
sponsibility to verify joint implementation credits, integrating joint 
implementation into national planning, assigning specific responsibili-
ties to avoid double counting in advance, and providing for national 
responsibilities and consequences for possible failures. These rules 
should carefully provide for meaningful public participation in the 
process, so that the public can help prevent fraud and abuse. 
In order to facilitate that participation, the COP should require that 
all traders and their governments provide a comprehensive set of 
information to an international clearinghouse.429 This should be de-
signed to help the public monitor and verify any trade occurring 
anywhere in the world, without having to depend upon dozens of 
national governments and private companies for essential informa-
tion. 
4. The Cheap Fix Theory and the Specific Proposal 
These proposals will not appear attractive to those who think of 
trading as a "free lunch." The "free lunch" theory tends to favor an 
objective of maximizing the volume rather than the quality of trades. 
Maximizing the volume of trades will increase the cost savings from 
trading. Indeed, it will do this best if emission reductions are abso-
lutely fraudulent. The cheapest credits will come from double count-
ing, claiming credit for activities that would occur with or without 
trading, or claiming credits for activities that do not, in fact, reduce 
emissions. 
The cheap fix theory calls attention to the full dimensions of the 
problem. First, to the extent trading generates less environmental 
benefit than compliance without trading, it offers not just a cheap fix, 
but a poor cheap fix, like a bad patch job on a homeowner's roof. 
Second, if trading undermines confidence in international agreements, 
slows innovation, interferes substantially with the process of trans-
lating general international goals into specific national commitments, 
and greatly lessens public involvement and accountability, it will un-
dermine progress in confronting environmental issues over time. 
A decision to maximize the volume of trades in this first interna-
tional trading experiment may, in the long run, reduce the use of 
uncertainty about exact amount of greenhouse gas offset in a newly planted forest or energy 
conservation program). 
429 I am indebeted to Professor William Buzbee of the Emory Law School for this idea. 
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trading on the internationalleve1.430 To the extent trading becomes a 
means of avoiding innovation and accountability, it may earn a very 
poor reputation. To the extent it helps reduce the cost of innovation 
and provides a reasonably reliable and flexible means of meeting 
environmental goals, its reputation (which is deservedly mixed) will 
improve. It may always be a cheap fix, but depending on the ground 
rules, it can be either a useful cheap fix that involves only mild conflict 
with long-term goals, or a very bad decision that makes long-term 
progress very difficult. The cheap fix theory helps make this dilemma 
apparent. 
CONCLUSION 
Cheap fix issues deserve more scholarly attention. Emissions trad-
ing, long thought of as a "free lunch," is really a cheap fix. Policy 
makers should take this into account as they address proposals for 
emissions trading. 
430 See AXEL MICHAELOWA, JOINT IMPLEMENTATION OF GREENHOUSE GAS REDUCTIONS 
UNDER CONSIDERATION OF FISCAL AND REGULATORY ALTERNATIVES 21 (1995) (Some saving 
potential must be sacrificed in order to prevent misuse of joint implementation "and so ensure 
its long-term operability."). Some observers cite the Montreal Protocol as precedent for joint 
implementation under the Climate Change Treaty. See JOINT IMPLEMENTATION, supra note 161, 
at 11. The Montreal Protocol does contain some language that resembles the joint implementa-
tion language found in the climate change treaty. See id. at 10 (citing Montreal Protocol, supra 
note 37, art. 2(8)(a». But this provision only applied to trades within the European Union. See 
BENEDICK, supra note 44, at 94-97 (describing the political background). Furthermore, the 
Montreal Protocol allowed transfer of production allowances between countries. See JOINT 
IMPLEMENTATION, supra note 161, at 10. It does not appear that a significant amount of trading 
occurred under these provisions. Email Letter from Michael Graber, Deputy Executive Secre-
tary, Secretariat for the Vienna Convention and the Montreal Protocol, United Nations Envi-
ronment Program to David M. Driesen (June, 30, 1998) (on file with author). Hence, while 
commentators are correct to state that some legal precedent exists for joint implementation 
under the climate change treaty, little significant practical experience with emissions trading 
resulted. 
